(46i) The Need for a Unified Process Safety Map

Knowing Where You're Going -- The
Need for a Unified Process Safety Map

teddy.bucher@cognascents.com

Keywords: Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), Process
Safety Management (PSM), Process Safety Information (PSI), effective
communication, Independent Protection Layers (IPL), Hazard and Operability
Study (HAZOP), hazard identification, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), risk
assessment, risk management.

Abstract

Since the passage of the OSHA Process Safety Mandate, the
various methods of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) have become commonplace. Process
Safety Management (PSM) systems and the corresponding Process Safety Information
(PSI) that feed into them have proliferated and permeated numerous aspects of
production companies. As this has occurred, constituent groups within those
companies have further developed the specific subsets of PSI relevant to them,
yielding data sets that are increasingly useful and that allow them to operate
more efficiently.

Yet with every PHA revalidation cycle, approaches in both
preparation and execution frequently tend to concern themselves with the
immediate - the presence of the direct inputs needed for the hazard analysis
and the production of the direct outputs of the analysis. Viewing these
separate components of PSM as distinct elements has a tendency to result in little
consideration being given to the overall quality of the inputs, with the
assumption that issues with the design of the input will be captured on the
next revalidation cycle for that input. This approach of separate revalidation
cycles for each element can be effective for the capture of design changes
arising from major modifications to the process itself. However, it can also
introduce the possibility for multiple changes to be made to a system in
parallel, potentially rendering the input inadequate. It also overlooks the
possibility that changes to one element of a PSM program could introduce new
demands on another element previously thought to be adequate.

The authors posit that implementation of a unified process
safety map that reflects the true interconnected nature of the various elements
of a PSM program would minimize this potential for systemic error and allow for
a more efficient PSM system. In this paper, the authors discuss the structure
of an effective PSM program which utilizes a process safety map. This map would
highlight how common PSM elements serve as both inputs to and outputs from the
same processes through comprehensive communication of changes throughout the
whole PSM program. In addition, the authors also provide examples of breakdowns
in communication of PSI to illustrate the importance of a PSM program which
continually improves as a whole, as a result of modifications to only one part
of the program.

The target audience for this paper includes project managers,
project engineers, EH&S managers, PSM coordinators, and operators; however,
anyone involved with small or large capital projects may also benefit from this
paper's content.