The Risk Analysis Screening Tool
RAST Manual

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Purpose

This document provides a reference for using the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) software and for RAST users who have attended classroom training in a RAST workshop. This manual is available on the RAST/CHEF website [1].

Please refer to the Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) Guide for the conceptual methods and mathematical techniques that are used in the RAST software [1].

Feedback Request

Please provide feedback or comments on the content of this document to the RAST Committee, via the CCPS RAST/CHEF website [1].

Revision History

This manual's history is located at the end of this document.

Acknowledgments

The Dow Chemical Company originally donated the Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) and the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) software and manuals to CCPS in 2015. At Dow, Kevin Shaughnessy and Kevin Hersey did much of the early RAST workbook development. CCPS has supported the enhancements and generalization of the software and the development of the supporting documents and training. Ken First, who began RAST's technical development at Dow, has led this updating effort as a CCPS Consultant since 2017. Dr. Bruce K. Vaughen at CCPS has been supporting Ken during this period. Appreciation is extended to the CCPS project subcommittees who originally created the enormous reference library, including many of the figures and tables found in CHEF and RAST. Special appreciation is extended to the users of CHEF and RAST, as well. Their concerns and insightful questions continue to provide inspiration and direction as the software and concepts within it continue to evolve.

Disclaimer

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Table of Contents

Figure List

Table List

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIChE	American Institute of Chemical Engineers
API	American Petroleum Institute
BLEVE	Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
CCPS	Center for Chemical Process Safety (of AIChE)
CEI	Chemical Exposure Index (Dow Chemical)
CHEF	Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals
CPQRA	Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Assessment
EPA	US Environmental Protection Agency
ERPG	Emergency Response Planning Guideline
ETA	Event Tree Analysis
F&EI	Fire and Explosion Index (Dow Chemical)
HAZOP	Hazard and Operability Study
HIRA	Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis
IPL	Independent Protection Layer
LFL	Lower Flammable Limit
LOPA	Layer of Protection Analysis
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MALR	Maximum Allowable Leak Rate
MART	Maximum Allowable Response Rate
MAWP	Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
OSHA	US Occupational Safety and Health Administration
QRA	Quantitative Risk Analysis
RBPS	Risk Based Process Safety
SDS	Safety Data Sheet
SIS	Safety Instrumented System

Glossary

This Glossary contains some of the common terms in this guide and some of the relevant process safety-related terms from the CCPS Process Safety Glossary. The terms in this guideline are current at the time of publication; refer to the CCPS website for updates to the CCPS Process Safety Glossary.

Term	Definition
Aerosol Fraction	The fraction of liquid phase, 1 - x, which, after flashing to the atmosphere, remains suspended as an aerosol.
ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable; the concept that efforts to reduce risk should be continued until the incremental sacrifice (in terms of cost, time, effort, or other expenditure of resources) is grossly disproportionate to the incremental risk reduction achieved.
Asset integrity	The condition of an asset that is properly designed and installed in accordance with specifications and remains fit for purpose. (Note: The term "Mechanical Integrity" was being used at the time of the RAST software development. Discussions and references to "Mechanical Integrity" in this Manual and the RAST software are equivalent to the term "Asset Integrity" at the time of publication [3])
Atmospheric Storage Tank	A storage tank designed to operate at any pressure between ambient pressure and 0.5 psig (3.45kPa gage).
Barrier	A control measure or grouping of control elements that on its own can prevent a threat developing into a top event (prevention barrier) or can mitigate the consequences of a top event once it has occurred (mitigation barrier). A barrier must be effective, independent, and auditable. See also Degradation Control. (Other possible names: Control, Independent Protection Layer, Risk Reduction Measure).
Blast Wave	The overpressure wave traveling outward from an explosion point.
Boiling-Liquid-Expanding-Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)	A type of rapid phase transition in which a liquid contained above its atmospheric boiling point is rapidly depressurized, causing a nearly instantaneous transition from liquid to vapor with a corresponding energy release. A BLEVE of flammable material is often accompanied by a large aerosol fireball, since an external fire impinging on the vapor space of a pressure vessel is a common cause. However, it is not necessary for the liquid to be flammable to have a BLEVE occur.
Bow Tie Model	A risk diagram showing how various threats can lead to a loss of control of a hazard and allow this unsafe condition to develop into a number of undesired consequences. The diagram can show all the barriers and degradation controls deployed.
Cause	An event, situation, or condition which results, or could result (Potential Cause), directly or indirectly in an accident or incident.

Term	Definition
Checklist Analysis	A hazard evaluation procedure using one or more pre-prepared lists of process safety considerations to prompt team discussions of whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
Chemical Process Industry	The phrase is used loosely to include facilities which manufacture, handle, and use chemicals.
Combustible Dust	A finely divided combustible particulate solid that presents a flash fire hazard or explosion hazard when suspended in air or the process specific oxidizing medium over a range of concentrations.
Condensed Phase Explosion	An explosion that occurs when the material is present in the form of a liquid or solid.
Conditional Modifier	One of several possible probabilities included in scenario risk calculations, generally when risk criteria endpoints are expressed in impact terms (e.g., fatalities) instead of in primary loss event terms (e.g., release, vessel rupture). Conditional modifiers include but are not limited to: probability of a hazardous atmosphere, probability of ignition, probability of explosion, probability of personnel presence, probability of injury or fatality, and probability of equipment damage or other financial impact.
Conduct of Operations (COO)	The embodiment of an organization's values and principles in management systems that are developed, implemented, and maintained to (1) structure operational tasks in a manner consistent with the organization's risk tolerance, (2) ensure that every task is performed deliberately and correctly, and (3) minimize variations in performance.
Confined Explosion (or Building Explosion)	An explosion of fuel-oxidant mixture inside a closed system (e.g. vessel or building).
Consequence	The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.
Consequence Analysis	The analysis of the expected effects of incident outcome cases, independent of frequency or probability.
De Minimis Risk	A level of risk that would be perceived by most to be broadly acceptable, and not requiring further reduction.
Deadheading	A blockage on the discharge side of an operating pump which results in the flow reducing to zero and an increase in the discharge pressure. The energy input from the deadheaded pump increases the temperature and pressure of the fluid in the pump.

Term	Definition
Deflagration	A combustion that propagates by heat and mass transfer through the un-reacted medium at a velocity less than the speed of sound.
Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT)	The transition phenomenon resulting from the acceleration of a deflagration flame to detonation via flame-generated turbulent flow and compressive heating effects. At the instant of transition a volume of pre-compressed, turbulent gas ahead of the flame front detonates at unusually high velocity and overpressure.
Detonation	A release of energy caused by the propagation of a chemical reaction in which the reaction front advances into the unreacted substance at greater than sonic velocity in the unreacted material.
Dike	An embankment or wall built to act as a barrier blocking passage of liquids to surrounding areas.
Dispersion Models	Mathematical models that characterize the transport of toxic/flammable materials released to the air and/or the water.
Dose	Time-integrated concentration.
Effect Models	Models that predict effects of incident outcomes usually with respect to human injury or fatality or property damage.
Effect Zone	For an incident that produces an incident outcome of toxic release, the area over which the airborne concentration equals or exceeds some level of concern. For a flammable release, the area over which a particular incident outcome case produces an effect based on a specified criterion. For a loss of containment incident producing thermal effects, the area over which a particular incident outcome case produces an effect based on a specified radiative heat stress limit.
Enabling Condition	A condition that is not a failure, error or a protection layer but makes it possible for an incident sequence to proceed to a consequence of concern. It consists of a condition or operating phase that does not directly cause the scenario, but that must be present or active in order for the scenario to proceed to a loss event; expressed as a dimensionless probability.
Event	An occurrence involving a process that is caused by equipment performance or human action or by an occurrence external to the process.
Event Sequence	A specific unplanned sequence of events composed of initiating events and intermediate events that may lead to an incident.
Explosion	A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.

Term	Definition
Failure	An unacceptable difference between expected and observed performance.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis	A hazard identification technique in which all known failure modes of components or features of a system are considered in turn, and undesired outcomes are noted.
Failure Rate (or Failure Frequency)	The number of failure events that occur divided by the total elapsed operating time during which these events occur or by the total number of demands, as applicable.
Flammable Liquids	Any liquid that has a closed-cup flash point below 100 °F (37.8 °C), as determined by the test procedures described in NFPA 30 and a Reid vapor pressure not exceeding 40 psia (2068.6 mm Hg) at 100°F (37.8 °C), as determined by ASTM D 323, Standard Method of Test for Vapor Pressure of Petroleum Products (Reid Method). Class IA liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73 °F (22.8 °C) and boiling points below 100 F (37.8 °C). Class IB liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points below 73°F (22.8 °C) and boiling points at or above 100 °F (37.8 °C). Class IC liquids shall include those liquids that have flash points at or above 73 °F (22.8 °C), but below 100 °F (37.8 °C) [2].
Flammable Limits	The minimum and maximum concentration of fuel vapor or gas in a fuel vapor or gas/gaseous oxidant mixture (usually expressed in percent by volume) defining the concentration range (flammable or explosive range) over which propagation of flame will occur on contact with an ignition source.
Flash Fire	A fire that spreads by means of a flame front rapidly through a diffuse fuel, such as a dust, gas, or the vapors of an ignitable liquid, without the production of damaging pressure.
Fireball	The atmospheric burning of a fuel-air cloud in which the energy is mostly emitted in the form of radiant heat. The inner core of the fuel release consists of almost pure fuel whereas the outer layer in which ignition first occurs is a flammable fuel-air mixture. As buoyancy forces of the hot gases begin to dominate, the burning cloud rises and becomes more spherical in shape.
Frequency	Number of occurrences of an event per unit time (e.g., 1 event in 1000 yr. = 1 x 10-3 events/yr.).
Grounding	The process of connecting one or more conductive objects to ground so that each is at the same potential as the earth. By convention, the earth has zero potential. In practice, grounding is the process of providing a sufficiently small resistance to ground so that a static hazard cannot be created at the maximum credible charging current to a system.
Hazard	An operation, activity, or material with the potential to cause harm to people, property, the environment or business; or simply, a potential source of harm.

Term	Definition
Hazard Analysis	The identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and usually the estimation of the consequences.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)	A systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. A HAZOP is used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guide words. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards
Hazard Evaluation	Identification of individual hazards of a system, determination of the mechanisms by which they could give rise to undesired events, and evaluation of the consequences of these events on health (including public health), environment, and property. Uses qualitative techniques to pinpoint weaknesses in the design and operation of facilities that could lead to incidents.
Hazard Identification	Part of the Hazards Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) method in which the material and energy hazards of the process, along with the siting and layout of the facility, are identified so that a risk analysis can be performed on potential incident scenarios.
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA)	A collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance.
Hazard Zone	For an incident that produces an outcome such as toxic release, the hazard zone is the area over which the airborne concentration equals or exceeds some level of concern. For a flammable release, the area of effect is based on a specified level of thermal radiation. For a release that results in explosion, this is the area defined by specified overpressure levels.
Hot Work	Any operation that uses flames or can produce sparks (e.g., welding).
Human Factors	A discipline concerned with designing machines, operations, and work environments so that they match human capabilities, limitations, and needs. Includes any technical work (engineering, procedure writing, worker training, worker selection, etc.) related to the human factor in operator-machine systems.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)	A method used to evaluate whether system-required human-actions, tasks, or jobs will be completed successfully within a required time period. Also used to determine the probability that no extraneous human actions detrimental to the system will be performed.

Term	Definition
Impact	A measure of the ultimate loss and harm of a loss event. Note: Impact may be expressed as the number of injuries and/or fatalities, the extent of the environmental damage, or the magnitude of the loss, such as property damage, material loss, production loss, market share loss, and recovery costs.
Incident	An event, or series of events, resulting in one or more undesirable consequences, such as harm to people, damage to the environment, or asset/business losses. Such events include fires, explosions, releases of toxic or otherwise harmful substances, and so forth.
Incident Investigation	A systematic approach for determining the causes of an incident and developing recommendations that address the causes to help prevent or mitigate future incidents.
Incident Outcome (or Outcome)	The physical manifestation of the incident: for toxic materials, the incident outcome is a toxic release, while for flammable materials; the incident outcome could be a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), flash fire, vapor cloud explosion (VCE), etc. For example, the incident outcome for a leak of chlorine from a railcar is a toxic release.
Individual Risk	The risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. This includes the nature of the injury to the individual, the likelihood of the injury occurring, and the time period over which the injury might occur.
Inherently Safer	A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations used in the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is permanent and inseparable from the process.
Initiating Event (or Initiating Cause)	The operational error, mechanical failure, or external event or agency that is the first event in an incident sequence and marks the transition from a normal situation to an abnormal situation.
Interlock	A protective response which is initiated by an out-of-limit process condition. Instrument which will not allow one part of a process to function unless another part is functioning. A device such as a switch that prevents a piece of equipment from operating when a hazard exists. To join two parts together in such a way that they remain rigidly attached to each other solely by physical interference. A device to prove the physical state of a required condition and to furnish that proof to the primary safety control circuit.
Jet Fire	A fire type resulting from the discharge of liquid, vapor, or gas into free space from an orifice, the momentum of which induces the surrounding atmosphere to mix with the discharged material

Term	Definition
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)	An approach that analyzes one incident scenario (cause-consequence pair) at a time, using predefined values for the initiating event frequency, independent protection layer failure probabilities, and consequence severity, in order to compare a scenario risk estimate to risk criteria for determining where additional risk reduction or more detailed analysis is needed. Scenarios are identified elsewhere, typically using a scenario-based hazard evaluation procedure such as a HAZOP Study.
Level of Concern	The concentration of an airborne chemical above which there may be adverse human health effects experience as a result of a short-term exposure during an episodic release.
Likelihood	A measure of the expected probability or frequency of occurrence of an event. This may be expressed as an event frequency (e.g., events per year), a probability of occurrence during a time interval (e.g., annual probability) or a conditional probability (e.g., probability of occurrence, given that a precursor event has occurred).
Lockout/Tagout	A safe work practice in which energy sources are positively blocked away from a segment of a process with a locking mechanism and visibly tagged as such to help ensure worker safety during maintenance and some operations tasks.
Loss Event	Point in time in an abnormal situation when an irreversible physical event occurs that has the potential for loss and harm impacts. Examples include release of a hazardous material, ignition of flammable vapors or ignitable dust cloud, and over-pressurization rupture of a tank or vessel. An incident might involve more than one loss event, such as a flammable liquid spill (first loss event) followed by ignition of a flash fire and pool fire (second loss event) that heats up an adjacent vessel and its contents to the point of rupture (third loss event).
Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC)	An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from primary containment, including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO_2, or compressed air).
Management of Change (MOC)	A management system to identify, review, and approve all modifications to equipment, procedures, raw materials, and processing conditions, other than replacement in kind, prior to implementation to help ensure that changes to processes are properly analyzed (for example, for potential adverse impacts), documented, and communicated to employees affected.
Management System	A formally established set of activities designed to produce specific results in a consistent manner on a sustainable basis.

Term	Definition
Mechanical Integrity	A management system focused on ensuring that equipment is designed, installed, and maintained to perform the desired function. (Note: The term "Mechanical Integrity" was being used at the time of the RAST software development. Discussions and references to "Mechanical Integrity" in this Manual and the RAST software are equivalent to the updated term "Asset Integrity" at the time of publication [3])
Mitigation	Lessening the risk of an accident event sequence by acting on the source in a preventive way by reducing the likelihood of occurrence of the event, or in a protective way by reducing the magnitude of the event and/or the exposure of local persons or property.
Mitigation Barrier	A barrier located on the right-hand side of a Bow Tie diagram lying between the top event and a consequence. It might only reduce a consequence, not necessarily terminate the sequence before the consequence occurs (Other possible names: Reactive Barrier, Recovery Measure).
Near-Miss	An event in which an accident (that is, property damage, environmental impact, or human loss) or an operational interruption could have plausibly resulted if circumstances had been slightly different.
Node	Sections of equipment with definite boundaries (e.g., a line between two vessels) within which process parameters are investigated for deviations. The locations on P&IDs at which the process parameters are investigated for deviations (e.g., a reactor). The concept of dividing a process into nodes for analysis is commonly, but not exclusively, used in HAZOPs.
Occupant Vulnerability	Proportion of building occupants that could potentially suffer an injury or fatality if a postulated event were to occur. The level of injury is defined according to the technical basis of the occupant vulnerability model being used.
Off-Site Population	Persons located outside of the site property line that may be impacted by an on-site incident.
On-Site Population	Employees, contractors, visitors, service providers, and others present at the facility.
Operating Limits	The values or ranges of values within which the process parameters normally should be maintained when operating. These values are usually associated with preserving product quality or operating the process efficiently; however, they may also incorporate the safe upper and lower limits of the process, or other important limits.
Operating Procedures	Written, step-by-step instructions and information necessary to operate equipment, compiled in one document including operating instructions, process descriptions, operating limits, chemical hazards, and safety equipment requirements.

Term	Definition
Operational Discipline (OD)	The performance of all tasks correctly every time. Individuals demonstrate their commitment to process safety through OD, executing the organization's Conduct of Operation (COO) RBPS Element each and every day.
Operational Readiness	A management system element associated with efforts to ensure that a process is ready for start-up/restart. This element applies to a variety of restart situations, ranging from restart after a brief maintenance outage to restart of a process that has been mothballed for several years.
Organizational Change	Any change in position or responsibility within an organization or any change to an organizational structure, policy, or procedure that affects process safety.
Organizational Change Management (OCM)	A method of examining proposed changes in the structure or organization of a company (or unit thereof) to determine whether they may pose a threat to employee or contractor health and safety, the environment, or the surrounding populace.
OSHA Process Safety Management (OSHA PSM)	A U.S. regulatory standard that requires use of a 14-element management system to help prevent or mitigate the effects of catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from processes covered by the regulations 49 CFR 1910.119.
Oxidant	Any gaseous material that can react with a fuel (either gas, dust, or mist) to produce combustion. Oxygen in air is the most common oxidant.
Performance Standard	Measurable statement, expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the performance required of a system, equipment item, person or procedure (that may be part or all of a barrier), and that is relied upon as a basis for managing a hazard. The term includes aspects of functionality, reliability, availability, and survivability.
Physical Explosion	The catastrophic rupture of a pressurized vessel or equipment which may result in fragments or projectiles and a blast pressure wave.
Pool Fire	The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid at the base of the fire.
Potential Explosion Site (PES)	A volume within a plant with sufficient congestion and/or confinement that a flammable vapor cloud ignited there could likely develop into an explosion.
Pressure Relief Valve (PRV)	A pressure relief device which is designed to reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored.
Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)	See Pressure Relief Valve

Term	Definition
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)	A systematic and thorough check of a process prior to the introduction of a highly hazardous chemical to a process. The PSSR must confirm the following: Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications; Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; A process hazard analysis has been performed for new facilities and recommendations and have been resolved or implemented before startup, and modified facilities meet the management of change requirements; and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.
Prevention Barrier	A barrier located on the left-hand side of Bow Tie diagram and lies between a threat and the top event. It must have the capability on its own to terminate completely a threat sequence. (Other possible name: Proactive Barrier).
Preventive Maintenance	Maintenance that seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of unplanned shutdowns by establishing a fixed schedule of routine inspection and repairs.
Probability	The expression for the likelihood of occurrence of an event or an event sequence during an interval of time, or the likelihood of success or failure of an event on test or on demand. Probability is expressed as a dimensionless number ranging from 0 to 1.
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)	An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with processes and operations to enable their control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate recommendations are developed. Occasionally, quantitative methods are used to help prioritize risk reduction.
Process Knowledge Management	A management system element that includes work activities to gather, organize, maintain, and provide information to other management system elements. Process safety knowledge primarily consists of written documents such as hazard information, process technology information, and equipment-specific information. Process safety knowledge is the product of this management system.
Process Safety	A disciplined framework for managing the integrity of operating systems and processes handling hazardous substances by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating practices. It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy. Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire, or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injuries, property damage, lost production, and environmental impact.
Process Safety Culture	The common set of values, behaviors, and norms at all levels in a facility or in the wider organization that affect process safety.

Term	Definition
Process Safety Incident/Event	An event that is potentially catastrophic, i.e., an event involving the release/loss of containment of hazardous materials that can result in large-scale health and environmental consequences.
Process Safety Information (PSI)	Physical, chemical, and toxicological information related to the chemicals, process, and equipment. It is used to document the configuration of a process, its characteristics, its limitations, and as data for process hazard analyses.
Process Safety Management (PSM)	A management system that is focused on prevention of, preparedness for, mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or energy from a process associated with a facility.
Process Safety Management Systems	Comprehensive sets of policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure that barriers to episodic incidents are in place, in use, and effective.
Protection Layer	A concept whereby a device, system, or human action is provided to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of a specific loss event.
Qualitative Risk Analysis	Based primarily on description and comparison using historical experience and engineering judgment, with little quantification of the hazards, consequences, likelihood, or level of risk.
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)	The systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and severity of potential incidents associated with a facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques.
Reactive Chemical	A substance that can pose a chemical reactivity hazard by readily oxidizing in air without an ignition source (spontaneously combustible or peroxide forming), initiating or promoting combustion in other materials (oxidizer), reacting with water, or self-reacting (polymerizing, decomposing or rearranging). Initiation of the reaction can be spontaneous, by energy input such as thermal or mechanical energy, or by catalytic action increasing the reaction rate.
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP)	A term originally used by the US OSHA, stems from the selection and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents.
Reliability	Core attribute of a protection layer related to the probability that the equipment operates according to its specification for a stated period of time under all relevant conditions.

Term	Definition
Responsible Care©	An initiative implemented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) in 1988 to assist in leading chemical processing industry companies in ethical ways that increasingly benefit society, the economy and the environment while adhering to ten key principles.
Risk	A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury or loss. A simplified version of this relationship expresses risk as the product of the Frequency and the Consequence of an incident (i.e., Risk = Frequency x Consequence).
Risk Analysis	The estimation of scenario, process, facility and/or organizational risk by identifying potential incident scenarios, then evaluating and combining the expected frequency and impact of each scenario having a consequence of concern, then summing the scenario risks if necessary to obtain the total risk estimate for the level at which the risk analysis is being performed.
Risk Assessment	The process by which the results of a risk analysis (i.e., risk estimates) are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with risk targets.
Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)	The Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) risk-based approach that uses risk-based strategies and implementation tactics that are commensurate with the risk-based need for process safety activities, availability of resources, and existing process safety culture to design, correct, and improve process safety management activities.
Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule	EPA's accidental release prevention Rule, which requires covered facilities to prepare, submit, and implement a risk management plan.
Risk Matrix	A tabular approach for presenting risk tolerance criteria, typically involving graduated scales of incident likelihood on the Y-axis and incident consequences on the X-Axis. Each cell in the table (at intersecting values of incident likelihood and incident consequences) represents a particular level of risk.
Risk Tolerance Criteria	A predetermined measure of risk used to aid decisions about whether further efforts to reduce the risk are warranted.
Root Cause	A fundamental, underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred that identifies a correctable failure(s) in management systems. There is typically more than one root cause for every process safety incident.
Safe Operating Limits	Limits established for critical process parameters, such as temperature, pressure, level, flow, or concentration, based on a combination of equipment design limits and the dynamics of the process.

Term	Definition
Safeguard	Design features, equipment, procedures, etc. in place to decrease the probability or mitigate the severity of a cause-consequence scenario.
Safety Critical Element	Any part of an installation, plant or computer program whose failure will either cause or contribute to a major accident, or the purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident. Safety Critical Elements are typically barriers or parts of barriers. In the context of this book, safety includes harm to people, property and the environment. (Other possible names: Safety and Environmental Critical Element, Safety Critical Equipment).
Safety Instrumented Function	A system composed of servers, logic servers, and final control elements for the purpose of taking the process to a safe state when predetermined conditions are violated.
Safety Instrumented System (SIS)	A separate and independent combination of sensors, logic solvers, final elements, and support systems that are designed and managed to achieve a specified safety integrity level. A SIS may implement one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs).
Safety Integrity Level (SIL)	Discrete level (one out of four) allocated to the SIF for specifying the safety integrity requirements to be achieved by the SIS.
Screening Tool	A simplified model with limited capabilities, suitable for screening-level studies.
Severity	The maximum credible consequences or effects, assuming no safeguards are in place.
Societal Risk	A measure of risk to a group of people. It is most often expressed in terms of the frequency distribution of multiple casualty events.
Source Term	The release parameters (e.g. magnitude, rate, duration, orientation, temperature) that are the initial conditions for determining the consequences of the loss event for a hazardous material and/or energy release to the surroundings. For vapor dispersion modeling, it is the estimation, based on the release specification, of the actual cloud conditions of temperature, aerosol content, density, size, velocity, and mass to be input into the dispersion model.
Sustainability	Meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
Tolerable Risk Level	The maximum level of risk of a particular technical process or condition that is regarded as tolerable in the context of the circumstances in questions.
Top Event	The loss event or other undesired event at the top of a fault tree that is traced downward to more basic failures using Boolean logic gates to determine its possible causes.

Term	Definition
Toxic Dose	The combination of concentration and time for inhalation of a toxic gas that produces a specific harmful effect.
Uncertainty	A measure, often quantitative, of the degree of doubt or lack of certainty associated with an estimate of the true value of a parameter.
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)	The explosion resulting from the ignition of a cloud of flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant overpressure.
Worst Case Consequence	A conservative (high) estimate of the consequences of the most severe accident identified. For example, the assumption that the entire contents of a contained volume of toxic material is released to the most vulnerable area in such a way (all at once or continuous) as to have the maximum effect on the public or employees in that area. The contained volume could be chosen as the containers and pipes between shutoff valves or the entire process unit but probably not the entire plant.
Worst Case Scenario	A release involving a hazardous material that would result in the worst (most severe) off-site consequences.

Preface

The Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) Guide focuses on understanding of hazards and risks while providing an overview of methods, techniques and models commonly used in a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study. Guidance is also provided as to which methods have been selected to use in addition to limitations. These same methods and models are used in the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) workbook to assist HIRA study teams and organize study information. Many of the models and methods used in CHEF and RAST come from the open literature and several are derived from relatively simple material and energy balances. However, quantitative results within a Hazard Analysis and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study are highly uncertain due to the extreme complexity of most scenarios. The intent of CHEF and RAST is to provide possible and *consistent* results (but not necessarily certain or accurate results) so that risk may be compared to other scenarios or a company's risk tolerance criteria. The default values used in the software for the RAST and CHEF tools are examples and not necessarily values agreed upon across the industry. In most cases, Users are able to enter different values rather than use the defaults (see Disclaimer). This document does not include the derivation of most equations. For this additional detail, the reader should go to the references listed.

HIRA is one of two elements with the Understanding Hazards and Risks pillar of CCPS Risk Based Process Safety (the other being Process Knowledge Management). CHEF and RAST align with many of the 20 Risk Based Process Safety elements. Under the pillar of Commitment to Process Safety, CHEF and RAST support Compliance with Standards and development of Process Safety Competency. The methods and techniques described within CHEF and utilized in RAST may help in Incident Investigation and other aspects of the Learning from Experience pillar. Finally, the Manage Risk pillar describes elements which sustain and improve process safety performance following the implementation of recommendations from a HIRA study.

Both qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques are included in CHEF based on overall utility and ease of application. These estimates are used to help study teams make well-informed process safety decisions, such as

- the level of detail to be considered,
- if sufficient safeguards or protections have been implemented to meet a company's tolerable risk criteria, or
- if the chemical operations should be drastically altered to reduce risk or discontinued.

Often during consequence analysis, data will be used in understanding and designing systems to minimize risk to people, the environment, and the business. Typically, conservative values are selected for various characteristics and modeling parameters. By doing so, a conservative modeling result is obtained and can be translated into engineering solutions intended to address process risk with a safety margin. It is important, however, to consider the result of all of the conservative assumptions in total. Conservatism on top of conservatism can result in an unrealistic estimation of consequence and risk. Selecting values that are conservative, and still realistic, is the intended approach.

To illustrate conservative modeling, consider a problem requiring an estimate of the gas discharge rate from a hole in a storage tank. This discharge rate will be used to estimate the downwind concentrations of the gas, with the intent on estimating the toxicological impact. The discharge rate is dependent on a number of parameters, including (1) the hole area (2) the pressure within and outside the tank (3) the physical properties of the gas, and (4) the temperature of the gas, to name a few. The reality of the situation is that the maximum discharge rate of gas will occur when the leak first occurs, with the discharge rate decreasing as a function of time as the pressure within the tank decreases. The complete dynamic solution to this problem is difficult, requiring a mass discharge model cross-coupled to a material balance on the contents of

the tank. An equation of state (perhaps nonideal) is required to determine the tank pressure given the total mass. Complicated temperature effects are also possible. A modelling effort of this detail is not necessarily required to estimate the consequence. A much simpler procedure is to calculate the maximum mass discharge rate, assuming a fixed temperature and pressure within the tank. The actual discharge rate at later times will typically be less, and the resulting downwind concentrations will also be less. In this fashion a conservative result is ensured.

CHEF is organized into HIRA work-flow steps based on key questions. Additional training from AIChE and CCPS on the various topics covered in CHEF are summarized as follows:

What are the Hazards? **What can go Wrong?** **How Bad could it Be?** **How Often might it Happen?** **Is the Risk Tolerable?** *How is Tolerable Risk Sustained over Time?*

| Select Equipment or Activity to be Analyzed | Identify Chemical and Process Hazards | Develop Scenarios | Analyze Consequences | Estimate Frequency | Analyze Risk | Implement Additional Safeguards as Needed | Sustain Performance for Life Cycle of Facility |

Relation to other AIChE/CCPS Training available

CH 910 – Foundations of Process Safety

CH 166 – Hazard Identification for Operations and Maintenance Workers

ELA 951– Hazard Recognition **ELA 963** – Fire Hazards

ELA 961 – Toxicological Hazards **ELA 962** – Chemical Reactivity Hazards

CH 157 – HAZOP Studies and Other PHA Techniques for Process Safety and Risk Management

ELA 970– Hazards and Risks – What can go Wrong?

ELS 104– HAZOP Studies **S8** – PHA/HAZOP of Procedures

CH 754 – Advanced Concepts for Process Hazard Analysis

CH 800 – Inherently Safer Design

ELA 695– Source Models **ELA 697**– Atmospheric Dispersion

ELA 109 – Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

ELA 971– Introduction to Pressure Protection

ELA 973– Safeguards other than Relief Systems

ELS 105 – Process Safety Management Overview

The Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) builds upon the concepts and methods from CHEF and may be used to help HIRA study teams be more productive. This workbook stores key chemical process information, chemical properties, potential hazard scenarios to build upon, consequence estimates, risk analysis results, and team recommendations. This information may then be used to compare risk to other chemical operations or corporate guidelines and evaluate safeguards or protective layers.

1   Introduction

1.1   Intended Audience

The intended audience for Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) software is personnel performing Screening Level Hazard Evaluation or Risk Analysis (such as a Layer of Protection Analysis) for existing and future manufacturing facilities including:

- Manufacturing personnel
- Research and Development Engineers
- Process Engineers
- Other Process Safety roles

1.2   RAST Manual Objectives

The overall objective for the RAST manual is to:

- Develop familiarity with the RAST tool such that Evaluation Teams with the help of Facilitators and Process Safety personnel should be able to perform *screening level* Hazard and Risk Evaluations.
- Provide an example problem so that users understand the limitations of this tool and when to utilize more advanced methods or to engage a Subject Matter Expert.

1.3   Sections

There are nine sections included in the Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) Manual including:

1. Introduction
2. Getting Started with RAST
3. Chemical Properties
4. Evaluation of Reactivity Hazards
5. Additional Inputs and Reports
6. Scenario Development
7. Layer of Protection Analysis
8. Case Study
9. Wrap-up

1.4   Process Risk Management

Process Risk is a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss resulting from an incident in terms of both likelihood and magnitude of the loss or injury. Risk Management is the systematic application of management policies and procedures in analyzing, assessing, and controlling risk. It utilizes both *Risk Analysis* and *Risk Assessment.* Process Risk management is intended to continuously improve safety, health, and environmental performance of manufacturing plants over the long term by addressing risk to people, property, and the environment. RAST supports risk analysis in providing a consistent evaluation based on a company's specific criteria.

1.5 What is RAST?

RAST is a collection of process safety and risk analysis screening tools used to assist when performing a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study that draws upon common input information. Included are:

- Dow Fire and Explosion Index (FEI)
- Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI)
- Reaction Hazards Evaluation
- Identification of Common Scenarios
- Hazards and Consequence Evaluation Summary
- Relief Device Effluent Screening
- Risk Analysis (modified Layer of Protection Analysis or LOPA)

RAST is intended as a productivity tool to aid evaluation teams in performing Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) studies providing consistency among analysis teams while reinforcing company protocol and criteria. It utilizes simplified and often empirical methods in quantifying hazards, consequences, and risk. These methods have been quality checked and reasonably correlate to complex algorithms of other commercially developed software

RAST bridges the gap between qualitative and detailed quantitative risk evaluation and allows application of greater rigor and detail for high risk scenarios (Figure 1-1). In some cases, other software or rigorous evaluation methods may be needed beyond the capability of RAST to meet a company's risk analysis requirements. For these cases, RAST accommodates the entry of results from other software or methods (including qualitative estimates) in the overall study.

Figure 1-1 Hierarchy of Risk Analysis Methods

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis is a collective term that encompasses all activities involved in identifying hazards and evaluating risk at facilities, throughout their life cycle, to make certain that risks to employees, the public, or the environment are consistently controlled within the organization's risk tolerance [4]. RAST is based on a suggested HIRA work process (Figure 1-2) to answer basic questions involving:

Figure 1-2 Overall Work Process Steps for Hazard Evaluation and Risk Analysis

- What are the Hazards?
- What can go Wrong?
- How Bad can it be?
- How Often might it happen?
- Is the Risk Tolerable?

RAST and the accompanying Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) materials are based on performing HIRA tasks in a specific order. The order of task execution is based on an overall work flow such that results of a specific estimate (such as a source model) being available as input for the subsequent task (such as vapor dispersion). RAST is set up to use minimal information to get started with the addition of more information over time to improve the analysis and generate additional reports.

The overall Work Process for HIRA within RAST includes:

Identify the Equipment or Activity for the analysis. RAST uses the operation of a specific equipment item containing a specific chemical or chemical mixture to define the activity. For example, the operation of a storage tank, a reactor, a piping network, etc. Inputs are chemical data, equipment design information, operating conditions, and plant layout.

Identify Chemical and Process Hazards or "inherent chemical or physical characteristics that have the potential for causing damage to people, property, or the environment". RAST considers both Chemical and Operational related hazards. Chemical Hazards include flammability, toxicity, corrosivity, and reactivity (stored chemical energy). Operational Hazards include stored pressure-volume energy, high or low temperature (potential for thermal burns) and, to some extent, electrical conductivity (potential for static discharge). RAST contains administrative screening parameters (such as flash point for consideration of flammability hazard, ERPG-3 concentration for consideration of toxicity hazard, etc.) to aid in determining what hazards to consider,

RAST contains a data table of chemical properties (for 250 chemicals as of the date of this manual) that are used for quantifying hazards and in source models to determine leak rate. Users may enter properties for additional chemicals as needed in the HIRA study. There are several limitations relative to chemical properties, the most significant being that vapors are addressed as ideal gases and thermodynamic properties are correlated as simple linear relationship with temperature. Some source models for chemical processes operating near the critical point (critical temperature and critical pressure) will be less accurate than processes operating at or below the normal boiling point.

Each company has the ability to update the default screening parameters provided on hidden worksheets within RAST to utilize their specific criteria. CCPS does not endorse any specific criteria but provides initial values needed for the program to run and for the company to consider.

If hazard severity is considered reasonably low, then a HIRA study may not be required (in other words "screened out"), provided there is no regulatory or other requirement. In that case the RAST Hazard Summary Report may be used to document why the study team considers the hazard to be low.

Development of Scenarios involves "a detailed description of an unplanned event or incident sequence that results in a loss event and its associated impacts, including the success or failure of safeguards involved in the incident sequence". In addition to Cause (or Initiating Event) and Consequence (or Incident Outcome), a RAST scenario contains one unique Loss Event. Details of the Loss Event help clarify the event sequence for the analysis team. In addition, the Loss Event is linked to a specific Source Term that allows RAST to perform a simple Consequence Analysis.

It should be noted that a RAST scenario contains only one Loss Event (Figure 1-3). If the overall event sequence contains more than one loss event, it is addressed as multiple RAST scenarios. For example: a spill of flammable liquid (first loss event) that ignites causing a pool fire that heats an adjacent vessel to the point of either ruptures or activates a relief device (second loss event) would be addressed as multiple RAST scenarios (the second loss event being a domino effect of the first). Each spill of flammable material which could ignite and create a pool fire impacting another vessel in the area would be addressed as separate scenarios. The heating from pool fire resulting in relief venting, rupture or damage would be addressed as an additional scenario. This is consistent with the Layer of Protection Analysis methodology.

Standardized lists of Initiating Events and Incident Outcome are also used to develop the scenario in RAST. Common parameter deviations for the type of equipment being analyzed is used to link some Loss Events with Initiating Events consistent with a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) approach. RAST generates a list of suggested scenarios for consideration by the study team.

The suggested list of scenarios provided by RAST is not intended to represent all scenarios needed for an effective HIRA study, but a starting point that the evaluation team may build upon.


Scenario = Initiating Event + Loss Event + Incident Outcome

Partial List of Initiating Events
- ❏ Human Error
- ❏ Mechanical Failure
- ❏ Regulator Failure
- ❏ Pump Seal Failure
- ❏ Heat Ex Tube Failure
- ❏ Hose Failure
- ❏ Loss of Agitation
- ❏ Utility Failure

Partial List of Loss Events
- ❏ Small Hole Leak
- ❏ Medium Hole Leak
- ❏ Full Bore Leak
- ❏ Overfill Release
- ❏ Vapor Release-Fire
- ❏ Vapor Release-Reaction
- ❏ Equipment Rupture
- ❏ Equipment Damage

Partial List of Incident Outcome
- ❏ Flash Fire
- ❏ Building Explosion
- ❏ Vapor Cloud Explosion
- ❏ Fireball or BLEVE
- ❏ Toxic Release
- ❏ Toxic Infiltration
- ❏ Environmental Damage
- ❏ Business Loss

Figure 1-3 Scenario Development in RAST

RAST also considers operational limits to evaluate the feasibility of a scenario. For example, does the maximum system pressure exceed the design limits of the equipment or the relief device set pressure? Finally, RAST is "live" so that updates of Input information will automatically update the list of scenarios for consideration.

Consequence Analysis in RAST uses various source and effect models from CCPS and other literature sources. Loss events are categorized as related to hole size (vapor, liquid, or two-phase), material balance (such as overfill), heat balance (such as vaporization resulting from fire exposure), rupture (instantaneous release) or equipment damage. If the release is liquid or two-phase, vapor rate is estimated from simple flashing, aerosol evaporation, and pool evaporation models.

A generic Event Tree (Figure 1-4) is used with RAST to determine Incident Outcome resulting from the Loss Event using criteria based on release location, release quantity and physical state, concentration at distance to the public, occupied buildings or on-site personnel location, in addition to process area congestion and other criteria. Administrative Incident Outcome criteria in RAST may be updated to reflect a company's standards on which a judgment or decision may be based. Parameter values provided in the RAST software are example criteria for the company to consider.


Figure 1-4 Generic Incident Outcome Event Tree used in RAST

RAST estimates a single "worst" Consequence Severity for each Incident Outcome.

There are three approaches that may be used to categorize consequence severity for *human harm* in RAST.

- **Simplified Quantitative Estimate of Human Harm**: This method involves the use of mathematical models to estimate the release rate, the subsequent dispersion, and toxic or blast effects. The models used in RAST are described in the Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) Guide available for download from CCPS. In addition to direct comparison with a company's risk tolerance criteria, quantitative methods provide better consistency between different analysts.

It must be recognized that the results of real-world events have been both significantly less and significantly greater than those calculated. A set of assumptions such as weather conditions, wind direction, and release orientation are used to determine a "worst" consequence that may not represent real-world events.

- **Severity without Direct Reference to Human Harm**: This method is based on results of simple dispersion or explosion models such as a release where the distance to ERPG-2 concentration exceeds 1000 m or where the distance to 1 psi blast overpressure exceeds 500 m. Each Incident Outcome utilizes a different correlation with either a Hazard Distance or Concentration divided by a Level of Concern. Administrative parameters for relating consequence severity to dispersion and explosion model estimates may be updated to reflect a company's specific criteria.

This approach avoids directly estimating the number of potential injuries or fatalities which may appear to imply that injuries or fatalities are tolerable. This approach also recognizes the difficulty in estimating the number of people who may be harmed and how severe the harm might be. For example, a toxic release may result in one or more fatalities or no harm at all, depending on the proximity of people to the release location and capability they have to escape.

- **Estimates of Consequence Severity other than provided by RAST**: RAST allows the User to enter a severity level as agreed upon by the study team rather than utilize the estimates provided.

Consequence severity for **Environmental Damage** is based on liquid release quantity to the ground or to waterways with a specific NFPA Health Hazard Rating (or GHS Hazard Classification) for Environmental Damage severity. (For example, 1000 kg material with GHS Hazard Classification of "toxic to aquatic life" or "toxic if swallowed")

Consequence severity for **Business Loss** is based on User entered cost to repair damaged equipment plus cost of business interruption for Business Loss severity

Scenario Frequency in RAST is order-of-magnitude and based on independence of initiating events, enabling conditions/conditional modifiers and protective layers. Tables of initiating event frequencies, enabling condition or conditional modifier probabilities (such as probability of ignition), and probability of failure upon demand (PFD) for independent protective layers (IPL) are stored as administrative parameters. Residual failures (those leaks represented by chronic issues such as wear or fatigue rather than a process upset) are labeled Mechanical Integrity scenarios (Asset Integrity scenarios) in RAST with frequency based on correlation on published leak frequency data. These tables and correlation coefficients may be updated to reflect a company's specific frequency values for use in risk analysis. The scenario frequency is simply the product of the initiating event frequency times the enabling condition or conditional modifier probability times the failure probability for each IPL appropriate for the scenario.

Risk Analysis within RAST involves converting the Consequence Severity and Scenario Frequency to graduated scales representing order-of-magnitude levels. The Risk Matrix (Figure 1-5) is used to summarize results with each cell in the matrix (at intersecting values of Consequence Severity and Scenario Frequency) representing a specific value of scenario risk. Tolerable Risk may also be summarized in the same tabular

Risk Matrix and compared to scenario risk in determining if further risk reduction is needed. The values of tolerable frequency for the various Consequence Severity levels are administrative parameters that should be updated to reflect a specific company's risk tolerance criteria. The criteria for Human Harm in the risk matrix may also be related to Hazard Distance if a company desires not to use number of severe impacts or fatalities as the reference. The default parameters provided in RAST should be considered "examples" as CCPS does not endorse any specific risk criteria.

Risk Matrix: Risk = Consequence Severity times Frequency

Consequence Severity Description

Description	Human Harm	Environment	Business Loss
Severity Level-1	Minor Injury On-site (or < 0.01 Person Severely Impacted On-site) Potential for Adverse Local Publicity	Reportable Incident to Environmental Agency OR < 10 kg Very Toxic to Waterway OR < 100 kg NFPA-H4 to Soil < 100 kg Toxic to Waterway OR < 1000 kg NFPA-H3 to Soil < 1000 kg Harmful to Waterway OR < 10000 kg NFPA-H2 to Soil	Property Damage and Business Loss < $50M
Severity Level-2	Major Injury On-site (or 0.01 to 0.1 Person Severely Impacted On-site) Public Required to Shelter Indoors (or Minor Injury Off-site)	Environmental Contamination Confined to Site OR < 100 kg Very Toxic to Waterway OR < 1000 kg NFPA-H4 to Soil < 1000 kg Toxic to Waterway OR < 10000 kg NFPA-H3 to Soil < 10000 kg Harmful to Waterway OR < 100000 kg NFPA-H2 to Soil	Property Damage and Business Loss $50 M to $500 M
Severity Level-3	Potential Fatality On-site (or 0.1 to 1 Person Severely Impacted On-site) or Potential Major Injury Off-site	Environmental Contamination of Local Groundwater OR < 1000 kg Very Toxic to Waterway OR < 10000 kg NFPA-H4 to Soil < 10000 kg Toxic to Waterway OR < 100000 kg NFPA-H3 to Soil < 100000 kg Harmful to Waterway OR < 1000000 kg NFPA-H2 to Soil	Property Damage and Business Loss $5 MM to $50 MM
Severity Level-4	1 to 10 People Severely Impacted On-site 0.1 to 1 People Severely Impacted Off-site	Incident Requiring Significant Off-Site Remediation OR < 10000 kg Very Toxic to Waterway OR < 100000 kg NFPA-H4 to Soil < 100000 kg Toxic to Waterway OR < 1000000 kg NFPA-H3 to Soil > 100000 kg Harmful to Waterway OR > 100000 kg NFPA-H2 to Soil	Property Damage and Business Loss $5 MM to $50 MM
Severity Level-5	> 10 People Severely Impacted On-site > 1 Person Severely Impacted Off-site	Incident with Significant National Media Attention OR < 100000 kg Very Toxic to Waterway OR < 1000000 kg NFPA-H4 to So > 100000 kg Toxic to Waterway OR > 1000000 kg NFPA-H3 to Soil	Property Damage and Business Loss > $50 MM

Frequency

Low Consequence →→→ High Consequence

High Frequency ←——→ Low Frequency

	10^-2/year	10^-3/year	10^-4/year	10^-5/year	10^-6/year	10^-7/year

Legend
- Acceptable
- Tolerable - Offsite
- Tolerable - Onsite
- Unacceptable

[1]

Figure 1-5 Example RAST Risk Matrix for Consequence Frequency times Severity

RAST also provides a graph of cumulative frequency versus consequence severity level as an indicator of societal risk. For human harm consequences, this graph is similar to an F-N Curve for making risk decisions.

The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) section within RAST is used to summarize the risk associated with each scenario to be analyzed. Scenarios are selected from a list of potential scenarios for risk analysis by the analysis team. Scenarios of relatively low risk may be screened out from LOPA consideration based on a company's risk screening criteria which may be entered as administrative parameters. Those scenarios representing "worst cases" are noted (those requiring the greatest number of protective layers to meet a company's risk tolerance criteria) to aid the analysis team in selecting which scenarios to include in the analysis.

During LOPA, the study team adds **additional cost effective IPLs** until each scenario is at or below the tolerable risk criteria. Once approved by company leadership, these additional IPLs would be implemented and entered into the company's inspection, testing and maintenance programs to ensure that all safeguards are sustained for the life of the facility. RAST includes several reports to aid the study team in development of a design basis for effective IPLs (such as estimation of the maximum allowable response time for a protective layer to function).

1.6   Methods and Models

Many of the models and methods used in CHEF and RAST come from the open literature and several are derived from relatively simple material and energy balances. However, quantitative results within a Hazard Analysis and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study are highly uncertain due to the extreme complexity of most scenarios. The intent of CHEF and RAST is to provide possible and *consistent* results (but not necessarily certain or accurate results) so that risk may be compared to other scenarios or a company's risk tolerance criteria. Detailed explanation of the various methods and models is presented in the CHEF Guide. A brief summary of selected methods and models used in CHEF and RAST are depicted in Figure 1-6.

Figure 1-6 Methods and Models used at various Steps within a HIRA

Understanding and categorizing *hazard severity* helps to determine which equipment or unit operations represent a concern such that a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) should be done. Comparing chemical hazard properties (such as NFPA ratings), operating conditions (such as pressure, temperature, stored reaction energy), equipment parameters (such as high-speed turbines, fired equipment or dust handling equipment) to predefined "levels of concern" ensures consistency in defining the scope of analysis.

1.6.1   Hazard Evaluation Methods in RAST

In determining "What Can Go Wrong?", RAST suggests a list of potential scenarios based on historical incidents, common failure modes for specific equipment types, and generic process parameter deviations that could lead to loss of containment event (and, in some cases, equipment damage). This list is interactive (depending on the inputs into RAST) and intended to help an _evaluation team_ get started by building upon these ideas as well as ensuring common issues are addressed. Additional scenarios for consideration should be added to the RAST listing using the "User Scenario" option to capture cases from HAZOP, What-If, or any other hazard evaluation method the team determines is appropriate for the risk and complexity of the chemical process. Finally, the listing of scenarios includes fields to capture existing safeguards, recommendations, and selection by the team for further analysis. In this way, the team may decide that only qualitative risk analysis is needed to determine if sufficient safeguards or protections exist (or are noted in the recommendations).

The scenarios listed are formatted (Cause-Consequence or Initiating Event-Outcome pairs) to be candidates for semi-quantitative Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). Standard lists of Initiating Event (or Initiating Cause such as human failure, control failure, equipment failure, etc.) categories, Loss Event categories (based on specific hole sizes, material balance criteria, energy balance criteria, or near instantaneous release of entire equipment contents), and Incident Outcome categories based chemical and hazard properties (fires, explosions, toxic release, chemical exposure, or equipment damage) are used to develop well-defined scenarios. The team will typically need to add Initiating Event details, and consider any Enabling Conditions (or Conditional Modifiers) that are applicable to the scenario. The team may also decide that a suggested scenario is not feasible and exclude it from the study.

It is strongly recommended that any HIRA study utilize an evaluation team, particularly in identification of scenario candidates (within Hazard Evaluation) and selection of most effective safeguards and protective layers (Risk Analysis). Team members should include:

- Team Leader to organize and schedule meetings, and ensure the appropriate study scope and concerns are addressed
- Scribe or Note Taker to ensure team discussion, inputs and decisions are well-documented
- At least one person knowledgeable in the specific analysis method being used (such as HAZOP What-If, etc.)
- A person knowledgeable with the RAST or CHEF software
- Other members with expertise in areas such as process technology, design, operating procedures, maintenance, safety and health, or other relevant subjects.

A single person may fill more than one of these roles, but a team _cannot_ be a single analyst. RAST suggests a long list of scenarios as well as various protective layers commonly used to mitigate specific Loss Events or Incident Outcome. It is inappropriate for a single analyst merely to "accept" all suggestions without input or agreement from the analysis team when performing a HIRA study, particularly if the study is to meet a regulatory requirement such Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).

1.6.2 Consequence Analysis in RAST

There are several intermediate steps in addressing "How Bad Could It Be?" (Consequence Analysis) to estimate a result of interest in a HIRA study. For example, to obtain a consequence for a vapor cloud explosion, one needs to utilize:

- Various physical, chemical and hazard property models (particularly if the release is a mixture for density, heat capacities, heat of vaporization, flammable limits, toxic dose, etc.)
- Source models to determine the quantity and rate of vapor release (which might include also liquid release rate, release velocity, flash evaporation, droplet or aerosol evaporation, and pool evaporation models)
- Dispersion models to determine the size of the vapor cloud in the flammable region followed by an estimate of explosion energy
- Explosion models to determine overpressure at a specific location from the epicenter
- Vulnerability models to estimate the damage, injury or fatality potential at a specific blast overpressure and impulse
- Effect models to estimate the number of personnel impacted located outdoors or within occupied buildings

So, a single result includes many different models and methods in sequence where the results from one is often the inputs to the next. RAST and CHEF utilize simplifying assumptions so that each step is not always "most" conservative, but such that an overall result represents a feasible "worst case". The worst case is intended to be in the absence of safeguards or protective layers in addition to the absence of evasive or mitigating actions. The consequences of most actual incidents are often less than this "worst case" estimate.

There will always be concerns when using relatively simple models for complex problems. CHEF and RAST are not trying to compete with proprietary software (or various consulting companies), but "screen" for when more detailed analysis or additional help is warranted and provide a very approximate *but consistent* "worst case" result to allow the analysis team to make better informed decisions in managing the risk and/or prioritizing work. CHEF or RAST results are more "relative" than "absolute", particularly when it comes to estimating the number of potential serious impacts (including fatalities) in a scenario. In nearly every case study, CHEF or RAST has overestimated the number of fatalities (indicating that many if not most actual process safety incidents could have been worse) but is often close to more detailed modeling for some intermediate estimates (such as release rate, blast overpressure distance, or distance to specific toxic concentration).

For scenarios where semi or simplified risk analysis is warranted, RAST uses a Risk Matrix (which may be modified to meet a company's risk tolerance criteria) and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to determine if sufficient safeguards and protective layers have been implemented to bring risk to a "tolerable" frequency criterion. Frequencies are determined from historical data or using simple Fault Tree or Event Tree models. Generally, LOPA assumes all events and protective layers are Independent from one another. For highly complex scenarios or where extremely costly safeguards or protections may be needed, a detailed Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (CPQRA) may be considered. CPQRA is beyond the capability of RAST and outside the scope of this documentation.

1.6.3   Source Models in RAST

Source Models within RAST are normally based on "loss of containment" events. Generally, a vessel or equipment item within a chemical facility has feeds such as a liquid or vapor and outlets including vents, vapor or liquid streams. In addition, during a process upset, material may discharge from an emergency pressure relief device or leak from failed nozzles or piping (Figure 1-7. Source models are used to estimate discharge rate, total quantity released, and extent of flash and evaporation for liquids.

Figure 1-7 Examples of Source Models

A key intermediate result within Consequence Analysis is evaluation of the Airborne Quantity (as shown in Figure 1-8). The Airborne Quantity for a vapor release is the flow rate calculated at the temperature and pressure conditions of the equipment when the release occurs. Liquid release requires more complex treatment. As liquid exits equipment or pipe, it may partially flash or vaporize, there is often small liquid droplets or aerosol which may be carried away with the vapor and eventually evaporate, and a liquid pool may be formed which slowly evaporates. The Airborne Quantity for a liquid release is the summation of quantity flashed and quantity evaporated from aerosol droplets and liquid pools.

Figure 1-8 Flowchart for Estimation of Airborne Quantity

Source models used within CHEF and RAST are well documented in engineering [5] and CCPS Literature [6]. These models are based on a simple material and energy balance or generally accepted flow models such as the Bernoulli equation. Differences between results with commercial software is often related to the selection of a discharge coefficient. CHEF and RAST use an orifice discharge coefficient of 0.6 for most holes or 1.0 for smooth nozzles such as a safety valve.

At this time, there is not a generally acceptable method for predicting aerosol evaporation. An approach noted in the CCPS literature [6, pp. 98-99], is to estimate droplet size from a critical Weber number (typically 10 to 20), duration based on release elevation and settling velocity, and evaporation rate from the droplet surface. An approximation for droplet size from mechanical and flashing break-up (based on a critical Weber number of 10), typical surface tension of 0.02 N/m, assumed proportional to 1- flash fraction, and ambient air density of 1.18 kg/m³) has been developed for use within CHEF and RAST. Some commercial software may use proprietary models or an assumed ratio to the flash fraction in estimating droplet or aerosol evaporation leading to differences in results from CHEF and RAST.

The maximum surface area for an unconfined pool is estimated from the liquid rate and leak duration at a constant depth of 1 cm. The evaporation rate is estimated using a correlation recommended by the US EPA [7].This correlation was selected as there is a term to account for wind speed and the reference suggests it use for estimation indoor evaporation by using a very low wind speed of 0.1 m/sec. In addition to estimated pool area, the estimation of pool temperature may introduce differences in overall evaporation when comparing various techniques. RAST uses a simple material and energy balance to estimate pool temperature with maximum limits of the release temperature or atmospheric pressure boiling point of the fluid.

1.6.4 Vapor Dispersion Models in RAST

Release of vapor or aerosol often occurs at relatively high discharge velocity resulting in Jet Mixing. The primary dilution mechanism is entrainment of air due to shear forces. This mechanism is very important as often the initial dilution reduces concentration to below the lower flammable limit within a short distance for release of a flammable vapor. Jet mixing is also important in determining the initial concentration at the start of dense gas or neutrally buoyant dispersion.

The Britter and McQuaid dense gas model is selected for use in CHEF and RAST as it is relatively simple, easy to apply and agrees fairly well with other dense gas models. It was developed using dimensional analysis and correlation of existing data on dense cloud dispersions. Most of the data represents dispersion tests in remote, rural areas on mostly flat terrain. CHEF and RAST use points from this graphical technique and fit to a power law correlation for interpolation between points and adjusts results for surface roughness relative to rural surface roughness assuming a similar impact on overall vapor distribution as neutrally buoyant models.

There are many dense gas dispersion models available for which results can be significantly different (Figure 1-9) [8]. In addition to variation between models, the source term (such as jet mixing) used to determine the initial concentration may influence results. A factor of two between results from various dense gas models is sometimes considered good agreement.

Figure 1-9 Comparison between Models of Dispersion Distances

CHEF and RAST use the Pasquille-Gifford model for neutrally buoyant dispersion involving releases less than or nearly equal in vapor density to ambient air. Once a dense gas becomes sufficiently dilute, the neutrally buoyant model is used. The Pasquille-Gifford model has been used for many years and is well vetted. However, there are several different published distribution coefficients where CHEF and RAST utilize those coefficients found in CCPS publications. Differences between various software programs for neutrally buoyant dispersion may result from differences in distribution coefficients or the source term used to

determine the initial concentration (such as jet mixing or transition from dense gas dispersion). CHEF and RAST utilize the "virtual distance" technique described in in evaluating the transition from dense to neutrally buoyant dispersion [9].

1.6.5 Explosion Models in RAST

CHEF and RAST use the Thermodynamic Availability equation of Crowl for estimation of energy in a Physical Explosion [5]. Results are between that of isentropic and isothermal expansion or Brode's equation. (Note that there may be as much as a factor of two between these various explosion energy models.) The method described by Prugh was selected to estimate the additional energy associated with a Boiling-Liquid Expanding-Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) [10]. This method using an equivalent volume equal to the initial vapor volume plus the volume of vapor generated from instantaneous liquid vaporization and does not require detailed thermodynamic property data. (Note that CHEF and RAST do not utilize an equation of state but assume an ideal gas in evaluating thermodynamic properties.)

CHEF and RAST use the TNT Equivalency method for estimating blast overpressure for a Physical Explosion, BLEVE, or Condensed Phase (or Chemical) Explosion. This method has been used for many years and assumes a point source for the epicenter.

For combustion related explosion, CHEF and RAST use the method of Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST model) for estimating blast overpressure versus distance [11]. The combustion energy is estimated from a stoichiometric volume of fuel in air based on a typical hydrocarbon described in the CCPS literature rather than more detailed enthalpy of combustion data and evaluating chemical mixture may be problematic [12, p. 166]. The curves representing scaled overpessure versus scaled distance have been grouped to fewer categories (representing mach numbers of 0.35, 0.5, 0.7, 1 and greater than 1) for ease of use which may introduce some conservatism. The BST model was selected as explosion efficiency is conveniently correlated as a combination of fuel reactivity, obstacle density, and area confinement rather than leave the efficiency open to user interpretation.

For a confined space or building explosion, the center of the explosion is assumed the center of the confined space and only a single explosion source applies in CHEF and RAST. For Vapor Cloud Explosion, CHEF and RAST simplify the analysis by assuming a single explosion source involving the entire flammable cloud of average obstacle density (or congestion) and confinement and that the center of the explosion is the center of the cloud (and thus depends on wind direction). In more detailed evaluation, each confined or congested region within the flammable cloud would be considered a separate explosion source. The estimated overpressure from each source would be summed to obtain a total blast overpressure at each location of a site. Because localized regions of high congestion or confinement are not considered, the simplified BST method utilized in CHEF and RAST should not be used to estimate damage to high strength buildings or evaluate placement of high strength building within a plant site.

1.6.6 Vulnerability and Effect Models

Vulnerability models are intended to provide the analysis team with estimates of human harm that may be more directly compared with a company's risk tolerance criteria. These models have extremely high uncertainty but utilize simplifying assumptions that are intended to represent a "worst case" consequence. RAST allows and option to relate hazard distance (such as distance to a specific blast overpressure or toxic concentration) to consequence severity categories rather than estimate the number of people impacted if desired. A key simplifying assumption within CHEF and RAST is that wind direction is toward the greatest number of people. RAST considers three impact regions or zones – personnel located in close proximity to

the hazard, personnel at a specific location (such as an occupied building), and personnel distributed across a broad area (such as a residential community).

For personnel in close proximity to a hazard, a simple analysis based on hazards originating from a point source is used. The effect zone is estimated in terms of radial distance to a "level of concern" (such as a toxic concentration, thermal radiation resulting in severe burns, blast overpressure that may result in direct human harm) from the source. Personnel within the effect zone are assumed severely impacted while those outside this area are assumed not affected. The shape of the effect zone depends if the hazard source is outdoors or within an enclosed process area, if the hazard is impacted by wind direction (such as an outdoor toxic release), or if the hazard propagates throughout the entire circular area (such as a blast wave or thermal radiation) as depicted in Figure 1-10. This technique is described in the CCPS literature [12]. CHEF and RAST allow input for personnel in the immediate area whose probability of severe impact is 1 (such as an operator in attendance of a truck unloading activity) and a population density that is assumed uniformly distributed such that the number of severe impacts is population density times impact area.

Figure 1-10 Example Outdoor Effect Zone

The vulnerability of personnel to toxic impacts is estimated from a dose-response or probit model in the concentration region of interest. These models apply a Gaussian or bell-shaped curve to the dose-response relationship. Use of probit (or probability unit) correlations is a commonly used approach, however there is no general agreement upon correlation coefficients for specific chemicals. Factors such as age, overall health, and degree of exertion may affect toxic responses. Further complicating the issue is that most data is derived from test animals (often rat studies) and extrapolated to humans. A key consideration in development of a probit model is the fraction of population who may be highly sensitive to chemical exposure such as the elderly, children, and persons with diseases that compromise the respiratory or cardiovascular system. Results between published models can vary significantly such that a company may need to decide which values to use within risk analysis studies for consistency.

Figure 1-11 Concentration versus Lethality — Chlorine Probit Correlations

If probit coefficients are not available for the chemicals of interest, CHEF and RAST allow estimates based on one-hour exposure to a multiple of the ERPG-3 concentration (Figure 1-11). The shaded region of Figure 1-12 represents a potentially reasonable (conservative for most chemicals) multiple of ERPG-3 to use when a probit model is not available. Note that this approach is very approximate with the range for probability of severe impact (including fatality) of more than one order-of-magnitude at a specific concentration.

Figure 1-12 Toxic Vulnerability at One-Hour Exposure Duration

CHEF and RAST further simplify the probit approach by correlating probability of severe impact as a simple exponential or ln(probaliity) = a + b / Concentration (Figure 1-13). Using this simple exponential function

for toxic lethality is conservative above 50% lethality but does not contribute significantly to overestimation of results. For toxic infiltration to an occupied building at a specific location, RAST uses an average indoor concentration of 0.5 times the outdoor concentration at a distance to the occupied building from the leak source depending on the ventilation rate entered. The overall lethality is multiplied by the number of occupants to obtain the number of people seriously impacted (including potentially fatalities).

Figure 1-13 Concentration versus Toxic Vulnerability — Acrolein Probit Correlation

The vulnerability of building occupants to explosion impacts in CHEF and RAST is correlated from limited information in the CCPS literature [13, p. 62] (Figure 1-14).This correlation is also of high uncertainty as more recent literature correlates only building damage to blast overpressure rather than occupant vulnerability. Correlation of vulnerability to a simple exponential relationship is shown by the dashed lines in Figure 1-14. The number of people severely impacted in a building at a specific location is merely the vulnerability based on blast overpressure at the building location times the number of occupants. Note that CHEF and RAST assume a relatively long blast impulse such that correlating to only blast overpressure may be somewhat conservative.

Figure 1-14 Occupied Building Vulnerability versus Blast Overpressure

Evaluating personnel distributed across a broad area (such as a residential community) is extremely complex such that CHEF and RAST apply additional simplifying assumptions. Use of simple techniques such as assuming all personnel within a distance to toxic concentration (such as the LC_{50}) are seriously impacted while those outside this region are not affected, would miss personnel where vulnerability is low but the number of exposed people may be very high. The population is assumed uniformly distributed throughout the impact zone. Furthermore, for toxic cases the dose-response relationship is also assumed uniform throughout the impact zone (hospitals or schools are not distinguished from houses) and, occupied structures are assumed the same type of construction throughout the impact zone for evaluation of explosion impacts.

CHEF and RAST combine the simple vulnerability correlation with either the concentration versus distance power-law relationship for toxic vapors or blast overpressure versus distance relationship to obtain an expression of vulnerability versus distance. Up to two populated impact zones can be input. This vulnerability versus distance expression is then integrated over a distance representing a populated region to obtain an estimate of the number of people seriously impacted. This value is reported in CHEF and RAST as number of serious impacts offsite. Results are *very high uncertainty* and likely quite conservative. Values represent a relative measurement (such as an order-of-magnitude) intended to provide a consistent basis for comparison of consequence severity used in risk analysis.

Comparison of the estimated number of people seriously impacted to actual incident fatalities in case studies using CHEF or RAST is nearly always greater, as the estimates assume "worst case" situations in the absence of safeguards or protective layers and without taking evasive or mitigating actions that may have been partially effective in the actual incident. As previously noted, the intent of CHEF and RAST is to provide *possible* and *consistent* results (but not necessarily certain or accurate results) so that risk may be compared to other scenarios or a company's risk tolerance criteria.

1.7   RAST Documentation

RAST maintains datasets of new chemicals, suggested scenarios, consequence analysis results, and Layer of Protection Analysis results for each equipment item evaluated. These datasets are compatible with

and may be imported into newer versions of the RAST software to effectively manage the data and documentation associated with the study. Future HIRA studies for the facility are easily updated by importing previous studies into the latest version of RAST, review and update of inputs, and generation of updated reports.

All chemical, equipment, process conditions and location inputs are stored within RAST by the equipment item or unit operation name. A User may select any equipment item within the HIRA study to review inputs or results, make appropriate changes or additions, and save the updated information. All information related to risk analysis for a specific scenario is stored within RAST by the scenario number. A User may select any scenario number to review scenario details and identified protection layers, make changes, and save the updated information. All reports and analysis results may be viewed by selecting either the equipment item or scenario number depending on the specific report desired.

1.8   RAST Training Materials

There are three related training manuals (and workshops available) for RAST.

Chemical Hazard Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) is intended for newer engineers or as a refresher for experienced personnel. It describes methodology for performing a Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) study. There are many simplifying assumptions used that may not be suitable for every situation. A RAST user should be familiar with CHEF materials to recognize when a simplifying assumption may not be appropriate within a specific HIRA study.

Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) User focuses on how to utilize the software in helping HIRA study teams to improve productivity, consistency, and quality of the studies. Various inputs and reports are described in detail with examples.

RAST Technical Administrator is intended to show experienced Process Safety personnel how to incorporate a company's specific risk matrix and other screening criteria into the RAST software. It is intended for those filling a RAST Technical Administrator role rather than a RAST user.

2 Getting Started

RAST is a collection of process safety and risk analysis screening tools used to perform Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA). A simple study example will be used to illustrate some of the features of the RAST tool. The example presented in this manual covers simple identification of hazards and evaluation of risk associated with a single equipment item handling a single Chemical. Information input and Analysis details for more complex situations will be covered in the *Additional RAST Inputs and Reports* section. The tool is currently based on the Microsoft Excel platform.

2.1 Opening the RAST Workbook

Open the RAST Workbook. For RAST to run, you must accept the macros request noted at the top of your screen. The first tab is an "Introduction" worksheet (or spreadsheet) that contains notes pertaining to recent changes and other communication is the first tab in the workbook (Figure 2-1). Save this "blank" copy of the tool to the desktop then select "Go to Main Menu" in the top right corner or use the worksheet tabs at the bottom of the page to go to "Main Menu". The Instructions worksheet can be selected with the "Go to Instructions" in the top right corner or using the worksheet tabs at the bottom of the page.

Figure 2-1 Introduction Worksheet in RAST

2.2 Color Coding Guidance

Throughout the RAST workbook (Figure 2-2): "orange" colored cells represent the minimum required information while "yellow" colored cells represent other key information. In addition, "green" macro buttons at the top of each page are used for navigation to other worksheets, "black" for executing calculations, "red" to clear information, and "blue" for saving information.

Figure 2-2 Example of Color Coding for Macro Buttons in RAST

2.3 Main Menu

Equipment Identification, Equipment Type, and Location (Outdoors or Indoors) are entered on the Main Menu worksheet (Figure 2-3). On the Main Menu, one may also:

- Select the Source File for Input Information (prior LOPA or RAST workbook).
- Enter the Equipment Identification, Equipment Type and Location for analysis. (If updating a Previous Study, Equipment Identification, Equipment Type and Location is retrieved from the Equipment Table.)
- Access Workbook Notes for entering and viewing comments regarding the entire workbook and viewing selected parameters used in calculations (such as value of ambient temperature)
- Access Forms for Input Information such as Chemical Properties, Equipment Data, Operating Conditions, and Site or Facility Layout Information.
- Save all Input Information for the Equipment Identification selected
- Select the Evaluation or Report desired
- Update and Save Analysis Results for new or modified Equipment Items

Figure 2-3 Main Menu

2.4 Input Worksheet in RAST

There are five primary input worksheets in RAST:

- ❑ Chemical Data Input
- ❑ Equipment Input
- ❑ Process Conditions
- ❑ Plant Layout
- ❑ Reaction Input

Chemical Information is entered on the **Chemical Data Input** worksheet (Figure 2-4). On this worksheet, one may:

- Select the Chemical (or Chemical Mixture) contained within the Equipment being analyzed.
- Access key Chemical Information from a Chemical Data Table.
- Estimate specific Chemical and Physical Properties at the Operating Temperature including the Physical State (vapor, liquid, or solid), Vapor Pressure, Vapor Composition, Liquid Density, Liquid Heat Capacity, and Heat of Vaporization. Other Chemical Information such as estimated mixture Boiling Point and Saturation Temperature (boiling point at the operating pressure) are also available.
- Enter additional Chemical Information not available or missing from the Chemical Data Table.

Figure 2-4 Chemical Data Input

Equipment Parameters are input on the Equipment Input worksheet (Figure 2-5). On this worksheet one may:

- Enter key Equipment Information such as Volume, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure, Pipe or Nozzle Diameter, Material of Construction, Surface Area and Elevation.
- Enter Design Information for specialized equipment such as Heat Transfer Area, Heating Media Temperature, Coolant Temperature, Pipe Length, Pump Seal Type, etc.
- Enter information regarding Design Issues such as Corrosion or Stress Cracking Potential, Susceptible to Vibration Fatigue, Piping Vulnerable to Physical Damage, Use of Conductive Dip Pipe or Bottom Fill, etc.
- Enter Relief Device design information such as Relief Set Pressure, Relief Size (diameter), Relief Type, Tail Pipe Diameter, and Discharge Elevation.

Figure 2-5 Equipment Input

Process and Operating Information is entered on the **Process Conditions** worksheet (Figure 2-6). On this worksheet, one may:

- Enter ambient temperature to be used in the analysis.
- Enter key process conditions such as the maximum fill or feed rate and the liquid head for equipment with low operating pressure.
- Enter additional feed information such as the total inventory, maximum feed pressure, and type of feed (continuous or batch).
- Enter information on use of Pad Gas such as Pad Gas Pressure, Maximum Pad Gas Flow Rate and if a Non-ignitable Atmosphere is Being Maintained in the equipment.

Figure 2-6 Process Conditions Input

Site and Plant Layout Information is entered on the **Plant Layout** worksheet (Figure 2-7). On this worksheet, one may:

- Enter key location information such as minimum Distance to Property Limit or Fence Line, Furthest Distance to Property Limit, Distance to Occupied Building and Number of Building Occupants. One may also enter up to two offsite populated regions. If Equipment Location is "Indoors", key information includes the Enclosed Process Volume.
- Enter other location information such as: if Personnel are Routinely in the Immediate Area, Effective Egress from the Immediate Work Area, Degree of Equipment Congestion, Area of Containment Dike, Drainage to a Remote Location, and Distance from Fired Equipment.
- Enter the Number of Enclosed Area Personnel if the Equipment Location is Indoors.
- Enter Occupied Building Information including Name, Elevation of Ventilation Inlet, Ventilation Rate, and if there is Centralized Ventilation Shut-Off.

Figure 2-7 Plant Layout Input

The final input worksheet is **Reaction Input and Evaluation** (Figure 2-8) include:

- *Heat of Reaction*
- *Activation Energy*
- *Detected Onset Temperature and Rate*
- *Test Method and Thermal Inertia (Phi Factor)*
- *Gas Generation per volume of material.*

Evaluations Include:

- *Maximum Reaction Temperature and Pressure* for near Adiabatic conditions and for several common process upsets.
- *Temperature of No Return (TNR)* based on convective heat loss of the equipment.
- *Time to Maximum Rate (TMR)* for up to four initial temperatures.
- *Reactivity Parameter* provides an estimate for potential explosive material (Index > 20) similar to Yoshida correlation for DSC data.
- *Frank-Kamenetskii Critical Diameter* for "spontaneous reaction" of powders and solids is estimated.

The Reaction Input and Evaluation within RAST will be discussed in a later section of this document.

Figure 2-8 Reaction Input and Evaluation

2.5 An Example Study

As an example, to illustrate the RAST tool, consider a simple Hazard Evaluation and Risk Analysis for the storage tank containing acrylonitrile at 25 C (77 F) and 0.01 barg (0.2 psig) depicted in Figure 2-9:

Equipment Parameters
Tank Volume = 100 m³ (26000 gal)
Chemical = Acrylonitrile
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure = 0.2 bar (2.9 psig)
Flat Bottom Non-Anchored Tank
Bottom Outlet Nozzle = 100 mm (4 inch)
Circulating Pump = 5.6 kW (7.5 HP)

Operating Conditions
Operating Temperature = 25 C
Pressure = 0.01 bar (0.2 psig)
Liquid Head = 6 m (20 ft)
Feed Rate = 400 Kg/min (880 lb/min)

Figure 2-9 Diagrams for the Acrylonitrile Storage Tank Example

2.5.1 Study Input Information

Let's begin by entering the _minimum necessary_ Input Information to begin a new study.

STEP 1: In the Main Menu worksheet (Figure 2-10):

- Enter the Equipment Identification, V-101, select the Equipment Type, Vessel/Tank and Location, Outdoors from the drop-down lists.

Location is assumed Outdoors if input is blank. If updating a previous study, the Equipment Identification would be selected from the Equipment Table and displaced on the Study Menu form.

- Select Default Units as SI Units
- _One may also enter the Date(s) and Participants for the current study._

If updating a previous study, DO NOT select Default Units as information has already been entered in previously defined units.

Figure 2-10 Main Menu Inputs for Example Problem

From the **Main Menu, Select** _**Chemical Data Input**_ to enter Chemical information.

STEP 2: In the Chemical Data Input worksheet (Figure 2-11):

- Select the Chemical Name, _Acrylonitrile_, from the available list and Enter Weight Fraction Feed of 1.0.
- Enter the Operation Temperature of 25 C and Operating Pressure of 0.01 bar gauge (near atmospheric pressure).
- **Select Go to Main Menu** to continue with additional information input.

Note that there are "orange" cells on the Chemical Data Input worksheet denoting minimum inputs. Once inputs are made in these cells, they are no longer "orange". Also, on the Main Menu the "Minimum Complete" box has turned green for Chemical Data Input once all the minimum required inputs have been entered.

Figure 2-11 Chemical Data Inputs for Example Problem

From the Main Menu, Select _Equipment Parameter Input_ to enter Equipment Information.

STEP 3: In the Equipment Input worksheet (Figure 2-12):

- Enter the Equipment Volume of 100 m³, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of 0.2 bar gauge and Nozzle or Pipe Size of 100 mm. This represents the _minimum_ input information
- Additional Equipment Parameters available that should be entered are **Motor Power** of **5.6 Kw** for the circulating pump (which is a mechanical energy input to the tank). You may also enter an _Equipment Description_ if desired**.**
- **Select Go to Main Menu** to continue with additional information input.

Note that there are no longer "orange" cells on the Equipment Input worksheet denoting that minimum input requirements have been met. Also note that on the Main Menu the "Minimum Complete" box has turned green for Equipment Parameter Input.

Figure 2-12 Equipment Input for Example Problem

From the **Main Menu, Select *Process Conditions Input*** to enter Process and Operating Conditions Information

STEP 4: In the Process Conditions worksheet (Figure 2-13):

- **Enter** the **Liquid Head within Equipment** of **6 m** and **Maximum Feed or Flow Rate** of **400 Kg/min**. Ensure input units are correct. Note that *Liquid Head* is entered since it has a significant impact on the pressure drop available for leaks in this case. (The tank is operating at << 1 atmosphere gauge). Also note that leaving the *Total Inventory* blank implies an unlimited inventory available for overflow or leak scenarios.
- **Select Go to Main Menu** to continue with additional information input.

*Note that there are no longer "orange" cells on the Process Conditions worksheet denoting that minimum input requirements have been met. Also note that on the Main Menu the "Minimum Complete" box has turned green for Process Conditions Input.

Figure 2-13 Process Conditions Input for Example Problem

From the **Main Menu, Select** *Plant Layout Input* to enter Process and Operating Conditions Information

STEP 5: In the Plant Layout Input worksheet (Figure 2-14):

- Enter the Distance to Property Limit or Fence Line of 180 m, the Distance to Occupied Building or Enclosed Work Area of 70 m and Maximum Number of Building Occupants of 3. Note that if equipment *Location* is *"Indoors", Enclosed Process Volume* becomes a required input.

Select Go to Main Menu to Check Inputs, Save Inputs to the Equipment Table, or view Evaluations or Reports.

*Note that there are no longer "orange" cells on the Plant Layout worksheet denoting that minimum input requirements have been met. Also note that on the Main Menu the "Min Complete" box has turned green for Plant Layout Input.

Figure 2-14 Plant Layout Input for Example Problem

From the **Main Menu**, **Select <u>Check Inputs</u>** (Figure 2-15, blue macro button).

Figure 2-15 Main Menu Features and Reports

Inputs are checked for missing information, missing units, or values outside of a normal range. Errors are categorized as Comment, Warning, or Critical. Critical errors must be addressed before proceeding with preliminary evaluations. Any default values used for missing input information are described as comments.

Figure 2-16 shows error message examples which may occur.

Figure 2-16 Error Messages from Check Inputs

2.6 Saving Input Information

From the Main Menu, or any of the Input worksheets (Equipment Input, Chemical Data, Process Conditions, Plant Layout, or Reaction Input), Select Save Inputs to Equipment Table (blue macro button). All Input Information will be stored in the Equipment Table in a single row identified by a unique Equipment Identification or Tag (Figure 2-17).

Figure 2-17 Example Equipment Table

Inputs for additional equipment items are stored in subsequent rows on the Equipment Table. To save time for creating inputs, information for a previously stored Equipment Identification or Tag may be retrieved, modified to reflect the desired new input and saved under another unique Equipment Identification or Tag. If Input information for a specific Equipment Tag already exists in the Equipment Table, a message will appear asking if the information is to be updated or overwritten (Figure 2-18).

Figure 2-18 Warning Notice when Saving Inputs

2.7 Evaluations and Reports

Once the minimum required inputs have been entered, the user or analysis team may begin evaluations and identification of hazard scenarios. As more information is input, more thorough evaluation may be performed. In this way, a project team may begin with little initial information. Additional hazard scenarios are added for consideration as greater information is input. Selected evaluations and summaries associated with Screening Level Hazard Evaluation will be discussed in the next sections of Getting Started.

2.7.1 *Preliminary Fire and Explosion Index*

Even with limited information, the Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) or Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) may be estimated. These represent "Relative Ranking" indices which may be used by a company to screen when qualitative versus quantitative HIRA methods should be used. An example criterion for requiring a quantitative versus qualitative HIRA study might be an F&EI Index of 128 or higher.

The Fire and Explosion Index categorizes process hazard as shown in Table 2-1:

Table 2-1 Fire & Explosion Index Degree of Hazard

F&EI Range	Degree of Hazard
1 – 60	Light
61 – 96	Moderate
97 – 127	Intermediate
128 – 158	Heavy
159 and higher	Severe

Note that Preliminary F&EI from the RAST tool is based on a **single Equipment Item**. The Dow *Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide* allows evaluation of larger "Process Units" (consisting of multiple equipment items) within a single analysis. The Dow *F&EI Hazard Classification Guide* notes that risk will be overstated for Process Units handling less than 5000 lb. (2269 kg.)). Careful consideration should be given to Preliminary Results for equipment items handling small quantities. Also note that answers to several F&EI questions are evaluated based on available Input information which may not exactly match the question criteria. As a result, the Index and Radius of Exposure may be slightly different that attained with the DOW F&EI but is typically within 5 to 10% of the numerical value.

To view the preliminary Fire and Explosion Index, *Select* Fire & Explosion Index / Chemical Exposure Index from the *Study Menu* worksheet (Figure 2-19).

Figure 2-19 Fire & Explosion Index for Example Problem with Minimum Inputs

2.7.2 Preliminary Chemical Exposure Index

Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) may be estimated based on the ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 (Emergency Response Planning Guideline) concentrations from the Chemical Data worksheet. Calculation Units are selected as either SI or US/English based on the Input Units for Distance (meter or feet). Up to four standard cases are estimated:

Pipe or Nozzle Failure is based on the leak rate from hole size per the CEI guidance of:

- Diameter less than 2 inch (50 mm) – full bore failure
- Diameter between 2 and 4 inch (100 mm) – estimated as a 2 inch hole
- Diameter greater than 4 inch – estimated as a hole equivalent to 20% of cross-sectional area

Equipment Overfill or Overflow is based on a leak rate equivalent to the entered feed rate.

Release from Pressure Relief Device is based on an entered Design Capacity or estimated from the Relief Diameter and Set Pressure. (Results for this case are blank if Relief Device information has not been entered.)

Fire Exposure Vapor Venting is based on NFPA-30 estimates of fire heat input divided by the heat of vaporization. (Results for this case are blank if a fire potential is not feasible based on Chemical Data input and "Quantity of Other Flammables in Area" is zero or blank.)

The Chemical Exposure Index and related Hazard Distance to ERPG-2 concentration (HD-2) or Hazard Distance to ERPG-3 concentration (HD-3) are based on "ground" elevation releases lasting at least 5 minutes in duration. An example criterion for requiring a quantitative versus qualitative HIRA study might be a CEI Index of 200 or greater.

To view the preliminary Chemical Exposure Index, *Select* Fire & Explosion Index / Chemical Exposure Index from the *Main Menu* worksheet (Figure 2-20).

ESTIMATED CHEMICAL EXPOSURE INDEX
RAST Version 4.1

Prepared by: Date:
Reviewed by: Review Date:

Reviewer and Review Date may be Entered.

PLANT DATA

Process Unit: Vessel/Tank: V-101

Key Chemical: Acrylonitrile

Fraction Key Chemical	1	CEI UNITS: SI Units
Physical State	Liquid	
System Inventory, kg	63752	
Contained Mass, kg	63752	
Maximum Feedrate, kg/min	400	
Containment Dike Area, sq m		

Selection of CEI Units based on User Distance Units (m or ft)

Summary of entered Equipment and Location Information

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING   DISTANCES

NFPA Health Rating	4	Public, m	180
ERPG-2 (ppm)	35.0	Nearest Occupied Building, m	70
ERPG-3 (ppm)	75.0		

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES   EQUIPMENT INFORMATION

Operating Temperature, T, C	25	Equipment Volume, cu m	100
Operating Pressure, P (gauge), bar	0.01	Ht of Liquid within Equipment, m	6
Molecular Weight	53.1	Equivalent Pipe or Nozzle Size (in) =	2
Normal Boiling Point, C	77.2	Equivalent Pipe or Nozzle Size (mm) =	50.8
Vapor Press at Operating Temp, kPa absolute	13.94		
Liquid Density at Operating Temp, kg/cu m	796.90		
Liquid Heat Capacity at Op Temp, kJ/km C	2.06		
Heat of Vaporization at Operating Temp, kJ/km	635.5		

Summary of Chemical Properties from Chemical Data Input.

CEI CASE DATA - SUMMARY

	1	2	3	4
Case Number				
Scenario Description	Pipe or Nozzle Failure	Overfill or Overflow	Relief Device Vapor to Atmosphere	Fire Exposure Relief to Atmos.
Equivalent Hole Size, mm	50.80			
Liquid Release Rate, kg/sec	15.04	6.67		
Vapor Release Rate, kg/sec				5.13
Total Release Quantity in 15 minutes kg	13540.0	6000.0		
Flashed Fraction	0.000	0.000		
Overall Fraction Flashed+Droplet Evaporation	0.000	0.000		
Airborne Rate from Flash+Droplet Evaporation, kg/sec	0.00	0.00		
Pool Area, sq m	1699	753		
Estimated Pool Temperature, C	25.0	25.0		
Pool Evaporation Rate, kg/sec	2.62	1.21		
Total Airborne Rate, kg/sec	2.62	1.21		5.13

CEI Calculation Results for most common cases.

Include Pool Fire Exposure in CEI Summary?

CHEMICAL EXPOSURE INDEX

	1	2	3	4
Hazard Distance, HD-2, m	1216	826		1702
Hazard Distance, HD-3, m	831	564		1162
CEI	122	83		170

In addition to the Index, the estimated distance to ERPG-2 and ERPR-3 concentration is summarized.

Figure 2-20 Chemical Exposure Index for Example Problem with Minimum Inputs

2.7.3 Hazard Summary

A summary of Process Hazards is developed based on the input information is provided for "normal" and selected "upset" process conditions. Hazards associated with excessive pressure (potential for equipment rupture and/or relief device activation), chemical exposure (thermal and/or chemical burns,

dermal toxicity), flammability (including pool fire potential), inhalation toxicity, and reactivity are included in this summary. If information beyond the minimum required is input, additional hazards are considered. _The evaluation team should also consider any other hazards not identified in this summary._

Example Initial Hazard Screening Results are summarized as

Flammable Hazard Sufficient for Further Consideration if:

- Flash Point less than a specified limit (such as 60 deg C) - **_or_**
- The maximum process temperature (under normal or upset conditions) is greater than the flash point less a specified limit (such as 5 deg C) - **_or_**
- The chemical is considered a combustible dust or dust-flammable liquid hybrid.

Toxicity Hazard Sufficient for Further Consideration if:

- ERPG-3 less than a specified limit (such as1000 ppm by volume) - **_or_**
- Chemical is labeled as toxic in contact with skin, or toxic to the environment or considered by a regulatory agency to be toxic.

Reactivity Hazard Sufficient for Further Consideration if [14]:

- Heat of Reaction / Mass is more exothermic than specified limit (such as –50 J/gm) - **_or_**
- There is evidence of highly volatile or gaseous products generated - **_or_**
- There is evidence of a reaction with water or any other chemical which may be inadvertently added - **_or_**
- The chemical is considered a potential Condensed-Phase Detonable (explosive)

Hazardous Service Sufficient for Further Consideration if:

- The maximum process temperature (under normal, upset, or reaction conditions) is greater than a specified limit for thermal burns (such 60 deg C for liquids, or 100 deg C for vapors) or temperature is less than a low temperature limit (such as -20 deg C) - **_or_**
- The chemical handled is considered corrosive to human tissue - **_or_**
- The estimated maximum process pressure or vapor pressure (under normal, upset, or reaction conditions) exceeds the equipment Maximum Allowable Working Pressure or relief device set pressure.

Note that the Hazard Screening Criteria found on hidden worksheets may be changed to reflect a company's specific criteria. It is suggested that a company representative proficient in chemical process risk analysis (filling a RAST Technical Administrator role) be responsible for updating study parameters rather than RAST users or members of a specific study team. The default parameters provided in RAST should be considered "examples" as CCPS does not endorse any specific risk criteria.

Figure 2-21 shows the Hazard Summary for the Acrylonitrile example.

HAZARD SUMMARY

RAST Version 4.1　　　　　　　　　　*Date:*

Summary of Chemical Information　　　**for Process Unit: Vessel/Tank; V-101**

Physical State at Operating Conditions for Acrylonitrile = Liquid and Feed of:

Weight Fraction Acrylonitrile	1

Normal Boiling Point, C	77.2	**Hazard Screening**
Flash Point, C	**-5.0**	*Note Chemical Information in Bold*
Lower Flammable Limit at Initial Composition, vol %	3.0	
Combustible Dust?	No	*Flammability Hazard Sufficient for Further*
ERPG-2 at Initial Composition, ppm	35.0	*Consideration*
ERPG-3 at Initial Composition, ppm	**75.0**	
Dermal Toxicity Classification *(or Corrosive to Human Tissue)*	**Toxic**	*Toxicity Hazard Sufficient for Further*
Aquatic Toxicity Classification	**Toxic**	*Consideration*
Considered Toxic by a Regulatory Agency?	No	
Heat of Reaction, kJoule/kg		
Highly Volatile or Gaseous Products Generated?	No	
Potential for Mixing Incompatible Materials?	No	
Considered Condensed Phase Explosive?	No	

Summary of Equipment and Process Conditions	Temperature	Pressure	*Pressure Exceeds Relief Device*
Equipment or Vessel Volume 100 cu m	C	bar gauge	*Set Pressure?*
Normal Operating Conditions	**25**	**0.01**	
Relief Device Set Pressure	80.2	**0.10**	
Catastrophic Failure/Burst Pressure for Low Design Pressure	85.7	**0.30**	
Full Vacuum Rated?　Not Entered			
Catastrophic Failure High Temperature	**600.0**		
Temperature where Low Temp Embrittlement may Occur?　Not Entered			
Maximum Feed Pressure		Not Entered	
Maximum Gas Pad Pressure		Not Entered	
Maximum Downstream Equipment Pressure		Not Entered	
Maximum from Liquid Displacement *(based on 9 X compression or feed pressure)*		**4.55**	**Yes**
Estimated Maximum Headspace Deflagration Pressure		**10.13**	**Yes**
Maximum Pressure from Hydraulic Surge (Piping Only)			
Maximum Ambient Conditions	25	0.01	**No**
Maximum Feed Temperature			
Minimum Coolant Temperature			
Normal Boiling Point of Equipment Contents	77.2		
Maximum from Heating Media Temperature			
Estimated time to Relief Set Pressure or MAWP from Heat Transfer at Low Level, min			
Estimated time to Relief Set Pressure or MAWP from Heat Transfer at High Level, min			
Heating Media Source Pressure		0.00	**No**
Max Temp from Mechanical Energy at Low Level: Non-Insulate	32.3	0.09	**No**
Estimated time to Relief Set or MAWP from Mechanical Energy at Low Level, min		3755.25	
Max Temp from Mechanical Energy at High Level: Non-Insulate	28.2	0.04	**No**
Estimated time to Relief Set or MAWP from Mechanical Energy at High Level, min			
Maximum Mechanical Energy Temperature may also exceed the Flash Point			*Max. Temperature Exceeds High Temperature Failure*
Maximum Temperature , C	**32.3**		**No**
			Min Temperature less than Embrittlement Temperature
Minimum Temperature, C	**25**		**No**

Potential for Uncontrolled Reaction	**No**		*Relief Device may not be adequately sized for Uncontrolled Reaction*
Reaction Temperature of No Return is Greater than the Boiling Point at Relief Set Pressure or MAWP or non-Reactive			
Exothermic Reaction Temperature of No Return			*Pressure Exceeds Maximum Allowable Working or Relief Set Pressure?*
Maximum Reaction based on Adiabatic and Initial	*Temperature, C*	*Pressure, barg*	
Temperature as Operating Temperature	25.0	1.01	
Max Reaction Temp Exceeds High Temperature Failure?			

Potential for Pool Fire	Yes		
The Flash Point is Less Than: 60 C, Ambient Temperature + 5 C, Operating Temperature + 5 C, Heating Media Temperature + 5 C, Max Mechanical Energy Temperature + 5 C			
Quantity Flammable Available based on System Inventory	63752.0	kg	*Relief Device may not be*
Maximum Pool Fire Duration based on Direct Fire	513.2	minutes	*adequately sized for Pool*
Fire Heat Input per API 2000 or NFPA 30 for Storage or Low Pressure Tank	10222235.8	Kwatt	*Fire Exposure*

Contents Reach Relief Conditions at Pool Fire Duration
Contents Reach Failure or Rupture Conditions at Pool Fire Duration

Summary of Chemical Properties for screening of Flammability, Toxicity, and Reactivity Hazards

Hazard Screening Results

Summary of "Normal" and Selected "Upset" Process Hazards

Reaction Hazard Summary

Evaluation of Pool Fire Potential

Figure 2-21 Hazard Summary for Example Problem with Minimum Inputs

2.7.4 Consequence Summary

A summary of potential Consequences for a variety of Loss Events based on a single Equipment Item is provided in the Consequence Summary. The **Loss Event** is selected and estimation results for Airborne Quantity, Vapor Dispersion, Explosion, and Impact Assessment including *LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor* and *Occupied Building Impacts* are displayed.

Note: The Consequence Analysis in RAST is based on "steady state" rather than dynamic conditions at the chemical composition and flow rate entered on the Chemical Data and Process Conditions input worksheets. Several unit operations may require dynamic simulation to perform detailed hazard and risk evaluation rather than use of "average" composition or process conditions used by RAST. Examples of units where composition, location, other process conditions change over time within the equipment include reactors, distillation columns and, in some cases, piping. In these cases, the User needs to determine if RAST is capable of providing the accuracy and level of detail needed.

Loss Event Categories are aligned to specific discharge models including:

- Hole Size where release rate is determined by modeling the discharge from a hole of specified diameter, process pressure, and fluid density. A small hole (5 to 15 mm) may represent gasket failure or leaks from mechanical pump seals. A medium hole (25 mm) may represent significant equipment or piping leaks, while a large hole (100 mm to full bore) represents hose, pipe, or equipment nozzle failure.
- Overflow or Specified Rate where release rate is determined from the feed or other specified release rate.
- Excessive Heat where release rate is determined from the rate of heat input divided by the heat of vaporization.
- Equipment Rupture represents a sudden release of the entire contents and may apply to both energy and hazardous chemical releases.

Airborne Quantity for liquid releases involves estimation of liquid release rate, flash fraction, aerosol evaporation fraction, and evaporation from liquid pools.

Vapor Dispersion involves estimation of concentration and distance by jet mixing or atmospheric dispersion for continuous or instantaneous releases. The effects of buoyancy, momentum, elevation, and ventilation for indoor releases are also considered.

Explosions include Physical Explosion (equipment rupture), outdoor Vapor Cloud Explosion, and indoor Building (or confined space) Explosion. Hazard and damage level are related to blast overpressure with distance from the explosion epicenter.

Impact Assessment involves estimation of the number of people potentially impacted by various Incident Outcomes including Flash Fire, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Building Explosion, Physical Explosion, Toxic Release and Chemical Exposure. Impacts to personnel outdoors, within enclosed process areas, and within occupied buildings are considered. If the Study Parameter option to represent consequence severity is set as "Hazard Distance", the Impact Assessment, severity is estimated from Vapor Dispersion and Explosion estimates rather than number of people.

Figure 2-22 shows the Consequence summary for the selected loss event in the Acrylonitrile example.

CONSEQUENCE SUMMARY

Date:

Loss Event for: Vessel/Tank; V-101 Containing Acrylonitrile :

Gasket Failure at Op Press

> **Select Loss Event of Interest from a standardized listing.**

	Release Location	Outdoors

Prob of Exposure (proximity based) with Personnel Not in Immediate Area

		Factor	Probability

Airborne Quantity Summary:

On Site Toxic POE

Release Temperature, C	25.0	
Release Pressure, barg		
Physical State at Release Conditions	Liquid	
Heat Input, Kcal/min		Flash
Equivalent Hole Size, cm	1.000	
Release Rate, Kg/sec	0.45	Chemical Exposure POE
Release Duration, min	60.00	
Total Release Quantity, kg		Physical Explosion POE
Spray Distance, m	5.8	
Flash + Aerosol Evaporation Fraction	0.006	
Estimated Aerosol Droplet Diameter, _micron_	1225	
Pool Area, sq m	158.9	
Estimated Pool Temperature, C	8.1	
Maximum Pool Evaporation Rate, kg/sec	0.2448	
Total Airborne Rate, kg/sec	0.24	
Total Airborne Quantity, Kg	450.1	

> **Source Model Summary for Airborne Rate and Total Release Quantity**

Airborne Quantity Composition:

Mole Fraction Acrylonitrile	1.000	_Fence Line Concentration Exceeds ERPG-2_
		Ground or Work Area Exceeds Multiple of LFL or Time-Scaled ERPG-3
Mole Fraction Pad Gas (at Mw = 29)		
ERPG-2 for Vapor Composition, ppm by volume	56.3	
ERPG-3 for Vapor Composition, ppm by volume	120.6	
LC-50 Concentration, ppm by volume	596.9	
One-hour ERPG-3 for Vapor Composition, ppm by volume	75.0	
One-hour LC-1 Concentration, ppm by volume	99.2	
LFL for Vapor Composition, % by volume	3.00	

> **Dispersion Model Summary for Distance to Hazardous Concentration**

Dispersion Summary (Atmospheric Stability Class D with 3 m/sec wind except as noted):

Max Distance to Time-Scaled ERPG-2, m	319.6	
Max Distance to Time-Scaled ERPG-3, m	220.8	
Max Distance to 1% Lethality for 1.5 F weather, m	442.2	
Max Distance to Estimated LC-50 Concentration, m	99.7	
Max Distance to Flash Fire Impact or 0.5 LFL, m	15.7	_Potential Toxic Impact within Occupied Building (Indoor Conc > one-_
Maximum Ground Elevation Concentration, ppm	1000000.0	
Concentration at Distance to Fence Line, ppm	183.0	
Concentration at Distance to Unrestricted Work Area, ppm	1000000.0	
Concentration within Occupied Bldg 1, ppm	461.3	
Concentration within Occupied Bldg 2, ppm		
Concentration within Enclosed Process Area, ppm		
Conc within Enclosed Process Area w/Ventilation, ppm		

> **Explosion Summary for Distance to Blast Overpressure of Concern**

Explosion Summary:

Probability of Ignition (POI) 2

VCE or Building Explosion Energy, kcal		
VCE or Building Explosion Distance to 1 psi Overpressure, m		
Maximum Distance to LFL Concentration, m	9.0	
Blast Overpressure at Center of Occupied Building 1, psi	0.0	
Blast Overpressure at Center of Occupied Building 2, psi	0.0	
Distance to Severe Thermal Radiation Impact, m		
Rupture Explosion Energy, kcal		Probability of Explosion
Distance to Direct Blast Impact (10 psi), m		2
Maximum Fragment Range, m		
Rupture Distance to 1 psi Overpressure, m		
Rupture Overpressure at Center of Occupied Building 1, psi	0.0	
Rupture Overpressure at Center of Occupied Building 2, psi	0.0	

> **Estimated Probability of Ignition**

Incident Outcome and Consequence Summary:

Impact Assessment with Personnel routinely in the immediate area

	Exceeds Threshold Criteria	LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factors Based On _Estimated Number of People Impacted_
Offsite Toxic Impact based on Toxic Integration Method and 180 m to Fence Line	Yes	6
Onsite Toxic Impact based on Distance to LC-50 Concentration of 100 m	Yes	4
Outdoor Toxic Exposure Duration 600 sec		
Onsite Flash Fire Impact based on Distance to 0.5 LFL Concentration of 16 m		4
Chemical Exposure based on Dermal or Thermal Hazards and Spray Distance of 6 m		3
Equipment Rupture Direct Blast Impact based on Distance to 10 psi		
Onsite Thermal Radiation Impact based on Distance from Fireball		
Number of Potential Serious Toxic Impacts Onsite: 0.7 people		
Number of Potential Serious Flash Fire/Fireball Impacts Onsite: 0 people		
Occupied Building Toxic Impact	Yes	5
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 1: 3 people		
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 2: 0 people		
Occupied Building Impact from Vapor Cloud Explosion	No	NA
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 1: 0 people and 0 offsite		
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 2: 0 people and 0 offsite		
Occupied Building Physical Explosion Impact	No	
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 1: 0 people and 0 offsite		
Number of Potential Serious Impacts for Building 2: 0 people and 0 offsite		
Environmental Impact:		NA

> **Consequence Summary for Selected Loss Event including Tolerable Frequency Factor for various Incident Outcome. This may be used to "screen out" scenarios based on Consequence.**

Figure 2-22 Consequence Summary for Selected Loss Event in the Example Problem

2.8 Scenario Identification

A library of scenarios has been developed from operational experience, incident history, and historical risk analysis studies. The scenario library in RAST is based on considering the entered Equipment Item as a study "node" for which common parameters and deviations are identified – a format compatible to Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). For simplified Process Risk Analysis, parameter deviations are primarily focused on those which could lead to an unintended release of hazardous material or energy (a Loss Event) impacting people or the environment. Few cases involving only Equipment Damage or Business Loss have been included.

Scenarios considered in the library not meeting a "screening" criterion are shown in gray and not included on the Scenario Results worksheet. (Note that the screening criterion may be updated by the RAST Technical Administrator on hidden worksheets.) The Scenario Identification list is intended to assist the Hazard Evaluation or Risk Analysis study team identify *what could go wrong* in the operation of the equipment item. This list is interactive: adding or modifying input information will update the list. If this worksheet is accessed directly by the worksheet tabs then the "Update" command should be used to ensure the information is current. It may also be necessary to use the "Update" command to ensure inputs for existing safeguards, recommendations, and further evaluation are associated with the proper scenarios. Figure 2-23 shows a partial list of Suggested Scenario for the Example Problem.

The suggested list of scenarios depends on several of the inputs. Changing or updating inputs may alter the list of suggested scenarios.

"Update" command if accessed directly by worksheet tabs

Most Common Initiating Events with Descriptions

Draft of Design Intent Statement that may be Updated

Loss Event with Potential Outcome and Tolerable Frequencies

Existing Safeguards and Recommendations may be entered

Save Inputs for this Worksheet

Scenario Type with Comments or Description

To Main Menu

Update List

Create User Scenario

Suggested Scenarios from the RAST Library

Evaluation Node.

Plant Section =
Equipment Type = Vessel/Tank
Equipment Tag = V-101

Node Design Intent Summary:

V-101 is a Vessel/Tank containing Acrylonitrile that operates at 25 C and 0.01 bar. The volume is 100 cu m with a maximum allowable working pressure of 0.2 bar. The maximum feed or flow rate is 400 kg/min.

Scenarios in gray were suggested to be excluded for reason noted under Scenario Comments. Study Team should review each to determine if excluding from Risk Analysis is appropriate.

Go To Scenario Results >

Update Input this worksheet

Clear Input this Worksheet

Save Input to Equipment Table

Session Date:

Session Participants:

Mechanical Integrity Scenarios will NOT be reported.

Missing Inputs for Session Date or Participants

Menu Filters:

Potential Outcome / Tolerable Frequency Factors

Scenario Type	Scenario Comments	Parameters and Deviation	Initiating Event (Cause)	Initiating Event Description	Loss Event	Outcome	Off-Site Toxic Release	On-Site Toxic Release	Indoor Toxic Release	Toxic Infiltration	Chemical Exposure	Flash Fire or Fireball	Vapor Cloud Explosion	Building Explosion	Equipment Explosion	Property Damage or Env	Env	Existing Safeguards	Recommendations	Further Analysis
Drain or Vent Valve Open	Drain or Vent Valve left open following infrequent maintenance, purging or cleaning	Flow-Loss of Containment	Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	Operator leaves Drain or Vent Open following infrequent maintenance	Drain or Vent Leak	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	4		5	3	4						Procedures Require Blind Flange or Plug for all Terminal Valves in addition to a walk through inspection of Terminal Valves following Maintenance		No
Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposure	Vapor Pressure exceeds Relief Set or Burst Pressure from Pool Fire Exposure	Pressure-High	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Leak of Flammable Material or Material above its Flash Point which may ignite	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	6		6		4						Water Deluge System with good drainage in Place which covers this storage tank	Check relief device sizing and installation to ensure venting to a "safe" location	Yes
					Equipment Rupture at Fire Conditions	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball, Equipment Explosion	6	6		6	4	5			3					
Ignitable Headspace	Chemical is Flammable or Combustible: Maximum Operating, Mechanical Energy or Heating Media Temperature exceeds Flash Point less 5 C	Composition-Wrong Concentration	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Pressure or NonCombustible Atmosphere Control	Equipment Rupture - Deflagration	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball, Equipment Explosion	6	6		6	3	4			3			Tank is maintained under an inert atmosphere.	Check integrity/reliability of inert system and ensure sufficient Protective Layers for this scenario.	Yes
Overfill or Overflow	Overfill or Backflow of liquid with spill rate equal to the feed rate to a maximum quantity of the available inventory minus contained mass	Level-High	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Level Indication with continued addition of material	Overfill Release	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	6		6		4						Tank is equipment with a High Level Interlock and Operator is required to be present during unloading of a tank truck.	Check Toxic Infiltration Outcome to determine if sufficient protections exist for this scenario to protect building occupants.	Yes
			Human Failure Action more than once per quarter	Operator opens wrong valve or initiates filling when equipment is not empty		Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	6		6		4								
Excessive Heat Input - Heat Transfer	No Heating Media Temperature was noted	Pressure-High	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Flow Control																
Excessive Heat Input - Mechanical	Vapor Pressure plus pad gas Does Not exceed Maximum Allowable Working Pressure or Relief Set Pressure at Maximum Temperature from Mechanical Energy Input	Pressure-High	Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	Agitation or Pump Recirculation left running for extended time allowing slow temperature increase																

Scenario considered but not suggested in "gray". Comments explain why not suggested.

Evaluation Team may select which scenario to include for more detailed analysis.

Figure 2-23 Partial List of Suggested Scenarios for Example Problem

2.8.1 Example Impact of Changes in Parameter Inputs

To demonstrate the impact of a Parameter Input change:

Select **Scenario Identification** from the Main Menu and view the Scenario List. *Note that it may be necessary to use the "Update" command to ensure inputs for existing safeguards, recommendations, and further evaluation are associated with the proper scenarios.*

Return to the Main Menu and Select **Equipment Parameter Input**. Enter the input for **Insulation?** as **"Yes"**

Again, Select **Scenario Identification** from Main Menu.

Notice that a new scenario has been added (Figure 2-24):

Scenario Type	Scenario Comments	Parameters and Deviation	Initiating Event (Cause)	Initiating Event Description	Loss Event	Outcome											Existing Safeguards	Recommendations	Further Analysis
Drain or Vent Valve Open	Drain or Vent Valve left open following infrequent maintenance, purging or cleaning	Flow-Loss of Containment	Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	Operator leaves Drain or Vent Open following infrequent maintenance	Drain or Vent Leak	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball	4	5		5	3	4				Procedure require blank or plug on all terminal valves to the atmosphere. Procedure requires a :walk through" inspection of terminal valves before restart of proces.		Yes
Excessive Heat Input - Mechanical	Vapor Pressure plus pad gas exceeds Maximum Allowable Working Pressure or Relief Set Pressure at Maximum Temperature from Mechanical Energy Input	Pressure-High	Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	Agitation or Pump Recirculation left running for extended time allowing slow temperature increase	Vapor Relief Vent - Mechanical Energy	On-Site Toxic Release		2										
					Equipment Rupture at Saturation Temperature	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball, Vapor Cloud Explosion, Equipment Explosion	6	6		5	4	5	6		4			

Figure 2-24 New Scenario Added due to Adding Insulation under Equipment Input

If the vessel is well-insulated, then the small quantity of heat from the circulation may be able to slowly raise the maximum temperature to the point where vapor pressure of acrylonitrile exceeds the design limits of the equipment.

As another example:

Select **Process Conditions Input** from the Main Menu.

Enter for **Downstream Pressure** (gauge) **=** a value of **0.5 bar** to reflect the head of fluid downstream.

Return to the Main Menu and again select **Scenario Identification**.

Notice that the Overfill Scenario has been modified (Figure 2-25):

Scenario Type	Scenario Comments	Parameters and Deviation	Initiating Event (Cause)	Initiating Event Description	Loss Event	Outcome								Existing Safeguards	Recommendations	Further Analysis
Overfill or Backflow	Overfill or Backflow of liquid with spill rate equal to the feed rate to a maximum quantity of the available inventory minus contained mass	Flow-Backflow	Pump (blower, compressor, etc.) Failure	Pump Failure causing backflow	Backflow Release	Consequence Does Not Exceed Threshold Criteria for Continuing with LOPA										
					Equipment Rupture at Operating Temperature	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball, Vapor Cloud Explosion	6	6	6	3	5	5				
Overfill or Overflow	Overfill or Backflow of liquid with spill rate equal to the feed rate to a maximum quantity of the available inventory minus contained mass	Level-High	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Failure of Level Indication with continued addition of material	Overfill Release	Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	5	5	3	4		Operator present during tank truck unloading.	Potential for offsite toxic impacts. Continue with more detailed evaluation	Yes
			Human Failure Action more than once per quarter	Operator opens wrong valve or initiates filling when equipment is not empty		Off-Site Toxic Release, On-Site Toxic Release, Toxic Infiltration, Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball	6	5	5	3	4				

Figure 2-25 Scenario Modification due to Adding Downstream Pressure under Process Conditions

A second Loss Event has been added to reflect *backflow* as a means by which Overfill may occur. Also notice that additional Initiating Events may be added. Note that the backflow rate may also need to be entered under Process Conditions for evaluation of Consequence. (The Outcome comments note that the Consequence Does Not Exceed Threshold Criteria for Continuing in LOPA" since there is no flowrate entered.)

2.8.2 Saving Preliminary Analysis Results

From the Main Menu, Select **Go to Equipment Table**, select the cell containing V-101, and Select **Load Selected**. This will remove the changes in Insulation and Downstream Pressure inputs and return to the Main Menu. Select **Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded** (black macro button). Results of the Preliminary Analysis *for all scenarios selected for further analysis on the Scenario List worksheet* will be stored on the Scenario Results worksheet in a single row identified by a unique Scenario Number. Results contain information regarding the type of equipment, scenario category, initiating event, loss event, incident outcome, consequence, a summary of release quantities and summary of hazard distance estimates.

The Scenario Results worksheet may be accessed from the LOPA Menu.

There is no "calculation" per se, but a capture of scenario information at a point in time based on the team Input information available. If Inputs are changed and Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded is initiated at a later time, estimates are compared to the previous values for each existing Scenario. When estimates do not match the previous estimate, the cell containing the changed results turns "green" and the prior values are stored in the cell comments. This allows the user to determine the impact of changes in the Input information.

An example of the Scenario Results worksheet is located in Figure 2-26. Once the team is satisfied with the preliminary or screening analysis results, the entire workbook might be saved using a name specific to the project.

File | Page Layout | Formulas | Review | View | Developer | He...

G27

| Version | Equipment Loaded | < Equi...t Table | LOPA Worksheet > | | | Defines a Unique Scenario | | LOPA GAP ANALYSIS |
| 4.1 | V-101 | Reset Filters | Create User Scenario | Modify User Scenario | Duplicate Scenario | Risk Summary > | LOPA Worksheet Entry | |

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	CH	CI	CU	CV	CW	CX	CY	CZ	DA
2	SCENARIO	Cross Ref	Equipment Tag	Scenario Type	Initiating Event General Description	Loss Event	Outcome	Consequence	User Defined Consequence	Tolerable Frequency Factor	p in Layers of Protection	Worst Case Scenario for Further Analysis	Analyze via LOPA?	Source	Tool Version Used for Last Calc	Date of Last Calc	Comparison with Last Run
3	17.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Equipment Rupture at Fire Co	Chemical Exposure	Severity Level-3		4	1			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
4	18.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Equipment Rupture at Fire Co	Flash Fire or Fireball	Severity Level-4		5	2			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
5	14.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Equipment Rupture at Fire Co	Off-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
6	15.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Equipment Rupture at Fire Co	On-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
7	16.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Equipment Rupture at Fire Co	Toxic Infiltration	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
8	11.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	Off-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
9	12.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	On-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
10	13.01		V-101	Excessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposu	IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	Toxic Infiltration	Severity Level-5		6	3	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
11	8.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	Chemical Exposure	Severity Level-2		3	1			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
12	10.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	Equipment Explosion	Severity Level-2		3	1			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
13	9.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	Flash Fire or Fireball	Severity Level-3		4	2			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
14	5.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	Off-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	4	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
15	6.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	On-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	4	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
16	7.01		V-101	Ignitable Headspace	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Equipment Rupture - Deflagra	Toxic Infiltration	Severity Level-5		6	4	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
17	22.01		V-101	Overfill or Overflow	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Overfill Release	Flash Fire or Fireball	Severity Level-3		4	1			Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
18	19.01		V-101	Overfill or Overflow	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Overfill Release	Off-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	5	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
19	20.01		V-101	Overfill or Overflow	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Overfill Release	On-Site Toxic Release	Severity Level-5		6	5	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New
20	21.01		V-101	Overfill or Overflow	BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	Overfill Release	Toxic Infiltration	Severity Level-5		6	5	High TF & IPL		Tool	4.1	2/25/2022 20:01	New

Figure 2-26 Preliminary Analysis Results

3   Chemical Data

The chemical and physical properties of materials handled are fundamental in Hazard Evaluation and Risk Analysis. RAST contains a small chemical database and allows modification or creation of key chemical parameters for single components and mixtures.

This section contains:

- The simple correlations used for common chemical properties as a function of temperature.
- How to enter chemical properties for a new chemical.
- How to create a mixture from listed chemicals.
- How vapor composition is estimated in RAST from liquid composition assuming an "ideal" mixture.

Chemical Property Correlations in RAST

Chemical Properties are needed at several temperatures to perform screening calculations. The following are simple correlations of key chemical properties used in RAST that require only two data points at different temperatures in the region of interest.

Vapor Pressure: $\ln (P^{sat}) = a - b / (T - c)$. The "c" constant is 0 if only two data points are used with T in deg K

Liquid Density: $\rho = a - b\,T$

Liquid Heat Capacity: $C_S = a + b\,T$

Heat of Vaporization: $\lambda = a - b\,T - c\,T^2$. The "c" constant is zero if only two data points are used.

Vapor density may be estimated as an ideal gas by Equation 3-1:

$$\rho_V = 0.12\ P\ Mw\ /\ T \qquad\qquad \textbf{Equation 3-1}$$

where P is pressure in kPa and T in deg K

RAST contains a data table of Chemical Properties (on a hidden worksheet) to be maintained by the Technical Administrator. This allows a company or business to utilize a consistent set of properties specifically for Hazard and Risk Analysis. Chemical Names are color-coded on the Chemical Data Input worksheet such that chemical information from the RAST Dataset is *blue* while User entered Chemical Data is *red*. Note that values of the coefficients in these correlations in the data table are typically positive numbers as the "sign" is part of the correlating equation. An example of this simple linear equation is shown for iso-butane in Figure 3-1

The simple property correlations in RAST due not include an equation of state (vapor is estimated as an ideal gas). Physical properties have generally been correlated from approximately 0.4 to 0.8 of the critical temperature where properties are nearly linear with temperature. Liquid and vapor density may be significantly different for operation near the critical temperature and pressure (such as liquified gases at high pressure). This **limitation will result in less accuracy for equipment operating with liquid at elevated temperature and pressure (**such as a liquefied gas operating near the critical temperature of the material).

In some cases, it may be necessary to utilize more advanced software in estimation of thermodynamic properties for determination of material or energy release rate near the critical point.

Figure 3-1 Example simple property correlation for iso-butane

3.1 Entering New Chemical Properties

A fairly comprehensive list of chemical properties is available within the RAST Chemical Data Table. However, if a chemical is not listed or the User wants to modify the available data, the **Enter New Chemical** option must be used. Note that to create a chemical mixture, the properties for *each* component must be available from the Chemical Table listing (Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2 Entering a New Chemical

From the Chemical Data worksheet, select **Enter New Chemical** (Figure 3-3). One may begin with properties from an existing chemical by selecting a Chemical Name under the column "Starting chemical that is similar" or merely enter values under the column "User Supplied Values". Note that if any chemical property is updated by the user, then the chemical needs to be saved using a different Chemical Name to be available on the chemical listing.

Figure 3-3 Input Worksheet for New Chemical

Select **Save Data to Chemical Table** to save information as a "user" chemical for use within the current RAST file. All "user" chemicals will be included in new RAST files that are "imported" from this file. Contact a RAST administrator for addition, update, or deletion of chemical information in the globally available list within the RAST tool.

3.1.1   *Example Entry of New Chemical Properties*

As an example, data for t-butyl amine (CAS 75-64-9) is entered as a new chemical. The input information may come from a variety of sources, including various Physical Property Databases, Vendor NFPA Ratings, American Industrial Association ERPG values (or US Department of Transportation Protective Action Criteria), Material Safety Datasheets, or other literature references.

STEP 1: Enter initial data (Figure 3-4).

Molecular Weight: 73.14

Melting Point: -86.7 deg C

Boiling Point: 44.4 deg C

Chemical Properties	Starting Chemical That is Similar	User Supplied Values	Properties of User Chemical to be Saved
Chemical Name =			t-butly amine
CAS Number =		75-64-9	75-64-9
Data Source:		Supplier Material Safety Datasheet	
Mol Weight =		73.13	73.13
Melting Point, TM (C) =		-86.7	-86.7
Boil Point, TB (C) =		44.4	44.4

Figure 3-4 Initial Data Entry for Example Problem

Select two temperatures to correlate vapor pressure, liquid density, liquid heat capacity and heat of vaporization. These temperatures should be selected to represent the region of interest (including operating temperature, ambient temperature, boiling point, etc.) and fall between the melting point to less than 0.8 of the critical temperature (if known) or roughly 1.2 times the boiling point in deg K. *(In this example, the critical temperature is listed as 211 deg C or 484 deg K such that 0.8 of the critical temperature is 387 deg K or 114 deg C.)* Temperatures of 0 deg C and 100 deg C are selected. Liquid properties values at "saturation" (pressure equals vapor pressure) are typically used.

STEP 2: Enter chemical property data at the two selected temperatures.

Use data from external sources (Figure 3-5).

Calculate Physical Property Constants from Data Points			
Property	Units	Point 1	Point 2
Temperature 1 and 2	C	0	100
Vapor Pressure (absolute)	kPa	16.3	517.1
Liquid Density	Kg/cu m	711	607
Liquid Heat Capacity	J/gm C	2.58	2.73
Heat of Vaporization	J/gm	413	323

Correlation Coefficients determined from data and "automatically" entered.

9.581
2623.92
43.0
0.711
0.00104
0.617
0.00036
98.7
0.215
0.00000

Units may be changed for convenient input of values

Data points from Physical Property Database or other Source

Estimated Boiling Point, C =   43.9

Figure 3-5 Chemical Properties from External Sources

STEP 3: Enter remaining available chemical data from the supplier Safety Data Sheet (SDS), ERPG Database, and other sources into the center (white) column (Figure 3-6).

Flash Point: -8 deg C

Lower Flammable Limit: 1.7 volume %

Upper Flammable Limit: 8.9 volume %

Autoignition Temperature: 380 deg C

ERPG-2: 0.38 ppm

ERPG-3: 56 ppm

NFPA-Health Rating: 3

NFPA-Flammability Rating: 3

NFPA-Stability Rating: 0

Chemical Properties	Starting Chemical That is Similar	[User] Supplied Values	Properties of User Chemical to be Saved
Flash Pt (C) =		-8	-8
LFL (Vol %) =		1.7	1.7
UFL (Vol %) =		8.9	8.9
AutoIgnition Temperature (C) =		380	380
ERPG-1 or Odor (ppm) =		2.5	2.5
ERPG-2 (ppm) =		28	28
ERPG-3 (ppm) =		170	170
NFPA Health =		3	3
NFPA Flammability =		3	3
NFPA Reactivity =		0	0

Data points from Physical Property Database or other Sources

Data points from AIHA ERPG listings

Figure 3-6 Entry of Additional Chemical Data for Example Problem

See Figure 3-7 for **STEPS 4** through **9.**

STEP 4: Enter Ease of Ignition category if there is sufficient information to indicate this hazard characteristic is outside of the default category of "Normal". Categories are Low, Normal, Elevated, and High Ignition based on heat of oxidation, Minimum Ignition Energy, Auto-Ignition Temperature, Fundamental Burning Velocity, and other rating systems such as Maximum Experimental Safe Gap. These categories are described in the references [15]. Examples of materials in the different Ignition Probability categories:

- **Low:** ammonia, methylene chloride, and trichloroethylene
- **Normal:** n-butane, propylene, acetone, methane, and methanol
- **Elevated:** hydrogen, acetylene, ethylene oxide, propylene oxide, carbon disulfide, and ethylene
- **High:** silane and various alkyl aluminum compounds (normally described as pyrophoric)

Leave blank if not sufficient data and a default of "Normal" will be used in Screening Analysis

STEP 5: Enter Fuel Reactivity category if there is sufficient information to indicate this hazard characteristic is outside of the default category of "Medium". Categories are Low, Medium, and High based on Fundamental Burning Velocity of less than 45 cm/sec, between 45 and 75 cm/sec and greater than 75 cm/sec respectively.

Leave blank if not sufficient data and a default of "Medium" will be used in Screening Analysis

STEP 6: Enter Conductivity category if there is sufficient information to indicate this hazard characteristic is outside of the default category of "Semi-Conductive". Categories are Non-Conductive, Semi-Conductive, and Conductive based on liquid electrical conductivity of less than 100 pico-siemen/meter (pS/m), between 100 and 10000 pS/m and greater than 10000 pS/m respectively.

Leave blank if not sufficient data and a default of "Semi Conductive" will be used in Screening Analysis

STEP 7: Enter Dermal and Aquatic Toxicity category if there is sufficient information to indicate a toxicity hazard based on (United Nations) Globally Harmonized System or European Dangerous Substances Directive categories. Note that t-butyl amine has been noted as "Harmful to Aquatic Organisms" in some literature references.

STEP 8: Enter Dust Hazard Classification if the material is a solid and there is sufficient information to indicate dust flammability hazard. Often this information is specific to the equipment in which the dust is handled and, therefore, not saved to the Chemical Table. In those cases, the dust classification information is entered and saved to the Equipment Table from the Chemical Data or Main Menu.

STEP 9: Enter the Chemical Name under "Properties of New Chemical to be saved" and select Save Chemical Data to Chemical Table.

If a Chemical Name is selected that has already been used in the Chemical Table, a dialog box appears as a reminder that the data will not be saved under the selected name. Merely enter "OK" and select another Chemical Name. See Figure 3-8.

If a User specified Chemical Name is selected that already exists in the Chemical Table, a dialog box appears. If merely updating data for a User specified Chemical, enter "OK". See Figure 3-9.

Since Reaction Data may be saved to the Chemical Table for User specified Chemicals, a reminder that reaction information must be entered and saved from the Reaction Input worksheet appears, enter "OK". See Figure 3-10.

Figure 3-7 New Chemical Data Input for Example Problem

Figure 3-8 Error Message if New Chemical's Name Already Exists

Figure 3-9 Dialog Box to Confirm Overwriting Chemical Data

Figure 3-10 Reminder to Enter Reaction Data

3.2 Chemical Mixtures

Where it is necessary to consider mixtures, simple methods based on selection of one component as a Key Chemical are presented in this section. The Key Chemical is merely the first chemical entered whose name will be used in reports rather than listing all the chemicals in the mixture. These methods are generally sufficient for hazard evaluation over a narrow temperature range which should include the operating temperature, ambient temperature and the normal boiling point. The following "Mixture Rules" provide a reasonable estimate for selected chemical properties. Either mass fraction with property per unit mass or mole fraction with property per mole may be used.

Chemical properties for mixtures are dependent on composition. For screening studies, the following simple mixture estimates are used to provide a reasonable estimate for selected chemical properties.

Mixture Liquid Density estimated by additive volumes using Equation 3-2:

$$1/\rho_{L\ mixture} = \Sigma\ x_i\ (1/\rho_{Li}) \qquad\qquad \textbf{Equation 3-2}$$

Example: Estimate liquid density for a mixture of 50 wt% A at 1.0 gm/cc and 50 wt% B at .0.6 gm/cc. Mixture volume = 0.5 / 1 + 0.5 / 0.6 = 1.333 cc/gm, and mixture density =   1 /1.333 = 0.75 gm/cc

Vapor Density estimated as an ideal gas using Equation 3-3:

$$\textbf{Equation 3-3}$$

$$\rho_V = 0.12\ P\ Mw_{avg}\ /\ T$$

where ρ_V is vapor density (kg/m³), P is pressure (kPa), T is temperature (deg K), Mw is average molecular weight of the vapor mixture.

Example: Estimate the vapor density for a mixture of 50 wt% A of molecular weight 30 and 50% wt% B of molecular weight 100 at 101.3 kPa pressure and 298 K. The average molecular weight is 1 / (0.5/30 + 0.5/100) = 46.2.

ρ_V = 0.12 P Mw$_{avg}$ / T = 0.12 (101.2) 46.2 / 298 = 1.88 kg/m³.

Mixture Liquid Heat Capacity estimated by the sum of liquid mass fraction times component Heat Capacity (or mole fraction times molar Heat Capacity), using Equation 3-4.

$$C_{L\ mixture} = \Sigma\ x_i\ C_{Li}$$ **Equation 3-4**

Example: Estimate liquid heat capacity for a mixture of 50 wt% A at 1.5 joule/gm and 50 wt% B at 3 joule/gm. Mixture heat capacity = 0.5 (1.5) + 0.5 (3) = 2.25 joule/gm C

Mixture Heat of Vaporization estimated by the sum of vapor mass fraction times component Heat of Vaporization (or mole fraction times molar Heat of Vaporization), using Equation 3-5.

$$\Delta H_{V\ mixture} = \Sigma\ x_i\ \Delta H_{Vi}$$ **Equation 3-5**

Example: Estimate the heat of vaporization for a vapor mixture of 50 wt% A at 600 joule/gm and 50 wt% B at 400 joule/gm. Mixture heat of vaporization = 0.5 (600) + 0.5 (400) = 500 joule/gm

3.3 Vapor-Liquid Equilibrium in RAST

Mixture Vapor Pressure requires an estimation of the equilibrium vapor composition from a known liquid composition. For simple Risk Analysis, an ideal mixture is assumed where the partial vapor pressure of each component is equal to the pure component vapor pressure times its mole fraction in the liquid (Raoult's Law).

A further simplification is assumption of constant relative volatility and/or a constant ratio of vapor pressures over a narrow temperature range. The vapor-liquid equilibrium ratio for each component is $k_i = y_i / x_i$ where y_i is the mole fraction vapor for component i and x_i is the liquid mole fraction of component i. Relative Volatility is the ratio of k_i values which may be estimated relative to a "key chemical" using Equation 3-6:

$$\alpha_i = k_i / k_{key} = x_{Key}\ y_i / (x_i\ y_{key})$$ **Equation 3-6**

For an "ideal" mixture, the relative volatility is also the ratio of vapor pressures.

Note: The ratio of vapor pressure typically decreases with increasing temperature. Selection of the appropriate temperature range is important to provide a reasonable or conservative estimate of vapor composition from liquid composition.

Two liquid phases (each of which is assumed ideal) is used for mixtures of immiscible liquids. In these cases, each component is assumed to be present in either liquid phase A or liquid phase B. The mixture partial pressure is the sum of the partial pressure for each liquid phase. An activity coefficient for each component is estimated at the feed composition and assumed constant in the region of interest using Equation 3-7:

$$\gamma_i - x'_i + x''_i / x_i \qquad \textbf{Equation 3-7}$$

where: x'_i and x''_i are the liquid mole fractions of component i in liquid phase A and B respectively and x_i is the overall liquid mole fraction of component i. For a single liquid phase $\gamma_i = 1$.

The partial pressure for each component is determined using Equation 3-8:

$$P_i = P^{sat}_i \, x_i \, \gamma_i \qquad \textbf{Equation 3-8}$$

where: P^{sat}_i is the vapor pressure of component i.

The total pressure, Π, is estimated as the sum of partial pressures using Equation 3-9:

$$\Pi = \Sigma \, P^{sat}_i \, x_i \, \gamma_i \quad \text{and,} \quad \Pi = x_{key} \, \gamma_{key} \, P^{sat}_{key} / y_{key} \qquad \textbf{Equation 3-9}$$

where:

x_i is the overall liquid mole fraction of component i

y_i is the vapor mole fraction of component i

γ_i is activity coefficient for component i

P^{sat}_i is the vapor pressure of component i

P_i is the partial pressure of component i

Π is the total pressure

Note that aqueous mixtures containing acids or bases are highly complex and not easily correlated by this simple model.

3.3.1 *Example Entry of a Liquid Mixture*

As an example, enter data for a mixture of 0.5 weight fraction acrylonitrile and 0.5 weight fraction water at an Operating Temperature of 25 C and Operating Pressure of 0.01 barg.

STEP 1: Enter liquid composition on the Chemical Data worksheet. Enter 0.5 as the weight fraction for Acrylonitrile. Select "Water" as a second chemical from the chemical list and enter the weight fraction of 0.5 (Figure 3-11).

Figure 3-11 Chemical Mixture Data Input for Example Problem

STEP 2: Enter which (if any) chemicals form a second liquid phase. Enter "Yes" for Second Liquid Phase for Water. Note the change in vapor composition and estimated Saturation Temperature when "Yes" is entered. There is a significant difference in these estimates for two miscible versus immiscible liquids. Observe the change in estimated boiling point between water as a second liquid phase or in solution. *Observe that changing the Operating Temperature to 80 C will change the Physical State to "Vapor".* See Figure 3-12.

Figure 3-12 Chemical Mixture Data with Input of Second Liquid Phase for Example Problem

STEP 3: **Update mixture Flash Point, Melting Point, Autoignition Temperature, and categories for Ease of Ignition, Fuel Reactivity, Dermal Toxicity, Aquatic Toxicity, and Liquid Conductivity as appropriate**. These parameters are not accurately estimated for mixtures, such that values representing the "worst" chemical in the mixture are initially selected. An estimated mixture flash point is provided based on the temperature at which the equilibrium vapor composition at atmospheric pressure equals the estimated lower flammable limit. Experimentally determined values should always be entered if available (Figure 3-13).

Mixture Properties	Mixture Estimates	User Values	
Melting Point =	-84		deg C
Flash Point =	-5		deg C
Est Mixture Flash Point =	*-2.7*	*deg C*	
Not "Sustained Burning"?			
AutoIgnition Temperature =	481		deg C
Ease of Ignition =	Normal		
Fuel Reactivity =	Medium		
Dermal Toxicity =	Toxic		
Aquatic Toxicity =	Toxic		
High Viscous Material (for F&EI)?			
Mixture NFPA Flammability =	3		
Mixture NFPA Health =	4		
Reactivity Category =			
Mixture NFPA Reactivity =	2		
Liquid Conductivity =	Conductive		

Dust Characteristics

Dust/Solids Hazard Class =			
Solids Mean Particle Size =			micron
Particle Size at 10% Fraction =			micron
Dust Min Ignition Energy =			mJoule
Dust-flammable hybrid?			
Solids Bulk Density >160 g/liter (>10 lb/ft³)?			

Figure 3-13 Additional Mixture Chemical Inputs for Example Problem

A summary of selected Chemical Properties for the Feed Composition is available on the Chemical Input Worksheet (Figure 3-14).

Summary of Chemical Properties

Estimated Boiling Point =	66.7	C
Vapor Pressure at Operating Temp =	17.250	kPa
Liquid Density at Operating Temp =	885.92	Kg/cu m
Liq Heat Capacity at Op Temp =	3.13	J/gm C
Liq Heat Capacity at Boiling Point =	3.22	J/gm C
Heat of Vaporization at Op Temp =	765	J/gm
Heat of Vaporization at Boiling Point =	718	J/gm
Boiling Point at Relief Set or MAWP =	71.7	C
Boiling Point at Burst Pressure =	74.0	C

Note the units may be changed to that most meaningful to the User.

Figure 3-14 Summary of Chemical Property Estimates for Example Problem

Do Not Save this example. Clear Water inputs and change Weight Fraction Acrylonitrile in Feed to 1.0.

3.4 Multi-component Flash and Evaporation in RAST

A single stage equilibrium flash is estimated in RAST assuming constant relative volatility. From a material balance:

$F = V + L$

$F z_i = V y_i + L x_i$

$z_i = (V / F) y_i + (1 – V / F) x_i = F_V y_i + (1 – F_V) x_i$

$x_i = z_i / \{ F_V (y_i / x_i) + 1 – F_V \}$

substituting $\alpha_i = k_i / k_{key} = x_{Key} \, y_i / (x_i \, y_{key})$ and $\Pi = x_{key} \, \gamma_{key} \, P^{sat}_{key} / y_{key}$ yields:

$x_i = z_i / \{ F_V (\alpha_i \, \gamma_{key} \, P^{sat}_{key} / \Pi) + 1 – F_V \}$

A heat balance of the system yields:

$F_V = (T_0 – T) \, C_S / \lambda$

A simple Rayleigh distillation (single equilibrium stage) is used in RAST for multi-component evaporation from a liquid pool once liquid feed to the pool has stopped. The material balance correlation is:

$x_i = z_i \; e^{\, \alpha_i \ln [(1 – F_V) \, x_{key} / z_{key}]} / (1 – F_V)$

where:

    F is molar flow rate of the feed stream

    L is molar liquid flow rate following flash

    V is molar vapor flow rate following flash

    z_i is the feed mole fraction of component i

    x_i is the liquid mole fraction of component I after flash or evaporation

    y_i is the vapor mole fraction of component i after flash or evaporation

    x_{key} is the liquid mole fraction of the key component after flash or evaporation

    y_{key} is the vapor mole fraction of the key component after flash or evaporation

    z_{key} is the overall feed mole fraction of the key component

    γ_{key} is activity coefficient for the key component

    P^{sat}_{key} is the vapor pressure of the key component at the final temperature

    F_V is the flash fraction

    Π is the total pressure after flash or evaporation

    T_0 is the initial temperature

    T is the final temperature after flash

    C_S is the molar liquid heat capacity

    λ is the molar heat of vaporization

These correlations are solved by trial-and-error for the temperature, T, at which both the material and energy balance is satisfied or $\Sigma \, x_i = 1$.

4 Reactivity Data and Evaluation

4.1 Introduction

Evaluation of Reactivity Hazards is one of our most challenging activities. It often involves interpretation of Reactive Chemicals test data. RAST allows input of Reactive Chemicals testing data in addition to providing several screening analysis techniques.

This section covers:

- Reactivity Screening evaluation including: Estimation of Maximum Reaction Temperature and Pressure, Temperature of No Return (TNR), and Time to Maximum Rate (TMR).
- Check for Insulation or Packing Fire potential.
- Check for Potential Explosive
- Correlation of Reactive Chemicals test data to first-order kinetics
- Evaluation of potential process upsets on reaction rate such as: catalytic impurities, "pooling" of reactants, and mis-loading or wrong recipe.

4.2 Reaction Data Entry and Evaluation

The Reaction Data worksheet is used both for input of Reactive Chemicals data and Screening Evaluation of Reactivity Hazards (Figure 4-1). Inputs include heat of reaction, activation energy, detected onset temperature, detected onset rate, test method, and quantity of volatile or gas generation per volume of material.

The detected onset temperature, detected onset rate, and Activation Energy represents a "best fit" of Reactive Chemicals data to a first-order kinetic model. For a test method of *Accelerating Rate Calorimetry* (ARC) or *Vent Sizing Package* (VSP), a *thermal inertia* or phi factor is also required. The phi factor represents the fraction of total reaction heat retained by the sample and is used to scale the data to large equipment. If the test method is *Differential Scanning Calorimetry* (DSC), the detected onset rate is not required as it is assumed to be the sensitivity of the instrument. For a test method of *Theoretical*, inputs are assumed to have been adjusted for large scale equipment.

Several screening evaluations are performed based on equipment, chemical, and reaction inputs. These include: Maximum Reaction Temperature and Pressure, Temperature of No Return (TNR) and Time to Maximum Rate (TMR) for up to four initial temperatures. A Reactivity Parameter provides an estimate for potential explosive material (Index > 20) similar to the Yoshida correlation noted in the Chemical Hazard Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) workshop under Reactivity. Finally, the Frank-Kamenetskii critical diameter for "spontaneous reaction" of powders and solids is estimated at the operating temperature and up to four initial temperatures by providing a thermal conductivity input of the bulk material.

Displays 1st Order Reaction Rate versus Temperature Graphically for selected Reaction Upset Cases

Entry of Reactive Chemicals Data

"Yes" to key questions allow estimates of Reaction upset conditions (displayed graphically)

Reports Estimated Potential for Insulation or Packing Fire

Reports Estimate of Critical Diameter for Solids Reactions

Estimates Activation Energy from two Temperature-Rate Data Points

Estimates Gas Generation from Final Reaction Temperature and Pressure

Reports Table of Critical Radius or Time to Maximum Rate for selected Reaction Upset Case

Figure 4-1 Reaction Data Input and Evaluation worksheet

4.2.1 Example Reaction Data Input and Evaluation

As an example, enter Reactive Chemicals test data for uninhibited acrylonitrile. This data is based on Accelerating Rate Calorimetry experiment.

STEP 1: Enter the heat of reaction. The measured heat in this experiment was -1058 J/g or -253 cal/g. This is only 80% of the theoretically reported value of -17.3 kcal/mole or -326 cal/g. Enter -326 cal/g. See Figure 4-2.

Note that for Continuous Reactions, the Heat of Reaction per Mass in RAST could include heating of the feed to the maximum reaction temperature such that the apparent Reaction heat may be much less than ΔH_R.

The Equipment and Chemical Information is entered before Reactivity Data.

Equipment Tag =	V-101	
Key Chemical =	Acrylonitrile	
Physical State =	Liquid	
Reactivity Data Input		
Assess Reactive Scenarios Only?	**No**	
	Table / **User**	**User Value**
Data Reference:		
Accelerating Rate Calorimetry MD-1987-	Accelerating Rate Calorimetry MD-1987-000517	
Heat of Reaction, ΔHR (cal/gm mix) =	**-326**	**-326**
Activation Energy, ΔE (Kcal/gm mol) =		
Detected Onset, T0 (C) =		
Detected Rate, R0 (C/min) =		
Gas Generation, k (gm mol/cc mix) =		
Gas Generation precedes Exotherm?		
Inhibited Monomer?		
Thermal Inertia (ARC or other), ϕ =		
Test Method =		

Figure 4-2 Entry of Heat of Reaction for Example Problem

The heat generated for continuous or semi-batch (rate controlled by the addition of a limiting reactant) reactions is entered as "Limiting Reaction Rate". For this entry, the Heat of Reaction per Mass is divided by the Residence Time (for continuous) or the Addition Time (semi-batch). These reaction schemes are inherently safer than batch as all reactants are not present initially.

STEP 2: Enter the Activation Energy. The Activation Energy should be based on a "best fit" of Reactive Chemicals Data to a first-order model. Enter 32 Kcal/gm mole.

If two temperature-rate data pair are available (two points on the "best fit" line), these may be entered under the section "Estimation of Activation Energy from ARC Data". The two data points should be selected within the lower ½ of the temperature rise and, in a region, where there is minimal scatter in the data. Enter 0.16 C/min at 210 C and 3.1 C/min at 260 C (data points from the ARC experiment, Figure 4-3). The estimated Activation Energy is 32.2 Kcal/gm mole (Figure 4-4). *(Note that the Estimated Activation Energy will change slightly with changes in the Detected Onset Temperature and Detected Onset Rate.)*

Figure 4-3 Experimental ARC Data for Example Problem

Estimation of Activation Energy from ARC Data		
Temperature, C	**210**	**260**
Observed Rate, C/min	**0.16**	**3.1**
Fraction Conversion	0.0640	0.2240
Activation Energy =	**32.2**	Kcal/gm mole

Figure 4-4 Results from Reactivity Data worksheet

STEP 3: Enter the Detected Onset Temperature and Detected Onset Rate. The Detected Onset Temperature in Figure 4-3 represents the detection limit of the test instrument. If inputs are based on a theoretical model rather than test data, a detected onset temperature corresponding to a detected onset rate of 0.01 cal/min (roughly 0.02 deg C/min) is suggested. If the test method is ARC or VSP, the thermal inertia or phi factor also needs to be input. Enter 190 C for the detected onset temperature, 0.08 C/min as a first-order "best fit" for the detected onset rate, a phi factor of 2.1 and "ARC" as the test method (Figure 4-5). This represents the "best fit" rate at the detected onset temperature of the experiment.

	Table / **User**	**User Value**
Data Reference:		
Uninhibited acrylonitrile Accelerating Rate	Uninhibited acrylonitrile Accelerating Rate Calorimetry MD-1987-000517	
Heat of Reaction, ΔHR (cal/g mix) =	-326	-326
Activation Energy, ΔE (Kcal/g mole) =	32	32
Detected Onset, T_0 (C) =	190	190
Detected Rate, R_0 (C/min) =	0.08	0.08
Gas Generation, k (g mole/cc mix) =		
Gas Generation precedes Exotherm?		
Inhibited Monomer?		
Thermal Inertia (ARC or other), ϕ =	2.1	2.1
Test Method =	ARC	ARC

Figure 4-5 Initial Data Entry for Example Problem

STEP 4: Enter the Gas Generation. From the vapor pressure versus temperature data (Figure 4-6), there is no evidence of volatile or gaseous products of reaction. Enter 0 or leave blank.

Figure 4-6 Vapor Pressure vs. Temperature for Example Problem

A single pressure-temperature at the end of the experiment may be used to estimate the quantity of Gas Generation. A pressure of 1865 psia (126.9 atm) at 386 C was reported from the experimental near the end of the experiment. Enter this data point and the estimated vapor pressure + inert pad (from the Chemical Data entered) is 134 atm which is slightly higher than the observed pressure indicating zero (or blank) gaseous products formed. The typical range for gm mole gas generated per cc reaction liquid is zero to 0.01.

For vapor-phase reactions, the gas generation term represents the moles products divided by moles reactants with values in the typical range of 0.5 to 2 (Figure 4-7). In this example, no gas generation is indicated as the observed pressure is less than (or equal to) the estimated pressure.

Estimation of Gas Generation		
Observed Press (atm abs) and Temp (C)	**126.9**	**386**
Estimated Vapor Pressure + Inert Pad	134.26	atm
Estimated Gas Generation, k =		gm mol/cc mix

Figure 4-7 Gas Generation Results for Example

STEP 5: Enter the Questions: "Gas Generation precedes Exotherm?" and "Inhibited Monomer?" The answers to these questions do not impact the preliminary Reactivity Evaluation but may be important in understanding upset process conditions that could lead to runaway reaction or generation of excessive pressure.

Note that any reaction that generates volatile or gaseous products will slowly pressurize a "closed" system, even a normal operating temperature.

STEP 6: Potential for Insulation or Packing Fire. The potential for insulation or packing fires is categorized as high, medium, or low (Figure 4-8).This index is based on Britton's method which compares Flash Point and Autoignition Temperature. If the chemical _cannot_ undergo an oxidation reaction, this Index should be ignored. Results do not reflect other exothermic reactions (such a polymerization) that may occur.

Potential for Insulation or Packing Fire			
Britton's Method, Z =	0.99	Potential =	LOW

Figure 4-8 Potential for Insulation or Packing Fire

STEP 7: Estimation of Frank-Kamenetskii Critical Diameter. Frank-Kamenetskii theory allows for a temperature gradient to be taken into account for a reacting system. This is particularly important where there could be a considerable resistance to convective heat transfer such as for solids or highly viscous fluids. This Critical Diameter is shape dependent and that reported in RAST is based on an "infinite slab". The F-K Critical Diameter represents the "depth" of solid or fluid at which "hot spots" can occur which, after a long enough induction time, may lead to runaway reaction.

Enter Thermal Conductivity for Acrylonitrile of 0.15 watt / m C at the operating temperature of 25 C. The F-K Critical Diameter is estimated at 38050 cm indicating that thermal gradients within the fluid are not likely to be sufficient for runaway reaction from the normal operating temperature (Figure 4-9).

Estimation of Frank-Kamenetskii Critical Diameter (Slab)		
Material Thermal Conductivity	0.15	watt / m C
F-K Critical Diameter at 25 deg C	38050.45	cm

Figure 4-9 F-K Critical Diameter

The F-K Critical Diameter may be estimated at a several temperatures from the table at the lower left-hand side of the Reaction Input worksheet. <u>Select F-K Critical Diameter and Enter Desired Temperatures</u> (Figure 4-10). The Critical Diameter does not become sufficiently small to indicate a runaway hazard below the Temperature of No Return (which is based on convective heat loss assuming a *uniform temperature* within the reacting medium or Semenov theory).

Select Type of Reaction Upset or F-K Critical Diameter for estimation at selected temperatures.

Time to Maximum Rate at Specified Starting Temperatures			
Reaction Scenario Type =	**F-K Critical Diameter**		
Temperature (C)		Crit Diam (cm)	
25		38050.5	cm
50		5093.9	cm
100		208.1	cm
150		18.4	cm

Select up to 4 Temperatures for Evaluation

Figure 4-10 F-K Critical Diameter vs. Temperature

STEP 8: Preliminary Reactivity Evaluation. Upon entry of the reaction inputs, a graph of heat rate versus temperature will be shown corrected to near "adiabatic" conditions (dashed black line). A yellow dashed line representing the estimated convective heat losses from the equipment (based on outer surface area and insulation inputs from the Equipment Input worksheet) is also shown. The intersection of the yellow dashed line representing heat losses and the reaction heat rate represents the Temperature of No Return – the temperature above which runaway reaction occurs based on convective heat losses.

Reaction Heat Gains and Losses

If mechanical energy or heat transfer inputs have been entered in the Equipment Input, a second line is shown on the graph representing reaction heat plus these additional heat inputs (dark blue line). If the potential for pool fire exists, then a third line is shown representing reaction heat plus pool fire heat input (red line) (Figure 4-11).

Figure 4-11 Reaction Heat Gain or Cooling Loss Chart

Reaction Pressure

A second graph of pressure versus temperature is also provided. The dashed black line represents the vapor pressure per the composition input from the Chemical Data worksheet. *Note that the effect of changes in composition with reaction conversion is not considered*. The total pressure (including initial gas pad and any gas generation input) for reaction heat plus additional heat inputs is shown as a dark blue line. If the potential for pool fire exists, then a third line is shown representing reaction heat plus pool fire heat input (red line). A dashed yellow line represents the Relief Device Set Pressure or Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) if relief device information is not available. A yellow triangle is shown at the intersection of the reaction pressure and Relief Device Set Pressure (or MAWP) and represents the reaction conditions where relief device activation may occur (Figure 4-12).

Figure 4-12 Reaction Pressure versus Temperature

A table summarizing Time to Maximum Rate is available for various reaction type (Figure 4-13).

Figure 4-13 Summary of Time to Maximum Rate for Example Problem

Another table summarizing maximum reaction temperature and pressure, temperature of no return, and Reactivity Parameter for potential explosive is shown at the bottom left of the Reaction Input worksheet. The Reaction Scenario Type is selected from the Time to Maximum Rate summary to determine which values are presented (Figure 4-14).

Estimated maximum Reaction Temperature and Pressure

The higher of TNR and Operating Temperature

Reactivity Parameter to check for potential explosive (Parameter > 20)

Reaction Screening Calculations					
Initial Temperature =	176.0	C	Rate at Initial Temp =	0.0283	cal/gm-min
Max Adiabatic Temp =	825.8	C	Reactivity Parameter =	17.6	
Max Adiabatic Pressure =	1016.07	atm	Insulated?	**No**	
Temp of No Return, TNR =	176.0	C	Convective HT Coefficient =	**0.01**	Kwatt/sq m C
TNR with Cooling =	>TNR	C			

Estimated Temperature of No Return

Heat Loss Coefficient for Equipment *(Insulation = "No")*

Figure 4-14 Summary of Key Reaction Screening Parameters for Example Problem

Reaction Scenario Type as "Reaction". Values shown represents no additional heat input. Try other Reaction Scenario Types to view appropriate hazard screening values.

STEP 9: Save Inputs to the Equipment Table.

Reaction inputs are normally saved to the Equipment Table. If however, the same reaction inputs are used across multiple facility, the data may be saved to the Chemical Table.

Figure 4-15 Saving Reaction Inputs for Example Problem

4.3   Evaluation of Potential Process Upsets

In some cases, screening evaluation for the impact of a process upset to a reaction may be obtained by adjustment of appropriate kinetic parameters. Common process upsets of interest are:

- ❑   External heat plus reaction
- ❑   Change in heat of reaction per mass (mis-loading or scale-up)
- ❑   Introduction of a catalytic impurity
- ❑   "Pooling" of reactants

It is important to recognize the evaluation of process upsets in RAST is based on a "steady state" approach with an "average" composition entered in the Chemical Data worksheet and simple first-order reaction kinetics. A dynamic simulation for a runaway reaction may be needed to address more detailed issues such as relief design for reactive systems.

Impact of External Heat: External heat may result from a heat transfer surface, mechanical energy such as an agitator or circulating pump, or fire. The primary impact of external heat is an increase in temperature without consuming reactants. At temperatures where reaction heat rate is much less than the external heat input, reaction conversion is essentially zero and total heat rate is only attributed to the external source. RAST uses a simple first-order kinetic model to determine reaction heat rate and either a constant external heat rate (such as for fire or mechanical energy) or an external heat rate which depends on temperature difference with a heating media (such as a heat exchanges). The total heat rate is the sum of both reaction and the external heat source.

Consider the impact of external heat on our acrylonitrile storage tank example. The maximum reaction temperature, pressure, and heat rate are much higher with external heat input. The reaction heat versus

temperature with external fire (red line) exhibits a peak rate at nearly 80 C higher than the adiabatic reaction (dashed black line). This results in a higher peak heat rate and higher pressure (Figure 4-16).

Figure 4-16 Example Simple Kinetic Model with 1 C/min External Heat

Change in Heat of Reaction per Mass: A change in heat of reaction per mass affects the maximum temperature, the conversion per temperature increment, and the initial heat rate (Figure 4-17). This change may be the result of scale-up since Thermal Inertia (loss of reaction heat to equipment or sample container) is less for larger scale equipment. A change in the heat of reaction per mass may also be the result of mis-loading or a change in reactant concentration. More dilute exothermic reactions generate less total heat per mass.

The temperature rise for a reaction using a simple kinetic model () is roughly 0.2 divided by 0.15 or 1.33 times higher for 20 weight % reactant versus 15 %. The corresponding maximum reaction rate is significantly (nearly one order of magnitude) higher for the more concentration reaction.

Figure 4-17 Example Simple Kinetic Model for Change in Reactant Concentration

The Reaction Input worksheet may be used to estimate the impact of changes in heat of reaction per mass. Assume that the reaction is run in 50% solvent (with a liquid heat capacity similar to the reactant) and a possible upset condition is failure to add solvent. Enter "Yes" for the question "Potential Mis-Loading of Reactants?" Enter "Multiple of Reaction Heat for Mis-Loading" of 2. This corresponds to the same heat of reaction but only ½ the total mass. Note that the temperature rise is essentially double the adiabatic temperature rise. This change results in an estimated peak reaction rate more than two orders of magnitude higher (Figure 4-18).

Figure 4-18 Effect of Mis-Loading of Reactants

Introduction of a Catalyst or Catalytic Impurity: Introduction of a small amount of catalytic material may significantly increase the overall self-heat rate for exothermic reactions. Chemicals normally maintained within safe operating limits may quickly progress to potential runaway conditions at the operating temperature. The reaction rate for the polymerization in Figure 4-19 is significantly higher (nearly one order of magnitude) with the addition of 500 ppm of BFO catalyst. Note that only reaction rate and not temperature rise (or heat of reaction) is affected by catalyst addition.

Figure 4-19 Example Simple Kinetic Model for Addition of Catalyst

The Reaction Input worksheet may be used to estimate the impact of a catalyst. <u>Enter "Yes"</u> for the question "Potential Catalyzed Reaction". An estimate is made within RAST by increasing the first-order rate constant until reaction heat rate exceeds the cooling capability at the normal operating temperature (orange line, Figure 4-20). This is a *hypothetical* situation and may not reflect what could actually occur. It is merely to address the question "if a sufficiently effective catalyst exists for uncontrolled reaction to occur at the normal operating temperature, what might be the effect to reaction parameters?"

Should the potential impact of a catalyst significantly affect analysis results, it is highly recommended that experimental data be obtained.

Figure 4-20 Effect of Potential Catalyzed Reaction

Note that for our acrylonitrile example, polymerization does not occur at an appreciable rate unless the temperature is well above the normal boiling point of 77 C (TNR = 140 C) even for uninhibited material. Since the equipment cannot operate at a pressure corresponding to the vapor pressure of acrylonitrile at 140 C (roughly 76 psia or 5.2 bar), the equipment would likely fail and contents vaporize prior to reaching the Temperature of No Return. However, if a catalyst is inadvertently added, a potentially explosive reaction rate could occur. The "catalyst" might be a strong acid or base such that if this vessel were vented to a scrubber, a potential reactive scenario might be contamination by the scrubber fluid.

Pooling of Reactants: A common means for controlling an exothermic reaction is by slow addition of a limiting reagent such that the overall reaction heat rate is proportional to the addition rate. "Pooling" occurs if the concentration of limiting reagent is allowed to increase - typically by loss of mixing or low temperature. Following accumulation of un-reacted material, batch reaction kinetics occurs potentially leading to runaway reaction.

For a batch reaction, a limiting reaction rate is estimated as the Heat of Reaction divided by the *Addition Time*. For a continuous reaction, a limiting reaction rate is estimated as the Heat of Reaction per mass divided by the *Residence Time*. Residence Time is estimated as the total reactor mass divided by the mass feed rate.

Assume that the reaction is controlled by the addition of monomer over 60 minutes. Enter a Limiting Reaction Rate of -326 / 60 minutes or -5.43 cal / g-min. To estimate reaction conditions if 50% of the feed were added without reacting, enter "Yes" for "Potential for Pooling" of Reactants?" and 0.5 for Fraction of Reaction Heat for "Pooling". [Note – these lines are "greyed out" until the values are entered.] An estimate is made within RAST for this condition denoted by a purple line on the heat rate versus temperature plot (Figure 4-21).

Figure 4-21 Effect of Reactant Pooling

In some cases, two liquid phases may be present. If, for example, the reaction mixture were 25 % acrylonitrile and 75% water, the Heat of Reaction per Mass would be 0.25 (-326) or -81.5 cal/g mixture. By selecting "Yes" to "Reactants in Separate Liquid Phase", an estimate of reaction conditions is made within RAST based conservatively on no heat loss to the second liquid. Note that "pooling of reactants" does not apply to vapor-phase reactions.

Do not save the entries for Potential Mis-Loading of Reactants, Potential Catalyzed Reaction, and Potential for "Pooling" of Reactants.

5 Additional RAST Inputs and Reports

5.1 Introduction

RAST allows input of detailed information for Equipment, Process Conditions and Plant Layout. This additional information is used to support identification of hazard scenarios and improved quantification of risk.

This section covers:

- How additional Equipment Parameter information is used to identify scenarios and evaluate hazards.
- How additional Process Conditions information is used to identify scenarios and evaluate hazards.
- How additional Plant Layout information is used to identify scenarios and evaluate hazards.

5.2 Equipment Parameters

In addition to the minimum required inputs, other information may be needed for various evaluations and reports. The more information available, the more thorough the evaluation. However, only those inputs for the specific equipment being evaluating needs to be entered. See Figure 5-1 for further examples.

Figure 5-1 Additional Equipment Input Parameters

5.3   General Equipment Parameters

General Equipment parameter information applies to most types of equipment. The minimum required inputs are **Volume** and **Maximum Allowable Working Pressure** (MAWP). Other inputs include:

Full Vacuum Rated? – should be answered "No" if vacuum failure is *feasible*. If the MAWP is less than 1 atmosphere gauge (101 kPag or 14.7 psig), this input is highlighted "yellow" as a recommended input. If blank, the default assumption is that the equipment is vacuum rated

Estimated High Temperature Failure – is the temperature where equipment failure may be possible at the normal operating pressure due to weakened material strength.

Estimated Embrittlement Temperature – is the temperature where equipment may fail under stress of shock due to transition from ductile to brittle.

Nozzle or Pipe Diameter – represents the largest practical hole size for nozzle, pipe, or hose failure scenarios. This is *a minimum input requirement* for all but solids containing equipment.

Number of Flanges or Nozzles – input is used in evaluation of Mechanical Integrity scenarios (Asset Integrity scenarios) for smaller hole sizes (5 mm and 25 mm) typically associated with flange or gasket failures.

Material of Construction – is a list of common construction materials. This input is used to determine if the equipment is "brittle" (likely to result in many fragments upon overpressure failure or rupture), susceptible to corrosion under insulation (external corrosion), and in determining the failure frequency for Mechanical Integrity (Asset Integrity scenarios).

Equipment Mass – is used in providing a better estimate for "time to failure" for overheating cases. If blank, the default is zero such that only the mass of equipment contents is used in the estimate. For pumps, a default estimate of equipment mass based on data from centrifugal pumps is used if this input is blank.

Internal Corrosion or Stress Cracking Potential? – should be answered "Yes" if the equipment contents represent an internal corrosion or stress cracking potential for the Material of Construction. This input is used in determining the failure frequency for Mechanical Integrity scenarios. If blank, the default assumption is that the Material of Construction is compatible with the equipment contents.

Susceptible to Vibration Fatigue? – should be answered "Yes" if vibration fatigue could cause a small hole size leak representing a "crack" in larger piping or failure of small piping branches.

Motor Power – represents mechanical energy input for the equipment such as a vessel agitator or mixer, circulating pump, etc. It may also represent an electric heater or tracing. An overall "inefficiency" of 50% (power resulting in heat) is assumed which is conservative for pumps and agitators but optimistic for electric heaters. For pumps, with a hydraulic efficiency of 0.6 and a 0.9 efficient electric motor exactly matched to the required hydraulic power, the thermal inefficiency would be roughly (1-0.6) (1-0.9) = 0.36 rather than 0.5. The user may need to adjust the power input to for improved estimates of maximum mechanical energy temperature.

Insulation – is used to determine a heat loss coefficient in energy balance estimations. Choices are "Yes", "No", and "Fireproof". The option, "Fireproof" will reduce the estimated heat input from external fire. If the equipment operating temperature is within the Corrosion Under Insulation temperature range, the Input will be labeled "Insulation with Potential Corrosion (CUI)".

Insulation Heat Reduction Factor - This is a reduction factor which will be multiplied by the heat transfer coefficient to account for insulation. It will default to a value of 0.05 if not entered.

User Equipment Wetted Surface Area – is the wetted surface area of the equipment used for fire heat input or convective heat losses. If blank an estimated Wetted Surface Area will be used based on equipment volume and tank/vessel geometry

Tracing? – entered as "Yes" if equipment is heat traced.

Equipment Elevation to Surface – represents the elevation or height of a leak above a liquid pool. This input is used to determine fire heat input (fire heat is zero for greater than 30 feet or 9.1 m elevation), distance for liquid spray and duration of aerosol droplets for estimation of Airborne Quantity. A default value of 1 m is used if this input is blank.

Drain Valve Size – is the "hole size" equivalent that will be used for estimation of leak rate for a drain valve inadvertently opened scenario. A default of ½ inch is used (representing a standard ¾ inch plug valve equivalent to a ½ inch hole) if this input is blank.

5.3.1 *Parameters Specific to Vessels or Tanks*

In addition to the General Equipment Parameters, additional inputs specific to **Vessels or Tanks** include:

Vessel/Tank Geometry? – Geometry is noted as horizontal, vertical, flat bottom" and/or "anchored" to improve estimation of surface area and Rupture Pressure.

Low Pressure Tank with Weak Seam Roof? – Used to determine is vessel is anchored to credit a Weak Seam Roof.

Vessel/Tank Considered as "Storage"? – To determine if the tank is considered as Storage per API 521 [16]. This is an Input for F&EI and used in determining fire heat input.

Conductive Dip Pipe or Bottom Fill? – should be answered "Yes" if appropriate. A "Yes" answer will suggest this design feature as a potential Safety Related Protective System for preventing electrostatic discharge for tanks or vessels containing flammable materials.

5.3.2 *Parameters Specific to Heat Exchangers or Vessel Jackets*

In addition to the General Equipment Parameters, additional inputs specific to **Heat Exchangers or Vessel Jackets** include:

Heat Transfer Area – is the area, A, used in estimation of heat input rate, q = U A 𝛥T where 𝛥T is the temperature difference between the Heat Transfer Fluid Temperature and Operating Temperature.

Heating Overall U – is the heat transfer coefficient, U, used in estimation of heat input rate. If either Heat Transfer Area or Heating Overall U is blank, no estimation of heat input rate is performed.

Heat Transfer Fluid Temperature – is used to determine if the maximum operating vapor pressure exceeds design limits, if the maximum operating temperature can exceed the Reaction Temperature of No Return, and in estimation of the heat input rate.

Heat Transfer Fluid Pressure – is used to determine if tube or heat exchanger failure will leak heat transfer fluid into the process or if process fluid would leak into the heat transfer system.

Tube Failure Release to Atmosphere? - Should be answered "Yes" if tube failure will result in a release of process fluid to atmosphere.

Heat Transfer Fluid Name – is used to look up chemical properties of the heat transfer fluid for estimation of tube leak hazards. **Heat Transfer Fluid State** is not an input but estimated from the fluid properties, temperature and pressure.

Tube or Leak Diameter – is used to estimate the leak rate and potential consequences for tube failure.

Number of Tubes – is entered either as "< 100" or "> 100" to determine the Initiating Event factor in LOPA.

Cooling Transfer Area, **Cooling Overall U**, and **Coolant Temperature** – are inputs to estimate the Temperature of No Return with cool for reaction scenarios.

5.3.3 Parameters Specific to Piping

In addition to the General Equipment Parameters, additional inputs specific to Equipment or Piping include:

Pipe Length – is the length of piping associated with an entire piping loop in the same Chemical Service.

Piping Vulnerable to Damage? – is used to determine if a pipe damage scenario should be added to the list of scenarios for consideration.

Apply Screwed Connection Penalty? – this input has options for: No Penalty, Through Very Small, Through Medium, Through Very Large and Through Extremely Large. A penalty will be taken for Mechanical Integrity scenarios (Asset Integrity scenarios) through the hole size noted.

Note that Piping inputs are only used if the Equipment Type is Piping, Pump, Compressor or Blower, or Turbine or Gas Expander.

5.3.4 Parameters Specific to Pumps

In addition to the General Equipment Parameters of Volume, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) and Motor Power, additional inputs specific to **Pumps** include:

Equipment Volume – represents the volume of the pump plus piping system. The volume of the pump cavity is estimated for a pump based on data for centrifugal pumps.

Pump Type – is used in determining the suggested type of Pump Deadhead scenario for evaluation. Options are: _Centrifugal, Positive Displacement_, or _Diaphragm with Limited Source Pressure_. The default is assumed Centrifugal if the input is blank.

Seal or Containment Type – is used to determine the Initiating Event for a Seal or Casing Leak scenario. Options are: _Single Mechanical, Double Mechanical, Magnetic Drive or Canned, or Double Containment_.

Remote Start Pump? – should be answered "Yes" if an "off, jog, auto" field switch is used (could not be in a manual "on" position) and the switch location is beyond the severe hazard impact zone associated with pump failure. The default is "No" if the input is blank.

Automated Suction or Discharge? – should be answered "Discharge Only" or "Both Suction and Discharge" if a failure of instrument air or Basic Process Control could result in the inadvertent closing of the discharge and/or suction values creating a pump deadhead scenario.

5.3.5   Parameters Specific to Relief Devices

Relief Device information may be entered for all types of equipment. Entry of a Relief Set Pressure indicates that a Relief Device exists (or is planned) for the equipment item being evaluated. The additional Relief Device Parameters are used for evaluation of Relief Device Effluent or in estimating the release rate within Layer of Protection Analysis.

Relief Device Identification – is the identification number of the Relief Device for reference.

Relief Type – is the type of Relief Device including: Rupture Disk, Graphite Disk, Safety Valve, Pilot Operated Valve, ERV, PVRV, Pressure Relief Line, Combination PSV, and Combination Disks.

Relief Discharges to: - provides information relative to the release location and orientation. Options include: Indoors, Outdoors-Upwards, Outdoors-Horizontal, Outdoors to Ground, Pump or Compressor Suction, Vent Header to Blow-down Tank, and Scrubber or Containment.

Relief Set Press (gauge) - is the set pressure of the Relief Device. If blank, it is assumed that no Relief Device has been used for overpressure protection of the equipment being evaluated.

Relief Size (equivalent diameter) – is the orifice diameter for Safety Values or diameter for other types of devices. It is used in estimation of the Actual Flow Rate for relief device activation.

Relief Design Actual Flow Rate – is the actual flow capacity from Relief Design calculations and must be matched to the composition on the Chemical Input worksheet. If the actual flow rate is based on a relief vent design program which only compares worst case chemical within a mixture, the input should be left blank and an estimate based on the device diameter and set pressure will be used.

Relief Tail Pipe Diameter – is the diameter of the Tail Pipe and used to determine the exit velocity from the relief system. This velocity is an important parameter in determining dilution of the relief effluent by "jet mixing". A low velocity is assumed if the input is blank.

Relief Discharge Elevation – is the elevation of the relief discharge and used in the dispersion modeling for estimation of ground level concentration versus distance. A worst case "ground" elevation release is assumed if the input is blank.

Closest Distance to Nearest Elevated Work Area – is used to determine the concentration of toxic or flammable material at the closest edge of the nearest elevated work area from the release location, most typically a relief device.

Furthest Distance to Nearest Elevated Work Area – is used to determine the concentration of toxic or flammable material at the furthest edge (for large areas) of the nearest elevated work area from the release location, most typically a relief device

Elevation of Nearest Work Area - is used to determine the concentration of toxic or flammable material within the nearest work area.

Locations Specific to Relief Device – <u>Entered ONLY if Different from Equipment Location</u>, includes:

>   Relief Distance to Property Limit or Fence Line
>
>   Relief Distance to Occupied Building 1 or Area
>
>   Relief Distance to Center of Occupied Building 1
>
>   Occupied Building 2 in Same Wind Direction for Relief?
>
>   Relief Distance to Occupied Building 2

5.3.6   *Example Relief Device Effluent Screening Evaluation*

As an example, for a Relief Device Effluent Evaluation, continue with the "Getting Started" Study Example. *(Note that Inputs on the Plant Layout worksheet will also impact Relief Effluent Screening.)*

STEP 1: Go to the *Equipment Table* and select a cell in the row representing Inputs for **V-101**. Use the *Load Selected* command. Information for **V-101** should now be "active" on the *Equipment Input* worksheet.

STEP 2: Go to *Equipment Input* and enter the Relief Device Identification as <u>PVRV-101</u>. Select <u>PVRV</u> for the Relief Type. Also enter Relief Size of <u>250 mm</u> (10 inch), a Relief Set Pressure of 0.<u>07 barg</u> (1 psig), and Relief Discharge Elevation of <u>6 m</u> (20 ft). (See Figure 5-2) Select *Save Input to Equipment Table.*

Relief Device Parameters		
Relief Device Identification	PVRV-101	
Relief Type =	PVRV	
Relief Discharges to:		
Relief Set Pressure (gauge) =	0.1	bar
Relief Size (equiv. diameter) =	250	mm
Relief Design Actual Flow Rate =		kg/min
Release Pipe Diameter =		mm
Release Elevation	6	
Closest Distance From Relief to Elevated Work Area =		m
Furthest Distance from Relief to Elevated Work Area =		m
Elevation of Nearest Work Area =		m

Enter Name and Type of Relief Device

If Blank, Horizontal Discharge to the Immediate Area is Assumed.

Enter Relief Device Set Pressure, Size or Diameter, and Release Elevation

Figure 5-2 Inputs for Relief Device Effluent Evaluation Example

STEP 3: Select *Go to the Main Menu*, then Select *Relief Effluent Screening Report* from the Main Menu (Figure 5-3).

Figure 5-3 Relief Effluent Screening Report

Relief Effluent Screening for up to 14 standard scenarios and two User-defined scenarios are summarized. Input for the LOPA Scenario Number that demonstrates adequate Risk Management for these cases may be entered to complete the documentation requirements. Details are summarized by selecting the specific Scenario.

STEP 4: Select ***Excessive Heat Input-Pool Fire Exposure*** from the available listing. A report, consistent with the Relief Effluent Screening Tool, is shown with details of the specific case selected. Refer to Figure 5-4.

Figure 5-4 Example of Relief Effluent Report for Example Problem

5.3.7 Parameters Specific to Specialized Equipment

Other Equipment Parameters include Replacement Cost & Business Loss in addition to highly specialized parameter such as:

Replacement Cost & Business Loss – Used for determining the Business Loss Consequence.

Drum Oven Volume – is the volume of an oven rather than volume of equipment being evaluated (typically a drum).

High Speed Rotation Equipment? – is used in determining the Probability of Ignition for Solids Handling Equipment. "Yes" implies a Maximum Tip Speed > 9.5 m/sec.

Bellows or Expansion Joint Used? – should be answered "Yes" if appropriate. A "Yes" answer will add the appropriate leakage penalty to the Fire and Explosion Index.

Sight Glass Used? – should be answered "Yes" if appropriate. A "Yes" answer will suggest a potential scenario involving failure of the sight glass and add the appropriate leakage penalty to the Fire and Explosion Index.

5.4 Process and Operating Conditions

In addition to the minimum required inputs of **Maximum Feed or Flow Rate** and **Liquid Head within Equipment** (for low Operating Pressure), other Process and Operating Information may be needed for various evaluations or reports. Refer to Figure 5-5.

Figure 5-5 Additional Process Condition Parameters

Total Inventory –the total quantity of chemical in the process which may be added to the equipment being evaluated. For storage tanks, it would represent a "full" tank plus the quantity within any tank truck, railcar, etc. that could be unloaded into the tank. The difference between Total Inventory and the estimated Maximum Contained Mass is the maximum amount that can be released for an overfill scenario.

Limiting Maximum Fill Fraction –the maximum fill fraction for the equipment used for estimating heat-up time, etc. If blank is assumed 0.9 or 90%.

Limiting Minimum Fill Fraction –the minimum fill fraction for the equipment used for estimating heat-up time, etc. If blank is assumed 0.1 or 10%.

Maximum Feed Pressure (gauge) –the source pressure of material feeding the equipment being evaluated. If the maximum feed pressure is less than the relief device set pressure, an overfill or hydraulic overpressure scenario is not feasible.

Maximum Feed Temperature –the maximum temperature of material feeding the equipment being evaluated.

Type of Feed (Batch or Continuous) –used in determining the most likely Initiating Event for some scenario cases.

Non-Ignitable Atmosphere Maintained? – answer "Yes" if a scenario case for "Loss of Inert or Air Ingress" should be included in the list of potential scenario cases.

Potential for Aerosol or Mist? –the potential for aerosol or mist from splash filling or vigorous agitation/mixing which may increase the probability of ignition for internal deflagration.

Pad Gas Name - used to look up chemical properties of the pad gas. If blank, a molecular weight of 29 is assumed for the pad gas.

Maximum Pad Pressure (gauge) - the source pressure of the pad gas feeding the equipment being evaluated. If the maximum pad gas pressure is greater than the relief device set pressure, an overpressure scenario is considered.

Maximum Pad Gas Rate –the maximum rate of pad gas into the equipment being evaluated. This input is used to estimate the rate of pressure rise for pad gas system failure.

Downstream Pressure (gauge) –the maximum pressure of downstream equipment and should include pressure due to change in elevation if appropriate. If this pressure is greater than the operating pressure, a backflow scenario is considered.

Maximum Back Flow Rate –the maximum back flow rate that could occur and used to estimate release rate for back flow scenarios.

Equipment Vents to… –used in identification of scenario cases. Options include: Immediate Area, Source/Vapor Balance, Scrubber System, Fired Equip (TOX- Flare), Does Not Vent, or Floating Roof Tank.

5.5   Operating Procedures

Information relative to selected common Operating Procedures may be input for use in Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). Included is:

Percent Time in Operation –used to determine if a Time at Risk Enabling Factor may be used in LOPA.

Frequent Turnaround or Cleanout? – answer "Yes" if frequent cleanout of equipment is needed for batch operations.

Effective Ventilation Shut-Off Building 1? - answer "Yes" if appropriate which will suggest a potential LOPA credit for toxic infiltration scenarios.

Effective Ventilation Shut-Off Building 2? - answer "Yes" if appropriate which will suggest a potential LOPA credit for toxic infiltration scenarios.

Use Time-based Release for Equipment Rupture? - answer "Yes" if a time-based model is to be used for Equipment Rupture outcome. The release duration in seconds also needs to be entered (to a maximum of 600 seconds). If left "blank" or "No" is entered, a Rupture (or Instantaneous) Release model will be used. For very rapid events such as explosions in pressure vessels, detonations, or very rapid runaway reactions, the Rupture Release model should be used. For slower events such as the rupture of a week seam roof or the base of a low-pressure vessel lifting from its foundations, a time-based model over an "appropriate" length of time may be more accurate.

5.6 Plant Layout Information

In addition to the minimum required inputs of **Distance to Property Limit of Fence Line**, **Distance to Occupied Building** and **Number of Building Occupants**, other Plant Layout Information may be needed for various evaluations or reports. Refer to Figure 5-6.

Figure 5-6 Additional Plant Layout Parameters

5.6.1 Specific Equipment Location Information

Furthest Distance to Fence Line or Effect Zone - used in estimating the maximum area of the effect zone to be used with the entered population density for outdoor toxic or flammable releases. Few people would be on-site beyond this distance.

Maximum Onsite Outdoor Population Density – represents the number of people who could be outdoors divided by the outdoor process area. A default of 0.0002 people/m^2 is used if this input is blank (which is an average value for many industrial facilities).

Personnel Routinely in Immediate Area? answer "Yes" if operator attendance is required, equipment location is near a walkway, etc. The default is "Yes" if the input is blank.

Distance to end of Offsite Zone 1 - two offsite population densities may be used in the analysis beyond the Property Limit distance to the end of Zone 1 distance and beyond Zone 1 distance.

Offsite Population Density within Zone 1 – offsite population density immediately beyond the Property Limit distance to the Zone 1 distance. If blank, the default offsite population density will be used. Typically, "Sparsely" populated is 0.0002 to 0.0005 people/m^2, "Moderately" populated is 0.001 to 0.002 people/m^2 and "Densely" populated is 0.003 to 0.005 people/m^2.

Offsite Population Density Beyond Zone 1 - offsite population density immediately beyond the Zone 1 distance. If blank, the default offsite population density will be used.

Effective Egress from Work Area? - answer"Yes" if personnel would not be trapped on an elevated work platform and have an unobstructed path for escape purposes.

Access for Emergency Services? – is used an input for Fire and Explosion Index. Options include: Adequate, Inadequate, and Partially Adequate.

Degree of Equipment Congestion in Area? – is used in determination of explosion energy. Options include: Low, Medium, and High.

Containment or Dike Area - is the surface area a spill would be confined to. If this input is blank, spills are assumed as not confined.

Consider Dike or Bund Failure for Vessel Rupture? – answer "Yes" to assume a "wave" of liquid spills over the dike wall or the dike wall fails for rupture cases.

Credit Fire Heat Adsorption for Drainage/Indirect? - answer "Yes" if drainage is such that fire heat is not directly under the equipment. "Yes" will reduce the NFPA fire heat (with remote impoundment) input by 50% or use a lower correlating coefficient in API fire heat input.

Distance to Nearest Fired Equipment – is used in determining factors with the Fire and Explosion Index and probability of explosion with LOPA. Options include: No, within 10 m (33 ft), within 20 m (65 ft), within 30 m (100 ft), and greater than 30 m (100 ft).

Quantity of "Other" Flammable Liquids in Area – is the mass of flammable material in nearby equipment that provide fuel for a pool fire. This quantity does not include the contents of the equipment being evaluated.

Quantity of "Other" Flammable Liquids in Adjacent Area – is the mass of flammable material in equipment or vessels in an adjacent area that provide fuel for a pool fire.

Adjacent Containment Surface Area - is the surface area a spill would be confined to within the adjacent area.

Automated EBV to limit spill quantity? - answer "Yes" if appropriate. This input is used within the Fire and Explosion Index.

5.6.2   Enclosed Process Area Information

Enclosed Process Volume – is the volume of the enclosed process area in which the equipment is located. If the equipment is located in a room that is isolated from the other areas of the process building, only the room volume should be entered.

Enclosed Process Ventilation –represents the mechanical ventilation rate of the Process Area. This input is used to estimate concentration within the enclosed process area to determine if mechanical ventilation may represent a possible "credit" in LOPA. This input does not impact LOPA Consequence.

Number of Enclosed Area Personnel – represents the number of people who could be within the enclosed process area who may be impacted. A default of two people is assumed if this input is blank.

5.6.3   *Occupied Building Information*

Identical inputs for up to two Occupied Buildings may be used. If a second building is to be included in the evaluation, the question: **Occupied Building 2 in Same Wind Direction?** should be answered either "Yes" or "No" as appropriate. Refer to Figure 5-7 for an example.

Figure 5-7 Depiction of Two Occupied Buildings Downwind

Occupied Building Name – is a text field used for reference by the evaluation team.

Distance to Occupied Building or Area? – is a minimum required input and represents the distance to the nearest edge of the Occupied Building or Occupied Area within an Enclosed Process Building.

Elevation of Occupied Building Ventilation – is the elevation of the ventilation inlet and often corresponds to the roof elevation.

Distance to Center of Occupied Building – is used in estimation of explosion damage to the building. This value should always be greater than the Distance to Occupied Building. A default of Distance to Occupied Building is used if this input is blank.

Occupied Building Type – is used to determine explosion damage to the Occupied Building. Options include: "Low Strength" which represents a low strength portable building, or "Typical Construction" representing typical residential or industry construction. Impacts to high strength or blast resistant buildings are not considered in RAST screening evaluation.

Occupied Building Ventilation Rate – is used in estimation of indoor concentration resulting from toxic infiltration. This input does not impact LOPA Consequence.

Centralized Ventilation Shut-Off? - answer "Yes" if appropriate which will suggest a potential LOPA credit.

Number of Building Occupants – is a minimum required input and should represent a daytime maximum building occupancy

Fraction Offsite Area with Occupied Buildings – is used to estimate the number of people in distributed across a region (such as a residential area) impacted by an explosion. A default of 0.5 is used if not entered.

Offsite Occupied Building Type – is the building type to be used in determining offsite explosion impact.

5.6.4 Environmental Inputs

RAST contains a very approximate table for estimating Environmental Consequences. Both spills to soil and spills to a waterway are considered.

Spills to Soil Require Remediation? – answer "Yes" if using this Environmental Consequence Table for estimating the Tolerable Frequency for spills to soil. The consequence will be based on the NFPA Health ranking in addition to the quantity spilled.

Potential for Water Contamination - answer "Yes" if using this Environmental Consequence Table for estimating the Tolerable Frequency for spills to a waterway. The consequence will be estimated based on the entered Aquatic toxicity (harmful, toxic, and very toxic) in addition to the quantity spilled.

High Population Downstream of Facility? – answer "Yes" if a city or other highly populated area is immediately downstream of the spill. "Yes" will increase the consequence category (or Tolerable Frequency) by 1 for water contamination.

5.7 Estimation of Number of People Impacted from Plant Layout Information within RAST

It must be noted that **estimating the number of people impacted for a scenario is extremely inaccurate**. Often consequence severity is predicted significantly higher or significantly less than actual historical incidents. It is the intent of RAST to provide estimates primarily for consistency among Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis studies and for comparison.

When using the option for *Consequence Severity without Direct Reference to Human Harm*, inherent to the correlation of hazard distance or concentration divided by Level of Concern is a population density or number of building occupants. For situations where the population density is significantly greater or less than inherent to the correlation, or where the number of building occupants is significantly greater or less than inherent to the correlation; adjustments or Conditional Modifiers may be needed in Risk Analysis.

The location references of the various RAST inputs are depicted in Figure 5-8.

The Maximum Number of On-Site Outdoor Personnel Impacted is estimated as:

Person Routinely in the Immediate Area

+ Person at Elevated Work Location

+ Effect Zone "Footprint" Area times Maximum Population Density

Note that the area of the Effect Zone is estimated as a "pie shaped" circle segment of 0.3 times Distance^2. The Vapor Cloud distance to a concentration of ½ the Lower Flammable Limit (flammable cloud) OR a

multiple of ERPG-3 concentration (toxic cloud) at ground elevation will be used unless limited by entering a maximum "Distance to Furthest Fence Line or On-Site Personnel".

The number of people impacted within Occupied Buildings is estimated as the sum of "Vulnerability" (or fraction of building occupants impacted) times Maximum Number of Occupants for each building. For outdoor release scenarios, the number of outdoor on-site personnel impacted is added to those impacted within occupied building to obtain a total number of people impacted.

Figure 5-8 RAST Input Referenced Locations

For example: Consider a flammable release with an estimated distance to ½ LFL concentration of 250 m, a maximum population density of 0.0002 people/m^2 within the effect zone, personnel noted as "routinely in the immediate area", concentration at the location of the elevated work area exceeding ½ LFL, and one building with 10 occupants within the blast wave of the resulting vapor cloud explosion such that the occupant vulnerability is 50%. The total number of people impacted for this scenario would be estimated as:

   1 person within the immediate area

+ 1 person within the elevated work area

+ 0.3 (250 m)^2 (0.0002 people /m^2) = 3.8 people within the effect zone

+ 10 (0.5) = 5 people within the occupied building

= 10.8 total people impacted

Additional information for estimation of effect zones and toxic or explosion damage vulnerability of building occupants is found in the training materials for Chemical Hazard Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF).

5.8 Pool Fire Evaluation Worksheet

Excessive Heat from Pool Fire is a common scenario case for Hazard Evaluation and Pressure Relief Design. The Pool Fire Evaluation worksheet provides a summary of key pool fire information for any Equipment Item. This summary contains an estimate of the fire heat adsorption rate and the pool fire duration. In addition, the times for heating to the saturation temperature at the relief device set pressure, heating to the saturation temperature at the rupture or catastrophic failure pressure, heating to the reaction Temperature of No Return (TNR) are estimated. Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 depict the Pool Fire Evaluation worksheet.

Figure 5-9 Pool Fire Evaluation Worksheet Part 1

Pool Fire Evaluation Worksheet
Fire Sizing Vent Rate = Q Fire / Heat of Vaporization:

$Q_{Fire} / \Delta H_V =$ 5.13   Kg/sec

Heat-up Times for 20 % Full Vessel or Equipment =
(with Heat Transfer Area = 0.34 times Maximum Wetted Area)

Mass of Contents at 20% Full =	15938.0	Kg
Average Mass for Self Leakage =	39845.0	Kg
at 0.5100	Kcal/Kg C	
Wetted Mass of Equipment at 20 % Full =		Kg
Average Wetted Equip Mass for Self Leakage =		Kg
at 0.1000	Kcal/Kg C	
Heat Adsorption at 20 % Full =	243.3	Kcal/sec
Average Heat Adsorption for Self Leakage =	472.1	Kcal/sec
Indurect Heat Adsorption at 20 % Full =		Kcal/sec

> Vessel or Equipment Heat-up Time based on:
> - *Self Leakage*
> - *Leakage within Diked Area*
> - *Containment Surface Area*
> - *Adjacent Containment Surface Area*

	Heat-up Times		***Basis***
Time to Temperature of No Return =		min	Direct
Time to Temperature at Relief (*non-reactive*) =	39.64	min	Self Leakage
Time to Temperature at Failure (*non-reactive*) =	43.53	min	Self Leakage

Contents Reach Relief Conditions at Pool Fire Duration
Contents Reach Failure or Rupture Conditions at Pool Fire Duratio

> Distance to three thermal radiation levels may be estimated based on the size of the burning liquid pool. This information may be helpful for emergency responders

Estimated Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Distances based on dike surface area of 0 m2, typical burning rate of 0.05 kg/m2 s, 42000 kJ/kg heat of combustion and 0.35 fraction of combustion energy radiated.

Thermal Radiation Level, kw/m²

4
12.5
37.5

Distance from dike wall, m

Figure 5-10 Pool Fire Evaluation Worksheet Part 2

Additional information associated with Pool Fire Evaluation is covered in the Layer of Protection Analysis section of this document under Pool Fire Frequency Evaluation.

5.9 Workbook Notes and Setting Units to be Displayed on the Scenario Results Worksheet

A Workbook Notes tab is available to capture notes from the LOPA team that apply to the entire workbook. The Basis for Analysis is also summarized on the worksheet including the values for Ambient Temperature, Wind Speed, and Onsite Population Density.

Standard Units to be displayed for all scenarios in the Scenario Results worksheet may also be entered at the bottom right of this worksheet. If not entered, units will be displayed as those entered by the User for the various inputs. For example, the units for distance will be that entered by the user for "Distance to Property Limit or Fence Line" on the Plant Layout Worksheet (which may be different for each equipment entry). Entering Standard Reporting Units on the Workbook Notes worksheet will ensure that the units for *all* scenarios in the Scenario Results worksheet are the same. Refer to Figure 5-11.

Figure 5-11 Workbook Notes Worksheet

On the right-hand side of the Workbook Notes worksheet is a display of the specific Risk Matrix for use in RAST Hazard Analysis. It is suggested that a representative of the company (referred as a RAST "Technical Administrator") update the risk criteria and risk matrix to reflect the company's risk tolerance criteria. The Technical Administrator should also update the number of severity and frequency levels for

consistency of users of the RAST within the company. The human harm criteria may be expressed as number of people severely impacted (the current default) or by the characteristics of the chemical release such as distance from the release point to a hazardous concentration. The default parameters provided in RAST should be considered "examples" as CCPS does not endorse any specific risk criteria. The default Risk Matrix is shown in Figure 5-12.

Figure 5-12 Workbook Notes Worksheet – Risk Matrix

Note: *A company's hazard criteria are maintained by the RAST Technical Administrator on hidden worksheets within the RAST Tool. The values shown on the Worksheet Notes worksheet are not editable. See the Technical Administrator Manual for more information.*

6 Scenario Development

Fortunately, the number of catastrophic incidents is small relative to the total number of incidents or near misses each year. Those incidents with extreme consequences are usually associated with a low frequency or probability.

Fortunately, not everyone personally experiences a catastrophic incident during their career. This may present a challenge in appreciating which potential scenarios are credible. This section covers:

- How Scenarios are developed
- Understanding of RAST Library of common Scenarios
- How to enter User-defined Scenarios

6.1 Scenario Definition

A Scenario represents an unplanned sequence of events leading to a loss event with undesired consequence (Figure 6-1).

Figure 6-1 Schematic of a scenario

- **Event** – An occurrence involving a process that is caused by equipment performance or human action or by an occurrence external to the process.
- **Event Sequence** – A specific, unplanned series of events composed of an initiating event and intermediate events that may lead to an incident.
- **Loss Event** – Point in time in an abnormal situation when an irreversible physical event occurs that has the potential for loss and harm impacts. Examples include release of a hazardous material, ignition of flammable vapors or ignitable dust cloud, and over-pressurization rupture of a tank or vessel. An incident might involve more than one loss event, such as a flammable liquid spill (first loss event) followed by ignition of a flash fire and pool fire (second loss event) that heats up an adjacent vessel and its contents to the point of rupture (third loss event). Generally synonymous with hazardous event.
- **Initiating Event (Initiating Cause)** – The operational error, mechanical failure, or external event or agency that is the first event in an incident sequence and marks the transition from a normal situation to an abnormal situation.
- **Incident Outcome -** The physical manifestation of the incident: for toxic materials, the incident outcome is a toxic release, while for flammable materials; the incident outcome could be a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), flash fire, vapor cloud explosion (VCE), etc. For example, the incident outcome for a leak of chlorine from a railcar is a toxic release.

- **Consequence** - The undesirable result of a loss event, usually measured in health and safety effects, environmental impacts, loss of property, and business interruption costs.
- **Enabling Condition -** A condition that is not a failure, error or a protection layer but makes it possible for an event sequence to proceed to a consequence of concern. It consists of a condition or operating phase that does not directly cause the scenario, but that must be present or active in order for the scenario to proceed to a loss event; expressed as a dimensionless probability.

6.2   Hazard Evaluation and Scenario Identificationin RAST

Hazard Evaluation begins on the Scenario List worksheet. The date(s) and participants involved in the evaluation of each equipment item is captured on the Main Menu in addition to the type of equipment and location (Figure 6-2).

Figure 6-2 Entries for Evaluation Team Participants and Date(s)

Once the inputs have been completed (Chemical Data, Equipment Input, Process Conditions, Plant Layout and Reaction Input as appropriate), use the Scenario Identification macro button to go to the Scenario List (Figure 6-3). On this worksheet, the evaluation team may review suggested scenarios, add additional scenarios, and capture existing safeguards and recommendations. Note that any inputs made on this worksheet must "Update Input This Worksheet" to temporarily store this information which will ultimately be saved on the Equipment Table with the command "Save Input to Equipment Table" from any of the input worksheets.

Scenarios that the team enters "Yes" for Further Analysis may be exported as "Cause-Consequence pairs" for more detailed Risk Analysis in addition to any "User" defined scenarios (Figure 6-3). Note that scenarios that are not selected will not appear on the Scenario Results worksheet for detailed analysis using Layer of Protection Analysis.

Figure 6-3 Location of Entries for Saving Evaluation Team Scenario Inputs

Note that it may be necessary to use the "Update List" command more than once to ensure that previously entered information relative to existing safeguards, recommendations, and further analysis appears in the correct row. Information needs to be in the correct row before "Saving to the Equipment Table".

6.3   Scenario Development in RAST

Scenarios are developed within RAST based on common process upsets (or deviations of a process parameter from the design intent) for a specific *Type of Equipment* and *Chemical* service. Scenario Cases contain an Initiating Event, a single Loss Event and an Incident Outcome. A Scenario Type may also be used to provide a key phrase to describe the overall event sequence.

Initiating Event + Loss Event + Incident Outcome

For example, **Equipment Rupture** (Loss Event) caused by a **Process Control Failure** (Initiating Event) resulting in a **potential Off-Site Toxic Release** (Incident Outcome) represents a Scenario that might occur if the maximum pressure exceeds the design limits of the equipment. *This event sequence or Scenario Type can be described as **Pressure Damage**, as well, to indicate a deviation of pressure from the design intent.*

RAST utilizes standardized listings for Equipment Type, Initiating Event Type, Loss Event Type, Incident Outcome Type, and Scenario Type to building the listing of potential scenarios.

6.4 Equipment Types in RAST

The general Equipment Types include:

6.4.1 Chemical Processing Equipment

- Absorber/Scrubber
- Compressor or Blower
- Distillation
- Drum/IBC Handling
- Extraction
- Filter/Centrifuge
- Heat Exchanger
- Piping
- Pump
- Stirred Reactor/Crystallizer
- Tank Truck/Rail Car/Tote
- Turbine or Gas Expander
- Vessel/Tank

6.4.2 Fired Equipment (shown in green text)

- Fired Equipment - Combustion Unit
- Fired Equipment - Fire Tube Combustion Unit
- Fired Equipment - Incinerator or TTU
- Fired Equipment – Flare
- Fired Equipment - Vapor Quench
- Fired Equipment - Process Heater

6.4.3 Solids Handling Equipment (shown in red text)

- Bag/Pak Dumping (Solids)
- Blender/Mixer (Solids)
- Conveyor-Mechanical (Solids)
- Conveyor-Pneumatic (Solids)
- Dryer-Mechanical (Solids)
- Dryer-Spray or Fluid Bed (Solids)
- Dust Filter or Bag house (Solids)
- Hopper Storage (Solids)
- Mill/Grinder (Solids)
- Screener or Sieve (Solids

6.4.4 Specialized Equipment

- Drum Oven
- USER DEFINED - EQUIPMENT

6.5 Initiating Events in RAST

Initially, the most likely Initiating Events are identified at a very high level. These will be defined in more detail ("how could this happen in my plant") after completing the Consequence Analysis. These are broadly categorized as: Control System Failures, Human Error, or Mechanical Failures. These broad categories are broken into greater detail for *Initiating Events* listed in RAST as:

6.5.1 Control System Failures

- BPCS Instrument Loop Failure

6.5.2 Human Error

- Human Failure Action more than once per quarter
- Human Failure Action once per quarter or less
- 3rd Party Intervention

6.5.3 Mechanical Failures

- Mechanical Failure (e.g. leading to spark or hot spot within equipment)
- Heat Exchanger Tube Leak < 100 tubes
- Heat Exchanger Tube Leak > 100 tubes
- Unloading/Loading Hose Failure
- Mechanical Loading Arm Failure
- Sight Glass Failure
- Pump (blower, compressor, etc.) Failure Loss of Flow
- Regulator Failure
- Single Mechanical Seal Failure
- Double Mechanical Seal Failure
- Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Failure
- General Utility Failure
- Natural Disaster (Storm, Earthquake, etc.)

6.5.4 Other Initiating Events categorized by Failure Frequency Factors (Initialing Event Factors (IEF))

- IEF=0 (1/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis
- IEF=1 (1/10 or 10^{-1}/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis
- IEF=2 (1/100 or 10^{-2}/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis
- IEF=3 (1/1,000 or 10^{-3}/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis
- IEF=4 (1/10,000 or 10^{-4}/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis
- IEF=5 4 (1/100,000 or 10^{-5}/year) as determined by Fault Tree or Detailed Analysis

6.6   Loss Event Categories in RAST

Loss Events are typically associated with "unintended release of a hazardous material or energy". Loss Event in RAST are categorized by the type of estimate used to determine release rate.

❑   **Hole Size** release.
Standardized hole sizes simplify the screening analysis, for example:
- 5 to 15 mm to represent gasket failure.
- 100 mm to full bore diameter to represent pipe or equipment nozzle failure.

❑   **Overflow** or other Material Balance released such that rate estimated from feed or fill rate.
❑   **Excessive Heat** such that vapor release rate estimated from rate of heat input divided by heat of vaporization.
❑   **Equipment Rupture** as a sudden release of entire equipment contents and reaction or pressure-volume energy.
❑   **Equipment Damage** represents a loss event requiring repair or replacement of equipment without loss of containment.

These broad categories are broken into greater detail for *Loss Events* listed in RAST as:

6.6.1   Hole Size Related Categories

- **Very Small Hole Size** leak represents a 5 mm (3/16 inch) hole leak which may be typical for a valve stem packing small gasket failure.

- **Small Hole Size** leak represents a standard size which can be used in process upset scenarios. The default setting is ½ inch hole (12.7 mm).

- **Mechanical Seal Hole Size** leak represents a maximum hole size for pump seal failure. The default setting is ½ inch hole (12.7 mm).

- **Gasket Hole Size** leak represents a typical hole size for gasket failure. The default setting is a ½ inch hole (12.7 mm).

- **Gasket Hole Size Leak (top)** represents a gasket leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents

- **Medium Hole Size** leak is used for Mechanical Integrity scenarios (Asset Integrity scenarios). The default setting is a 25 mm (1 inch) hole.

- **Medium Hole Size Leak (top)** represents a leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents.

- **Full Bore Hole Size** leak represents a full-bore pipe or nozzle hole which is common for nozzle failure and pipe rupture.

- **Large Hole Size Leak (top)** represents a leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents

- **Very Large and Extremely Large Hole Size** is used for Mechanical Integrity (Asset Integrity scenarios). The default setting is a 100 mm (4 inch) or 250 mm (10 inch) hole respectively and.

- **Very Large and Extremely Large Hole Size (top)** represents a leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents.

- **Drain or Vent Hole Size** represents a hole size entered by the User representing an open drain or vent valve.

- **Drain or Vent Hole Size (top)** represents a leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents

- **Tube Hole Size (Process)** represents a hole size entered by the User representing a "full bore" failure of a heat exchanger tube.

- **Tube Hole Size (Heat Transfer Fluid)** represents a leak of heat transfer fluid for a "full bore" heat exchanges tube failure.

- **User Hole Size** represents a hole size entered by the User.

- **User Hole Size (top)** represents a leak from the vapor space of a liquid filled vessel by depressurization of the pad gas saturated with the liquid contents

6.6.2 *Overflow and other Material Balance Related Loss Events*

- **Vent Release** is based on a User entered feed rate primarily used for scenarios associated with vent treatment systems such as a scrubber, flare, or thermal oxidizer.

- **Pad Gas Release** represents a release rate equivalent to the maximum pad gas feed rate.

- **Overfill Release** represents a release rate equal to the input feed rate, pad gas, or back flow rate. The release is assumed to flow out the relief system if the input feed pressure is greater than the relief set pressure.

- **Vapor Displacement from Liquid Filling** represents a vapor release rate equal to displacement of the entered liquid feed rate.

- **Solids Spill** represents a spill of solids equal to the feed rate. The release is assumed to occur from failed nozzle or flexible connection.

- **User-defined Release** is a release rate entered by the User.

6.6.3 *Excessive Heat or other Heat Balance Related Loss Events*

- **Vapor Relief Vent - Fire** represents a release rate estimated from fire exposure heat rate divided by the heat of vaporization released through the Relief System.

- **Vapor Relief Vent – Heat Transfer** represents all vapor venting and the rate is calculated as U A ᐧT divided by the heat of vaporization which depends on the temperature difference between the heating media and saturation at relief pressure.

- **Vapor Relief Vent – Mechanical Energy** represents all vapor venting and the rate is calculated as the heat from mechanical energy divided by the heat of vaporization.

- **Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction** represents all vapor venting and is the reaction heat rate at relief temperature divided by the heat of vaporization. A check for two-phase flow is used for Reaction cases and vapor created from flash or evaporation of ejected liquid is added to the vapor generated from reaction heat. Venting is assumed to be through the Relief System if the maximum Reaction Pressure exceeds the Relief Set Pressure. Vapor Relief Vent may occur for any of the five primary reaction types: *Adiabatic, External Heat, Fire, Catalytic, Pooling of Reactants, or Mis-Loading of Reactants.*

6.6.4 *Equipment Rupture Loss Events*

- **Equipment Rupture at Operation Temperature** represents a release of energy at the burst pressure and normal operating temperature. In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at normal process temperature.

- **Equipment Rupture at Peak Pressure** represents a release of energy at the burst pressure and temperature corresponding to the sum of vapor pressure plus thermal expansion of pad gas. In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at burst pressure saturation temperature.

- **Equipment Rupture at Saturation Temperature** represents a release of energy at the burst pressure and saturation temperature (boiling point at burst pressure). In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at burst pressure saturation temperature.

- **Equipment Rupture at Fire Conditions** represents a release of energy at the burst pressure and saturation temperature. In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at the fire burst pressure saturation temperature.

- **Equipment Rupture – Internal Deflagration** represents a release of energy at a deflagration pressure of roughly 10 atmospheres. In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at normal process temperature.

- **Equipment Rupture – Detonation/Deflagration** represents a release of energy with fragmentation assuming a condensed phase explosive material. In addition to the blast wave from the sudden release of pressure, the entire contents of the equipment are assumed to be released "instantaneously" at burst pressure saturation temperature.

6.6.5   Other Loss Events

- **Equipment Damage** represents an overpressure or high temperature event exceeding the design limits that does not lead to rupture. Equipment Damage may be associated with economic loss or loss of business scenario.

- **Equipment Failure above Design Temperature** represents failure of equipment due to high temperature rather than overpressure. It is analyzed similar to a full-bore hole size leak.

- **Secondary Dust Release** represents the release of dust that could accumulate on beams, rafters, or other surfaces and be later displaced to for a combustible or flammable dust cloud.

- **Flaming Liquid Release** represents a special case used for scenarios associated with Fired Equipment.

6.7   Incident Outcome in RAST

Incident Outcome in RAST is based on a generalized Event Tree (Figure 6-4). A single loss event may have several potential outcomes including:

6.7.1   Flammable Outcome:

- ❑ Flash Fire or Fireball
- ❑ Vapor Cloud Explosion
- ❑ Building or Confined Space Explosion

6.7.2   Toxic Outcome:

- ❑ Off-site toxic exposure

- ❑ On-site toxic exposure
- ❑ Toxic infiltration of occupied buildings
- ❑ Chemical Exposure

6.7.3 Other Outcome:

- ❑ Physical Explosion
- ❑ Environmental Incident
- ❑ Equipment Damage or Business Loss

Figure 6-4 Generalized Event Tree for RAST

Example criteria for screening of various Incident Outcome is covered in Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals training. In summary:

❑ **Flash (or Jet) Fire**

Personnel exposure to flammable cloud of a multiple of LFL concentration. The default for this multiple is set at 0.5 and intended to reflect the expansion of the flammable distance once ignition has occurred.

❑ **Vapor Cloud Explosion**

100 Kg flammable (10 Kg for high flame speed) total vapor released. These screening limits may be updated by the RAST Administrator on a hidden worksheet. The value is intended to reflect that even is an explosion occurs the energy would not be sufficient to cause significant damage warranting more detailed evaluation.

❑ **Building Explosion**

Indoor average concentration exceeds LFL

❑ **Physical Explosion**

1 psi overpressure (0.3 psi for fragmentation) distance exceeds a threshold distance

❑ **Toxic Vapor Release (Indoor, Outdoor)**

- Off-site exposure to > ERPG-2 concentration (60 min. basis)

- On-site exposure to > than a multiple of ERPG-3 or LC-50 concentration for short duration outdoors (5-10 minutes)

- On-site exposure to > ERPG-3 concentration based on 60 min. exposure within an occupied building.

These criteria are managed by the RAST Technical Administrator within hidden worksheets of the RAST workbook.

6.8   Development of a Scenario Library

A library of Scenario Cases is available within the RAST tool. The intent of the Library is to provide analysis teams with initial ideas to build upon and not a substitute for performing Hazard Evaluation. Please refer to the CHEF Guide for the PHA Team's approach using the Hazard Evaluation methodology [1, pp. CHEF, Section 8]. Development of scenarios is based on selecting appropriate items from various standardized lists for Initiating Event, Loss Event and Incident Outcome (Figure 6-5).

Scenario = Initiating Event + Loss Event + Incident Outcome

Partial List of Initiating Events

❑ Human Error
❑ Mechanical Failure
❑ Regulator Failure
❑ Pump Seal Failure
❑ Heat Exchanger Tube Failure
❑ Hose Failure
❑ Loss of Agitation
❑ Utility Failure

Partial List of Loss Events

❑ Small Hole Leak
❑ Medium Hole Leak
❑ Full Bore Leak
❑ Overfill Release
❑ Vapor Release-Fire
❑ Vapor Release-Reaction
❑ Equipment Rupture
❑ Equipment Damage

Partial List of Incident Outcome

❑ Flash Fire
❑ Building Explosion
❑ Vapor Cloud Explosion
❑ Fireball or BLEVE
❑ Toxic Release
❑ Toxic Infiltration
❑ Environmental Damage
❑ Business Loss

Figure 6-5 Use of Standardized Lists in Development of Scenarios

Beware of changing inputs such as the Chemical composition or properties, Equipment Type, Maximum Allowable Working Pressure, etc. as the suggested Scenario Type and Scenario Feasibility are dependent on Chemical Data, Equipment and Process Conditions inputs. to determine if other Initiating Events are feasible

and either *Modify* the suggested Initiating Event as appropriate or *Create* additional scenario cases for analysis based on their knowledge of the process.

Tables representing scenario logic are on hidden worksheets to be maintained by the Technical Administrator. Tables are highly complex and linked to specific text phrases to describe the scenario. It is strongly recommended that these tables are not changed by the Evaluation Team or other RAST users.

The suggested scenarios are in a format consistent with deviations of key process parameters similar to that used for Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) (Figure 6-6. This is intended to help Evaluation Teams incorporate additional scenarios identified during HAZOP or other Hazard Evaluation technique.

Guidewords ⇒ Parameter ⇓	More	Less	None	Reverse	Part Of	As Well As	Other Than
Flow	High flow	Low flow	No flow	Back flow			Loss of containment
Pressure	High pressure	Low pressure	Vacuum		Partial pressure		
Temperature	High temperature	Low temperature				Cryogenic	
Level	High level	Low level	No level				Loss of containment
Composition State	Additional phase	Loss of phase		Change of state	Wrong concentration	Contaminants	Wrong material
Reaction	High reaction rate	Low reaction rate	No reaction	Reverse action	Incomplete reaction	Side reaction	Wrong reaction

Figure 6-6 Example HAZOP Deviations

6.8.1 Scenario Types

Scenario types are used to categorize common parameter deviations and are often related to a specific Type of Equipment. The common parameter deviations help to define the most common Initiating Events for the scenario. Examples are depicted in Figure 6-7.

Example RAST Scenario Type	HAZOP Parameters with Deviation		
Accumulation of Untreated Vent or Waste	*Composition-Wrong Concentration*	*Flow-High*	
Blocked-In with Thermal Expansion	*Temperature-High*	*Flow-No*	
Excessive Heat Input - Heat Transfer	*Energy-High*	*Pressure-High*	*Temperature-High*
Pad Gas or Vapor Flow	*Flow-High*		
Ignitable Headspace	*Composition-Wrong Concentration*		
Overfill, Overflow, or Backflow	*Level-High*	*Flow-Backflow*	
Pressure Damage	*Pressure-High*		
Vacuum Damage	*Pressure-Low*		
Pump Deadhead	*Pressure-High*	*Flow-No*	*Temperature-High*
Hose or Loading Arm Damage from Movement	*Flow-Loss of Containment*		
Drain or Vent Valve Open	*Flow-Loss of Containment*		
Seal Leak	*Flow-Loss of Containment*		

Figure 6-7 Example HAZOP Initiating Events

In addition, a "feasibility" check of process conditions which allow the event sequences to occur, is also used. Those Scenario Cases where the likelihood of the event sequence is extremely low based on process limitations are not included in the suggested list within RAST (Figure 6-8).

Flammability
Flash Point
Lower Flammability Limit
Minimum Ignition Energy

Fire and Explosion
Process or Upset Temperature > Flash Point
Max Concentration > Lower Flammable Limit
Ignition Source > Minimum Ignition Energy

Toxicity
Inhalation Toxicity
Dermal Toxicity
Aquatic Toxicity

Toxicity
Max Vapor Concentration > ERPG or LC Value
Potential For Dermal Exposure
Potential for Environmental Damage

Reactivity
Heat of Reaction
Detected Onset Temperature
Gas Generation

Reactivity
Max Pressure > MAWP or Relief Set
Max Process or Heating Temp > Temp of No Return

Figure 6-8 Examples of Scenario Feasibility Checks

6.8.2 RAST Scenario Group and Scenario

A **RAST Scenario Group** is also similar to a "Bow Tie Diagram". It represents a single Loss Event with the related Initiating Events and Incident Outcomes. Figure 6-9 represents the generic Bow-Tie utilized in RAST. RAST evaluates essentially all Incident Outcome of interest but initially includes only the most common one or two Initiating Events. If needed, the study team would add additional scenarios representing other Initiating Events of interest prior to selecting scenarios for Layer of Protection Analysis.

Figure 6-9 Generic Bow Tie Diagram Used in RAST

6.9 RAST Scenario Types

The *Scenario Type* is also used to "link" Loss Event for a specific Equipment Type and Chemical Service in the Scenario Library. A *Scenario* in RAST represents a specific combination of Equipment Type, Chemical Handled and Loss Event with one of several possible Initiating Events and one of several possible Incident Outcome. Examples of Scenario Type include:

Accumulation of Untreated Vent or Waste is used for Fired Equipment - Incinerator or TTU to represent scenarios where vents are not adequately destroyed with *a Vent Release* to the atmosphere. The most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Blocked-In with Thermal Expansion may occur within piping or equipment handling refrigerated liquids, high melting point material that would require tracing, or very long un-insulated pipelines (>100 m) that could be heated by solar radiation. It is assumed that pressure build-up causes a gasket failure of a liquid full system which is not discovered until the subsequent transfer of material through this piping or equipment.

Casing or Containment Failure represents failure of a canned or magnetic drive pump casing caused by an upset, wear, or fatigue.

Connection Failure represents failure of a flexible connection to solids handling equipment resulting in a *Solids Spill*. The typical Initiating Event is *General Mechanical Failure*.

Drain or Vent Valve Open may occur following maintenance activities or during connection or disconnection of transportation equipment (drums, totes, tank trucks, rail cars, etc.). It is assumed that a *Drain Size leak* is most commonly initiated by *Operator Action Failure.*

Excessive Heat Input causes an overpressure event due to high vapor pressure at elevated temperature. It is assumed that this pressure may result in all vapor venting *Release thru Relief System* (if the relief device is adequately sized) or *Equipment Rupture at Saturation* conditions (if the maximum pressure exceeds the burst pressure). Excluding reactive scenarios, there are three specific types that match to a specific Vapor Relief Loss Event:

<u>*Excessive Heat Input – Heat Transfer*</u> is triggered if vapor pressure at the maximum heating media temperature exceeds the relief set pressure.

<u>*Excessive Heat Input – Mechanical Energy*</u> is triggered if vapor pressure at a maximum temperature evaluated by a simple equipment heat balance exceeds the relief set pressure.

<u>*Excessive Heat Input – Fire*</u> is triggered if the chemical handled is flammable or there are other flammable materials in the area. It is assumed that the fire will persist long enough for relief set and equipment burst pressures to be achieved.

Excessive Pad Gas Flow represents a scenario where the release rate equals the feed rate of pad gas or air saturated with process chemicals. It is assumed that a *Release thru Relief System* occurs if the Maximum Inert Pressure exceeds the Relief Set Pressure.

Exhaustion of Scrubbing Media represents a scenario where the scrubbing media become depleted resulting in a Vent Release normally caused by Loss of Composition Control (BPCS Failure).

Flash Back of High Energy Feed is used for Fired Equipment – Incinerator, Thermal Oxidizer or Flare to represent propagation of combustion to upstream equipment resulting in *Equipment Damage*. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Fuel Accumulation during Light Off is used for Fired Equipment representing a process upset during start-up of the unit resulting in Equipment Damage or Equipment Rupture - Deflagration. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Fuel Accumulation during Operation is used for Fired Equipment representing a process upset during operation resulting in Equipment Damage or Equipment Rupture - Deflagration. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Fuel Accumulation while Down is used for Fired Equipment representing leakage of fuel when not in operation resulting in Equipment Damage or Equipment Rupture - Deflagration. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

High Fuel Flow or Energy Content is used for Fired Equipment representing a process upset during normal operation resulting in Equipment Damage or Equipment Rupture - Deflagration. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

High Temperature Failure is used the maximum Feed Temperature exceeds the Design Temperature of the equipment resulting in Equipment Failure above Design Temperature. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is loss of temperature or flow control (BSCS Failure).

Hose or Loading Arm Connection failure may occur during connection or disconnection of transportation equipment (totes, tank trucks, rail cars, etc.). It is assumed that a *Small Hole Size Leak* (gasket failure) is most commonly initiated by Operator Action Failure.

Hose or Loading Arm Damage from Movement represents leakage from piping caused by movement of a transport vehicle while connected. The potential for a Large Hole Size Leak is assumed to be most commonly initiated by Third Party Intervention.

Hydraulic Surge may occur due to the sudden change in fluid momentum in long pipelines if valves are closed too quickly (or during start-up of a pump).

Hydraulic Overpressure may occur if the pressure source exceeds the design limits of the equipment.

Ignitable Headspace may potentially result in an internal deflagration and *Equipment Rupture – Deflagration* if the chemical handled is greater than 5 °C above the flash point. It is assumed that the peak deflagration pressure reaches 10 atmospheres which in turn assumes ignition at atmospheric pressure and may exceed the burst pressure for some equipment.

Liquid in Vapor Feed represents a process upset associated with the feed to a Flare resulting in Flaming Liquid hazards or Equipment Damage. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Loss of Flow – Absorber or Scrubber represents a scenario where vapor feed is not treated but assumed a *Release thru Vent System* at the feed rate. It is triggered if the physical state of the feed stream is "vapor" for *Equipment* that is Absorber or Scrubber. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Loss of Flow or Level - Fired Equipment represents a process upset where quench equipment or a process heater may see excessively high temperature with Equipment Damage or Rupture at Saturation Conditions. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Events include *Pump Failure* or *Basic Process Control System* (BPCS) Failure.

Loss of Pilot or Ignition is used for Fired Equipment – Flare to represent loss of flame during operation with *Release through Vent System* of untreated material.

Loss of Vacuum - Thermal Oxidizer used for Fired Equipment – Incinerator or TTU to represent loss of vacuum during operation with *Release through Vent System* of untreated material.

Low Temperature Embrittlement represents the potential for material of construction to become brittle at low temperature resulting in fracture upon stress or thermal shock. It is assumed that the most likely Initiating Event is Human Error allowing evaporative cooling of low boiling chemicals in preparation for maintenance with subsequent full-bore pipe or equipment nozzle failure (Large Hole Size Leak).

Mechanical Integrity Failure represents a piping or equipment leak caused by corrosion, wear or fatigue. Hole sizes include *Very Small, Medium, Very Large* and *Extremely Large* with failure frequency dependent on the length of piping.

Movement of Flammable Liquid or Mist represents the potential for electrostatic build-up during movement of flammable liquids such as transport or mixing resulting in *Equipment Rupture – Deflagration*. It is assumed that the peak deflagration pressure reaches 10 atmospheres which assumes ignition at atmospheric pressure and may exceed the burst pressure for some equipment.

Overflow or Overfill, and **Overflow or Backflow** represents a release equal to the feed rate (or back flow rate) of process chemical if sufficient Inventory is available. It is assumed a *Release thru Relief System* if the peak pressure exceeds the relief set pressure.

Overflow - Foam or Entrainment is a type of Overflow or Backflow scenario for equipment handling vapor/liquid mixtures such as Distillation.

Overflow - Plugging or Freezing is a type of Overflow or Backflow scenario for equipment containing material that may easily plug or freeze.

Physical Damage or Puncture represents leakage from piping caused by impact from lifts or vehicle collisions. The potential for a Large Hole Size Leak is assumed to be most commonly initiated by Third Party Intervention.

Piping or Equipment Leak - Small is a general scenario type for leaks of mechanical loading arm, sight glass or other small equipment. A Small Hole size is used as the Loss Event.

Piping or Equipment LOPC – Large is a Full-Bore Hole Size Leak loss event resulting from a Hose Failure, Sight Glass Failure or Mechanical Failure due to vibration.

Plugged or Frozen Vent Line is used for Fired Equipment – Flare resulting in *Equipment Damage*. The most likely Initiating Event is assumed to be *Loss of Utilities*.

Pressure Damage is a broad category of scenario for solids handling equipment that assumes a *Solids Spill* if the peak pressure exceeds MAWP. If the peak pressure exceeds the burst pressure, *Rupture at Operating Temperature* is the loss event selected.

Propagation of Flame or Burning Ember is used in Solids Handling scenarios to represent an upset in an upstream equipment item that could ignite dust downstream.

Pump Deadhead is an event where one or both of the suction and discharge valves are closed while the pump or compressor is running. It is assumed that heat and pressure build-up result in *Equipment Rupture at Saturation* conditions or may result in an *Uncontrolled Reaction – Thermal Initiation*.

Relief Device Failure is failure of a rupture disk at the normal operating pressure due to pressure cycling or fatigue.

Rotating Equipment Damage is a failure or *Rupture at Operating Temperature* due primarily High Speed (Turbines) or Vibration (other Rotating Equipment).

Seal Leak is a leak of a mechanical pump or other rotating equipment seal caused by an upset, wear, or fatigue. The frequency of failure is determined by the type of seal arrangement – *Single Mechanical Seal, Double Mechanical Seal, Magnetic Drive*, or *Canned Pump*.

Tube Failure LOPC is associated with a Heat Exchanger. If the Process source pressure is higher than the Heat Transfer Fluid pressure and the Relief Set Pressure, the leak is assumed to be Process Fluid. If the Heat Transfer Fluid source pressure is higher than the Relief Set Pressure and Operating Pressure, the leak is assumed to be Heat Transfer Fluid.

Uncontrolled Reaction is a group of overpressure scenarios resulting from gas generation or high vapor pressure at elevated temperature. This pressure may result in vapor venting as a *Release thru Relief System* (if the relief device is adequately sized), *Equipment Rupture at Saturation* conditions if the maximum pressure exceeds the burst pressure, or *Equipment Rupture – Detonation* for highly reactive systems. Types of Reaction include:

Uncontrolled Reaction – Thermal Initiation is used if the process, maximum heating media, or mechanical energy temperature exceeds the Temperature of No Return

Uncontrolled Reaction - Fire Induced assumes that the fire will proceed long enough for the system to exceed the Temperature of No Return.

Uncontrolled Reaction – Catalyst or Impurity denotes a reaction that may initiated by catalysts or impurities at normal operating temperature.

Uncontrolled Reaction – Pooling of Reactants denotes a reaction that is typically limited by feed rate but may build up reactants which then react like a batch reaction.

Uncontrolled Reaction - Mis-Loading denotes greater than normal reactant or less than normal solvent such that the heat of reaction per mass of mixture increases.

Uncontrolled Reaction – Incompatible Material is triggered by the user or if the NFPA reactivity rating is 2 or greater.

Vacuum Damage represents the potential for *Equipment Damage* or a *Nozzle Failure – top of Vessel* for equipment that is not full vacuum rated.

6.10 User-defined Scenarios

The User may enter additional Scenario Cases by selecting a Scenario Type, Initiating Event, Loss Event and Incident Outcome for the equipment item being evaluated. If one of the standard Scenario Types does not adequately describe the process upset, a **User-defined Scenario Type** may be selected and details entered under the Initiating Event description.

A **Loss Event** may be selected from the standard *List of Loss Events* which will allow estimation of Consequences by calculation methods within the RAST tool. Selecting User-defined Loss Event allows input of various Hazard Parameters such as Release Rate, Total Release Quantity, Distance to ERPG-3 Concentration, etc. from other software tools.

Consequences are estimated by Impact Analysis using the RAST estimates for various Hazard Parameters. If User-defined Loss Event is selected, Hazard Parameters evaluated in other software tools may be input to continue with Impact Analysis. Alternately, a Tolerable Frequency Factor may be selected without using a quantitative estimate.

6.10.1 Example User-defined Scenario Case

To enter a User Scenario: (Refer to Figure 6-10 for Steps 2-5)

STEP 1: Select Create User Scenario from either the Scenario List or Scenario Results worksheets.

STEP 2: Select the Scenario Type or User-defined Scenario Type from the listing. The Scenario Type is only used in the Scenario Description or to relate Loss Events with Initiating Events and Outcome in the Scenario Library. Select *Pressure Damage* from the listing.

STEP 3: Select the Initiating Event from the listing or based on the Initiating Event Factor. Enter a Description of the Initiating Event that will be used in scenario documentation. The Initiating Event Description may be also be entered or updated from the LOPA workbook. Select *Regulator Failure* from the listing. Enter a description of the failure such as "Pad Gas Pressure Regulator failure".

STEP 4: Select the Loss Event or User-defined Loss Event. A summary of RAST estimations for various Hazard Parameters will be displayed. If User-defined Loss Event is selected, an additional column appears for input of Hazard Parameters if desired. Select *Equipment Rupture at Operating Temperature* from the listing.

Scenario Definition

Plant Section or Sub-Area	
Equipment Tag	V-101
Equipment Type	Vessel/Tank
Key Chemical	Acrylonitrile
Scenario Type	Pressure Damage
Initiating Event	Regulator Failure
Initiating Event Description	PadGas Regulator Failure resulting in Overpressure and Rupture of V-101
Loss Event	Equipment Rupture at Operating Temperature
Outcome	On-Site Toxic Release
Outcome Descriptors	Modeled as Instantaneous Release at a Distance to Severe Toxic Impact (LC-50 Concentration) of 699 m which exceeds Distance to the Fence Line of 180 m. Target Factor may be conservative.
Consequence	Severity Level-5
User Defined Outcome Descriptors	
User Defined Consequence	

Figure 6-10 User Scenario Inputs for Example Problem

STEP 5: Select an Outcome from the listed options.

In addition, on the User Scenario worksheet, a table summary of tolerable frequency for each incident outcome and loss event is displayed (Figure 6-11). This will help the Evaluation Team determine which Outcomes have the greatest severity.

- A Table of Consequences or Tolerable Frequency Factors for each Outcome is displayed based on the Impact Analysis performed within RAST to aide in selection.
- If User-defined Loss Event was selected, a Tolerable Frequency Factor may be entered directly under User-defined Consequence using a standard LOPA Tolerable Frequency Description list.
- The numerical values for Tolerable Frequency Factor, Initiating Event Factor, Probability of Ignition (based on estimated cloud volume and flammable mass), Probability of Exposure (where sufficient input information is available), and Number of Protective Layers needed are displayed.

Cells in "gray" represent Incident Outcome that may not meet a predefined screening criteria.

Estimated LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor for each combination of Incident and Outcome. (Combination Selected highlighted in Yellow.)

Target Factor for Consequences Exceeding Threshold Criteria for Analysis

Incident	Off-Site Toxic Release	On-Site Toxic Release	Indoor Toxic Release	Toxic Infiltration	Chemical Exposure	Flash Fire or Fireball	Vapor Cloud Explosion	Building Explosion	Equipment Explosion	Property Damage or Business Loss	Environmental Damage
Very Small Hole Size Leak		3									
Mechanical Seal Failure	5	4			5	3	4				
Mechanical Seal Failure above Liquid Level											
Gasket Failure	5	4			5	3	4				
Gasket Failure above Liquid Level											
Gasket Failure at 1.3 MAWP	5	4			5	3	4				
Gasket Failure at 1.3 MAWP above Liquid Level											
Drain or Vent Leak	5	4			5	3	4				
Drain or Vent Leak above Liquid Level											
USER DEFINED HOLE SIZE											
USER DEFINED HOLE SIZE											
Small Hole Size Leak	5	4			5	3	4				
Small Hole Size Leak above Liquid Level											
Medium Hole Size Leak	6	5			5	3	4				
Medium Hole Size Leak above Liquid Level											
Full Bore Hole Size Leak	6	6			6	3	4	5			
Full Bore Hole Size Leak above Liquid Level											
Very Large Hole Size Leak	6	6			6	3	4				
Very Large Hole Size Leak above Liquid Level											
Extremely Large Hole Size Leak	6	6			6	3	4	5			
Extremely Large Hole Size Leak above Liquid Level											
Solids Spill											
Secondary Dust Release											
Flaming Liquid Release											
Relief Size Release	6	6			6		4	5			
Relief Size Release above Liquid Level											
Overfill Release	6	6			6		4				
Backflow Release											
Vent Release	6	6			6		4				
Tube Hole Size Leak (Process Fluid)											
Tube Hole Size Leak (Heat Transfer Fluid)											
Pad Gas Release											
Vapor Displacement from Liquid Filling											
USER DEFINED LEAK RATE											
Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	6	6			6		4	5			
Vapor Relief Vent - Heat Transfer											
Vapor Relief Vent - Mechanical Energy		2									
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction											
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction with External Heat											
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction with Fire	6	6			6		4	5			
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction with Catalyst											
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction with Pooling											
Vapor Relief Vent - Reaction with Mis-Loading											
USER DEFINED VAPOR VENT RATE at Relief Temp											
Equipment Damage										3	
Equipment Failure above Design Temperature	6	6			6	3	4	5			
Equipment Rupture at Operating Temperature	6	6			6	3	5	5			
Equipment Rupture at Saturation Temperature	6	6			5	4	5	6	3		
Equipment Rupture at Peak Temperature	6	6			6	3	5	6			
Equipment Rupture at Fire Conditions	6	6			6	4	5		3		
Equipment Rupture - Deflagration	6	6			6	3	4		3		
Equipment Rupture - Detonation/Deflagration	6	6			5	4	5	6			
USER DEFINED LOSS EVENT					3						

Gray = Consequence does not exceed threshold criteria for continuing with LOPA

Figure 6-11 Display of Tolerable Frequency for Incident Outcome and Loss Event

Select *Off-Site Toxic Release* from the listing (Figure 6-12).

Figure 6-12 User-defined Scenario Example

STEP 6: Select <u>Save Scenario</u> to add this User Scenario to the Scenario Listing and Scenario Results. Select <u>Cancel and Go Back</u> to return to other RAST worksheets without saving the User Scenario. Select <u>Clear Inputs</u> to start over with entry of a User Scenario.

User-defined Scenarios may also be used to change standard holes sizes, or enter specific liquid and vapor flowrate. Under the selection of Loss Event will be User-defined Hole Size, User-defined Leak Rate, or User-defined Vapor Vent Rate. When using these options, addition input fields will appear (see Figure 6-13).

Figure 6-13 Example User Scenario Case for User Specified Hole Size

The figure shows two panels. The left panel is "Scenario Definition" and the right panel is "Results for Loss Event".

A callout at the top reads: "Selection of User Defined Hole Size with additional Input Fields for Temperature and Pressure"

A callout at the bottom reads: "Estimations for all Consequence Analysis Parameters are Updated for Selected Input Conditions."

Scenario Definition

Field	Value	Units
Plant Section or Sub-Area		
Equipment Tag	V-101	
Equipment Type	Vessel/Tank	
Key Chemical	Acrylonitrile	
Scenario Type		
Initiating Event		
Initiating Event Description		
Loss Event	USER DEFINED HOLE SIZE	
Specified Hole Size	50	mm
Specified Temperature	70	C
Specified Pressure	2	bar
Outcome		
Outcome Descriptors		
Consequence		

Results for Loss Event

	Calculated	User	Units
Consequence Analysis Reference	RAST		
Equipment Volume	100		cu m
Equivalent Hole Diameter	50		mm
Release location	Outdoors		
Total Release Quantity	71100		kg
Feed Composition	Liquid: 1 Acrylonitrile, ,		
Release Temperature (deg C)	70		C
Release Pressure	2		bar
Maximum Release Rate	1530		kg/min
Duration at Max Release Rate (min)	42		min
Total Release Duration (min)	60		min
Liquid Pool Area	6150		sq m
Fraction Key Chemical in Airborne Vapor	1.000		
Time-Scaled ERPG-2 (ppm)	53		ppm
Time-Scaled ERPF-3 (ppm)	114		ppm
Estimated 1 hour LC-1 Concentration (ppm)	99		ppm
Estimated 1 hour LC-50 Concentration (ppm)	171		ppm
Estimated Time-Scaled LC-1 Concentration (ppm)	151		ppm
Lower Flammable Limit (vol %)	3.000		vol %
Total Airborne Quantity	26000.000		kg
Airborne Rate (blank if Instantaneous)	762		kg/min
Distance to ERPG-2 Concentration (HD2)	4050		m
Distance to ERPG-3 Concentration (HD3)	2630		m
Distance to Severe Toxic Impact (LC-50 Concentration)	1010		m
Distance to Time-Scaled LC-1 Concentration - D Weather	2240		m
Distance to Time-Scaled LC-1 Concentration - F Weather	2340		m

7 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

A Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a method for evaluating the effectiveness of Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) in reducing the likelihood or severity of an undesirable event. LOPA builds on information and Scenarios developed during Hazard Screening and Evaluation. The analysis uses a simplified "order of magnitude" approach for analysis of Process Risk.

This section covers:

- Frequency Evaluation and Risk Analysis
- How a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is addressed in RAST
- How to enter and update LOPA Unmitigated Risk information (such as Tolerable Frequency Factor, Initiating Event, and Enabling Conditions).
- How to enter Protective Layer information
- How to use worksheets that provide supporting evaluations for a LOPA.

7.1 Frequency Evaluation and Risk Analysis

Risk: A measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury.

Risk Analysis: The estimation of scenario, process, facility and/or organizational risk by identifying potential incident scenarios, then evaluating and combining the expected frequency and impact of each scenario having a consequence of concern, then summing the scenario risks, if necessary, to obtain the total risk estimate for the level at which the risk analysis is being performed.

"Risk Analysis is the development of qualitative or quantitative estimates of risk based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques for combining estimates of incident consequences and frequencies." [12]

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) utilizes an Event Tree approach for estimating scenario frequency (Figure 7-1). The Initiating Event, any Enabling Conditions or Conditional Modifiers, and actions of Safeguards or Protection Layers are assumed independent such that the overall scenario frequency is estimated as the Initiating Event frequency times the Enabling Condition or Conditional Modifier probability times the Probability of Failure on Demand for any Protection Layers.

Figure 7-1 Event Tree for a LOPA Scenario

Frequencies for initiating events, probabilities for common enabling conditions and probability of failure upon demand for protective layers are found in the CCPS literature [17] (Figure 7-2).

Initiating Event	Frequency Range from Literature (per year)
Basic process control system failure	1 to 10^{-2}
Pressure regulator failure	to 10^{-1}
Gasket or packing blowout	10^{-2} to 10^{-6}
Cooling water failure	1 to 10^{-2}
Pump seal failure	10^{-1} to 10^{-3}
Unloading hose failure	1 to 10^{-2}
Safety valve opens spuriously	10^{-2} to 10^{-4}
Piping leak per 100 m pipe length (20% leak)	10^{-3} to 10^{-5}
Piping leak per 100 m pipe length (full breach)	10^{-5} to 10^{-6}
Large external fire (aggregate causes)	10^{-2} to 10^{-3}
Lightning strike	10^{-3} to 10^{-4}
Third party intervention (impact by vehicle)	10^{-2} to 10^{-4}
Human error (routine procedure, unstressed)	10^{-1} to 10^{-3} per opportunity

Layers of Protection Analysis, Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York (2001)

IPL description
Safety interlock
Generic PFD suggested for use in LOPA
0.1
Special considerations for use of generic PFD for this IPL
A safety interlock consists of a sensor, controller, final control element, and support utilities and interfaces. It acts to achieve or maintain a safe state of the process in response to a deviation from normal operation. • Equipment (or loop) failures may be revealed through process operation, automated diagnostics, or ITPM activities. The risk of continued process operation with a detected failure of the safety interlock equipment is assessed, and compensating measures are implemented to address any increased risk. • Changes to the safety interlock hardware and software are controlled using an MOC process. During any process operating mode where the scenario of concern could occur, the safety interlock is only bypassed with administrative approval and the implementation of any necessary compensating measures. Administrative approval may involve formal MOC, implementation of bypass procedures with event tracking, following operating procedures, etc.
Generic validation method
• Inspections and proof tests are conducted at an interval necessary to achieve the claimed PFD. • Inspection and proof testing are performed according to a procedure by personnel who are capable of identifying the as-found/as-left conditions and verifying the integrity and reliability of the equipment. • Documents include as-found/as-left conditions, the tester, when tested, the procedure and equipment used, and calibration records.
Basis for PFD and generic validation method
Consensus of the Guidelines subcommittee. See ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 Mod.) (ANSI/ISA 2004) and Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems (CCPS 2007b).

Example PFD for use in Risk Analysis, CCPS Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers in Layer of Protection Analysis (2015)

Figure 7-2 Example References for Risk Analysis Frequencies and Probabilities

Most companies utilize a Risk Matrix to establish a Tolerable Frequency for specific Consequences. RAST allows up to a 7 by 7 matrix of Consequence and Tolerable Frequency. Note that *Tolerable Frequency for a single Scenario* should typically be much lower than a company's FN Curve (Figure 7-3).

FN Curve: Societal Risk Criteria

[18]

Figure 7-3 Frequency versus Number of Fatalities (FN) Curves for various Companies

An example pf tolerable frequencies based on the curve for Company (or Country) C in Figure 7-3 is shown in Figure 7-4:

N Fatalities (offsite)	Tolerable Frequency per Year	Example Tolerable Frequency for a Single *Scenario*
100	10^{-6}	10^{-7}
10	10^{-5}	10^{-6}
1	10^{-4}	10^{-5}
0.1*		10^{-4}

Extrapolated to 0.1 lethality of a single person

Figure 7-4 Example Tolerable Frequencies

The default Risk Matrix that is within RAST allows for (up to) seven severity categories and seven frequencies expressed as in order-of-magnitude values (Figure 7-5). Criteria for the RAST Risk Matrix are found on hidden worksheets to be updated by the RAST Administrator rather than Evaluation Teams for consistency across HIRA evaluations.

Figure 7-5 Default Risk Matrix Used within RAST

7.2 LOPA Menu

On the LOPA Menu worksheet (Figure 7-6) the Equipment Identification, Equipment Type, and Location (Outdoors or Indoors) are displayed. With the LOPA Menu, one may:

- Return to the Main Menu
- Update Scenario Analysis for cases associated with the Equipment Item being analyzed.
- Update Scenario Analysis for cases associated with all Equipment Items within the Equipment Table.
- Set controls for the cases that will be created in Scenario Analysis
- Access the Scenario Results worksheet for Selection of LOPA Scenario Cases.
- Set filter criteria for Scenario Results worksheet upon return from the LOPA Worksheet
- Access special LOPA worksheets including Pool Fire Evaluation, Protective Layer (IPL) Summary, Estimation of Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART) and Estimation of Maximum Allowable Leak Rate (MALR).
- View a Risk Summary

7.3 Update Scenario Analysis

This command updates the Scenario Results worksheet with the current estimations. Upon completion of the update, the Scenario Results worksheet will be displayed.

All calculations within the RAST workbook are "live" or current with the input values displayed on the various Input worksheets. **Update Scenario Analysis** allows a "snapshot" of the current evaluation results to be saved as potential LOPA scenario cases. A comparison is made to the previous values in the Scenario Results worksheet allowing the User to track changes to the previous evaluation.

Update All Scenario Cases performs the *Update Scenario Analysis* for all Equipment Items in the Equipment Table. Note that for a large file this update may require more than one hour for completion.

(Additional information may be found under the *Scenario Results* section.)

Figure 7-6 LOPA Menu

7.4   Scenario Results Worksheet

The Scenario Results worksheet (Figure 7-7) contains a summary of the evaluation for all Scenario Cases that have been identified either from the Scenario Library or User entered. The summary for each Scenario Cases is stored under a unique Scenario Number which is assigned by the RAST tool. A "filter" button at the top left of this worksheet allows excluding the Protective Layer details from this view.

From the Scenario Results Worksheet one may access the LOPA Worksheet.

Figure 7-7 Scenario Results Worksheet

7.5 Description of Scenario Results Worksheet

Columns at the left side of this worksheet identify the <u>Equipment Item</u>, <u>Equipment Type</u>, <u>Scenario Type</u>, <u>Initiating Event</u>, <u>Initiating Event Description</u>, <u>Loss Event</u>, <u>Incident Outcome,</u> and <u>Key Chemical</u> for the **Scenario Case**. These columns are denoted by "yellow" headings.

The next column is to notify the user of ***Flash Convergence Errors*** (column K with a pink header). When displaying entries in this column, note the following options:

A. If the convergence is a scenario that will not be part of the risk analysis – merely ignore.
B. If the failure is the condensation routine such that routine returns zero condensed, that is likely OK since very few chemicals or mixture will condense following release. (Note that only low vapor pressure material released at a very high temperature, i.e. > 200 C, will become supersaturated in ambient air and condense.)
C. If a diked or bunded area exists and has not been entered, that may correct the issue. (A very large pool area is difficult to converge to a good average pool temperature.)
D. Adjust the composition slightly. The biggest issue appears to be a small quantity of dissolved gas in the liquid. In these cases, a very small fraction evaporated causes a significant change in the pool vapor pressure.
E. Select "pseudo" single chemical for the mixture which will generally be a more conservative result but less likely to fail to converge as there is no composition portion to the trial and error calculations (only flash fraction or temperature as being trialed).

The next series of columns represent a ***Summary of Evaluation Results***. These columns are denoted by "orange" headings. Included are:

Total Release Quantity

Maximum Release Rate

Total Airborne Quantity

Maximum Airborne Rate

Maximum Distance to Time-Scaled ERPG-2

Maximum Distance to Time Scaled ERPG-3

Distance to Severe Toxic Impact (LC-50 Concentration)

Concentration within Occupied Building

Enclosed Process Area Concentration

Distance to Severe Flammable Impact (Multiple of LFL, BLEVE, or Dust Fireball)

Rupture Distance to Direct Blast Impact (Overpressure or Fragments)

Rupture Distance to 1 psi Overpressure

Rupture Overpressure at Distance to Occupied Bldg.

Basis for Probability of Ignition (Airborne Rate or LFL Distance)

Explosion Distance to 1 psi Overpressure

Explosion Overpressure at Distance to Occupied Bldg.

Time to Relief Set Pressure or Burst Pressure

The next series of Columns represent a ***Summary of Unmitigated Risk*** for each Scenario Cases. The summary is based on analysis within the RAST workbook unless the User selects an alternate analysis. Included are:

Outcome Description

Consequence Description – based on RAST analysis of the Scenario Case

LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor

Alternate Tolerable Frequency Factor – may be entered if other than RAST analysis is used

Initiating Event Factor

Probability of Ignition

Alternate POI – may be entered if other than RAST analysis is used

Probability of Exposure

Alternate POE – may be entered if other than RAST analysis is used

Time at Risk or Other Condition

Layers of Protection Required

Gap in Layers of Protection

The next columns capture information specific to ***Selection and Review of LOPA Scenario Cases***. Included are:

<u>*Worst Case Scenario for Further Analysis*</u> – provides guidance for selection of "worst" Scenario Cases. The Scenario Case (or cases) with the Highest *Tolerable Frequency* Factor (denoted **High TF**), Largest Number of Protective Layers Required (denoted **High IPL**), or both (denoted **High TF & IPL**) are noted for each Scenario group. Scenario Group are those scenarios with the same *Equipment Item*, *Chemical service*, *Scenario Type*, and *Loss Event* but with a different *Initiating Event* or *Incident Outcome*.

Analysis of "worst case" scenarios represents the starting point.

- If only "Preventive" Protective Layers are used (stops the Event Sequence such as a shutting off the feed pump upon high level or shutting off the heating media supply upon high temperature), then <u>all other cases will be adequately managed</u> (no additional scenario cases will need analysis).
- If more than one "Mitigating" Protective Layer is used (reduces the magnitude of the consequence such as a sprinkler system for pool fire scenarios, than additional scenario cases representing other than the "worst case" <u>Outcome</u> may need to be analyzed.
- If more than one "Pre-Initiating" Protective Layer is used (reduces the likelihood of the Initiating Event such as a checklist to prevent leaving drain valves open), than additional scenario cases representing other than the "worst case" <u>Initiating Event</u> may need to be analyzed.

Analyze via LOPA? – "Yes" is entered to select the Scenario Case for A LOPA. Only Scenario Cases denoted "Yes" are transferred to the LOPA worksheet for further analysis.

Source Tool Version Used for Last Calculation – captures the Version Number of RAST used for the Results currently captured in the Scenario Results worksheet.

Source – indicates which Scenario Cases were entered from the RAST Library ("Tool" or "User" entered.

Comparison with Last Run – denotes each Scenario Case as:

- ***Same*** – no difference in any of the captured results
- ***Revised*** – differences were found in one or more stored values

- *New* – a new case was added that did not previously exist
- **Eliminated** – the case no longer meets screening criteria. (Note that if the LOPA Team wants to retain an Eliminated Scenario Case, the Source column may be changed from "Tool" to "User" and the Modify User Scenario command used to update scenario information. Results are not updated for "Eliminated" Cases upon execution of the <u>Update Scenario</u> command.)
- *Orphaned* – the equipment item for which the scenario was created no longer exists in the Equipment Table.

Notes – may be used to capture scenario details not related to a specific LOPA factor.

"Comments /Issues to Resolve"- may be used to capture action items

Manufacturing Name, Manufacturing Date – used to capture the Manufacturing approval of the LOPA Scenario Cases analysis.

Process Safety Name, Process Safety Date - used to capture the Process Safety approval of the LOPA Scenario Cases analysis.

Process Control Name, Process Control Date- used to capture the Process Control approval of the LOPA Scenario Cases analysis.

The remaining columns of the Scenario Results worksheet are used to store all **Protective Layer** information from a LOPA including descriptions, factors, Instrument Identification numbers, etc. As discussed under RAST – Getting Started, changes are tracked from the previous saved results as any cell that contains a value which has changed turns "green" and the prior values stored in the cell comments.

Existing Scenario Cases on the Scenario Results Worksheet may be modified by:

A scenario case may be *duplicated* by selecting any cell within the row representing the scenario may be copied and using the **Duplicate Scenario** command. A unique scenario number will be assigned by the tool.

A User Scenario may be *modified* by selecting any cell within the user scenario row and using the **Modify User Scenario** command which opens the User Scenario worksheet for editing.

7.6   The LOPA Worksheet

When activating the LOPA Worksheet from the Scenario Results worksheet, only Scenario Cases that are "filtered" on the Scenario Results worksheet will be viewed in the LOPA Workbook (Figure 7-8). For example, if the Equipment Tag (or Equipment Identification) is filtered to only one Equipment Item, only Scenario Cases for the specific Equipment Item where "Yes" has been entered under "Analyze by LOPA?" will be shown. This allows specific sections of the LOPA Worksheet to be active rather than the entire worksheet.

Figure 7-8 Accessing the LOPA Worksheet

7.6.1   Unmitigated Risk – "Left" Side of LOPA Workbook

The "Left" Side of the LOPA Worksheet represents Unmitigated Risk and includes inputs for Tolerable Frequency Factor (or TFF), Initiating Event, Probability of Ignition (or Alternate POI), Probability of Exposure (or Alternate POE), Time at Risk or Other Enabling Factors.

Results from the RAST Consequence Analysis and Frequency Evaluation may be used or an Alternate method provided by the User. Additional Details for the Initiating Event (such as Sensor and Final Element Identification for Basic Process Control Failure, Procedure Reliability for Human Error, etc.) needs to be entered by the User.

7.6.1.1   Description of the Undesired Consequences

The description provided in RAST includes the Scenario Type, Type of Equipment, Chemical involved, Loss Event, Release Quantity, Airborne Rate and (if available) an estimate of the Process Safety Time. For User-defined scenarios, the Quantities reported are those entered by the User. See Figure 7-9.

Figure 7-9 Description of Consequence

7.6.1.2 Tolerable Frequency Factor Description

The Tolerable Frequency Factor description explains how the Tolerable Frequency was determined by the RAST tool. Included in the description is the selected Incident Outcome, a Hazard Distance (such as Distance to ERPG-2 Concentration), personnel location reference (such as distance to the Fence Line), and specifics on the Consequence Analysis method (Figure 7-10).


Figure 7-10 Description of the LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor

A User may select an *Revised Tolerable Frequency Factor* method by using the "+" macro button within the Tolerable Frequency Factor Description and a blank column will be available to enter a User Description and Select the Tolerable Frequency Factor from a "pull down" list. Refer to Figure 7-11.

Figure 7-11 Revised Tolerable Frequency Factor Description

7.6.2   *Initiating Event Factor (IEF)*

The IEF is determined initially within RAST based on a most common Initiating Event but may be changed by the User from the available "pull down" list (Figure 7-12). The initial description (in blue text) should also be updated by the User to better reflect "how this could happen in my plant". *The Initial Description is only available until it is updated. RAST will not return to the initial description once it has been updated.*

Figure 7-12 Description of the Initiating Event

If the Initiating Event is Human Error, the reliability of the procedure and frequency of execution may be entered by selecting the "Human Error" macro button to cross check the Initiating Event Factor. If the Initiating Event is Basic Process Control System Failure, Sensor and Final Element Information may be entered by selecting the "+" macro button. Refer to Figure 7-13.


Figure 7-13 Initiating Event Fields

7.6.3   *Probability of Ignition (POI)*

The POI for an outdoor release is determined in RAST using results of simple dispersion modeling. If needed, an ***Alternate Probability of Ignition*** method may be entered by selecting the "+" macro button. A blank column will be available to enter a User Description and Select the Probability of Ignition from a "pull-down" list. Refer to Figure 7-14.


Figure 7-14 Probability of Ignition

7.6.4   **Probability of Exposure** *(Presence Factor)*

The Presence factor is estimated in the RAST tool based on an Impact Area from simple dispersion or explosion models (similar to a release "footprint" from PHAST modeling) and Population Density of site personnel. An ***Alternate Probability of Exposure*** method may be entered by selecting the "+" macro button. A blank column will be available to enter a User Description and Select the Probability of Exposure from a "pull down" list. Refer to Figure 7-15.

Figure 7-15 Probability of Exposure

An additional column is available within the RAST version of the LOPA workbook to capture **Time at Risk** or Other Enabling Factors. There is no evaluation for Time at Risk within RAST and values are entered from a "pull down" list.

Tables of initiating event frequencies, enabling condition and conditional modifier probabilities, and probability of failure upon demand for protective layers are stored on hidden worksheets in RAST as administrative parameters. These tables and correlation coefficients may be updated to reflect CCPS or other literature values for consistency among Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis teams.

7.6.5 Time at Risk or Other Enabling Condition / Conditional Modifier

An additional column is available within the RAST version of the LOPA workbook to capture Time at Risk or Other Conditional Modifier (Figure 7-16). There is no evaluation for Time at Risk within RAST.

Figure 7-16 Time at Risk or Other Conditional Modifier

Tables of initiating event frequencies, enabling condition and conditional modifier probabilities, and probability of failure upon demand for protective layers are stored as administrative parameters and represent the options for the various "pull down" lists (Figure 7-17, stored on hidden worksheets). These tables and correlation coefficients may be updated to reflect CCPS or other literature values. It is strongly recommended that Evaluation Teams do not unprotect worksheets and change these factors without agreement of the RAST Administrator.

Initiating Event *Values updated on Scenario Identification Worksheet*	Factor	Reference
BPCS Instrument Loop Failure	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 64
Human Failure Action more than once per quarter	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 68,70
Mechanical Failure	1	
Human Failure Action once per quarter or less	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 72
3rd Party Intervention	2	
Heat Exchanger Tube Leak < 100 tubes	2	
Heat Exchanger Tube Leak > 100 tubes	1	
Sight Glass Failure	1	
Loss of Mixing or Agitation	1	
Unloading/Loading Hose Failure	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 94
Mechanical Loading Arm Failure	2	
Pump (blower, compressor, etc.) Failure	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 80
Regulator Failure	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 74
Single Mechanical Seal Failure	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 92
Double Mechanical Seal Failure	2	
Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Failure	2	
General Utility Failure	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 82
Natural Distaster (Storm, Earthquake, etc.)	3	
IEF=0 pending more detailed evaluation	0	
IEF=1 pending more detailed evaluation	1	
IEF=2 pending more detailed evaluation	2	
IEF=3 pending more detailed evaluation	3	
IEF=4 pending more detailed evaluation	4	
IEF=5 pending more detailed evaluation	5	

Independent Protection Layers Credit Factor Table			
Independent Protection Layer	**PFDs**	**Factor**	**Reference**
Human Response to Abnormal Condition Alarm > 1/4 hr to respond	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 256
Human Response to Abnormal Condition >24 hours to respond (multiple sensors)	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 258
BPCS Independent of Initiating Event	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 154, 156
SIS - SIL 1	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 159-160
SIS - SIL 1+	0.03	1.5	
SIS - SIL 2	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 159-160
SIS - SIL 2+	0.003	2.5	
SIS - SIL 3	0.001	3	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 159-160
Fully Meets Relief Design Criteria (No evidence of buildup)	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 180, 184, 19
Two PRDs in Series w/o Adequate Pressure Check	0.1	1	
Two PRDs in Series with Adequate Pressure Check	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 194
Two Independent PRDs on Separate Nozzles w/o Independence Audit	0.001	3	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 182
Two Independent PRDs on Separate Nozzles with Independence Audit	0.0001	4	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 182
Overflow Line with no Impediment to Flow	0.001	3	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 132
Explosion Panels meeting NFPA 68 or equivalent (excluding High Flame Speed Vapor or Class 3 Dust)	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 208
Effluent Treatment System (Scrubber, Flare TOX, etc.) that is both capable and reliable	0.1	1	
End-of-Line Deflagration Flame Arrestor which prevents propagation to equipment	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 124
Flow Restricting Orifice that results in ten-fold reduction in the consequence	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 214
Mitigation System (Deluge, Foam, etc.) that results in ten-fold reduction in the consequence	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 244
Effective Housekeeping Program to Prevent Secondary Dust Explosion Potential	0.1	1	
Dike system with effective drainage to remote containment and routine inspection	0.01	2	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 138, 140
Human Response to Clearly Identified Abnormal Condition with Simple Well-Documented Action	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 256
Extraordinary Inspection for High Consequence, Low Failure Probability Equipment	0.1	1	
Extraordinary Equipment or Piping Design	0.1	1	
Hose or loading arm pressure test before each use	0.1	1	
Derail device, wheel chocks, etc. to prevent movement of cars or trucks	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 260
Dip Pipe or Bottom Fill with Conductive Fluid (reduced probability for Static Ignition)	0.1	1	
Positive Identification of Raw Materials prior to Unloading.	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 256
Restricted Access to a Hazardous Area	0.1	1	
PFD=.1 Internal mechanical trip independent of SIS or BPCS	0.1	1	Guidelines for IE and IPL in LOPA pg 240
PFD=.01 Internal mechanical trip independent of SIS or BPCS	0.01	2	
1 - Other Safety related protection systems (PFD=0.1)	0.1	1	
2 - Other Safety related protection systems (PFD=0.01)	0.01	2	
3 - Other Safety related protection systems (PFD=0.001)	0.001	3	

Figure 7-17 Default Values for the Frequencies and Probabilities

7.6.6 Protective Layers – "Right" Side of LOPA Workbook

The "Right" Side of the LOPA Worksheet (Figure 7-18) represents Protective Layers and includes inputs for Basic Process Control Action, Operator Response to Alarm, SIS (Safety Instrumented System) Functions, Pressure Relief Device, and Safety Related Protective Systems (SRPS). Suggested Protective Layers for Common Scenario Cases are provided the first time Update Scenario is executed. These suggestions may be removed, revised or updated by the Analysis Team. A "pull-down" list for each Protective Layer is used to determine the appropriate LOPA Factor. The status for each Protective Layer may also be captured to aid in prioritization of work. Options include: *Fully Implemented, In Progress and Proposed.*

An IPL is considered Independent if it is not adversely affected by the initiating event or any other protection layer *associated within the scenario*. In some cases, however, *the same IPLs may be used to manage related scenarios* such that the PFD should be adjusted. If there are two scenarios with the same loss event and incident outcome but different initiating events, the PFD may need to be adjusted. For example: if there are two means for overfill of a tank, one a BPCS level control failure (at a frequency of 0.1 per year) and the other a human error, such as unloading into the wrong tank (at a frequency of 0.1 per year); then total demand on IPLs shared between these scenarios is 0.2 per year. At least one of the shared IPLs should be considered a PFD of 0.2 rather than 0.1 (or 0.02 rather than 0.01, etc.). This "correction" is typically ignored when using only order of magnitude assuming there is sufficient conservatism in the analysis. If, for

example, the shared IPL is a SIS loop, then one could specify a PFD of 0.05 rather than 0.1 for a SIL-1 to accommodate.

Figure 7-18 The 'Right Side' of the LOPA Worksheet-IPLs

A list of Possible IPLs may be displayed using the "> Possible IPLs" macro button. A partial listing which may be updated by the Plant or Analysis Team is displayed. Refer to Figure 7-19.

Figure 7-19 Possible IPLs Displayed

Additional Information for Automated Protective Layers may be entered by selecting the "+" macro button. An additional column will appear with fields for input of key Instrument Information. Refer to Figure 7-20.

Figure 7-20 Additional IPL Details Displayed

A listing for Safety Related Protection System (SRPS) and associated credits are based on literature examples. Credits may also be "manually" entered representing values agreed upon by Process Safety Subject Matter Experts.

Use *Back to Scenario Results* (Figure 7-21) to Save Information that has been input on the LOPA worksheet. LOPA Information for Each Scenario Case is stored, along with the scenario information, in a single row identified by a unique Scenario number. Manually save the Entire Workbook in the appropriate location.

Back to Scenario Results *saves* any inputs made while in the LOPA Workbook to the Scenario Results worksheet.

Figure 7-21 Back to Scenario Results

7.7 Example Scenario Selection and LOPA within RAST

As an example, the scenarios associated with the Acrylonitrile Storage Tank, V-101, are selected.

STEP 1: Ensure V-101 Information is "Active" within RAST.

From the Main Menu or LOPA Menu, view Equipment Identification. Refer to Figure 7-22.

Equipment Identification = V-101
Equipment Type = Vessel/Tank
Equipment Location = Outdoors

Figure 7-22 Equipment Identification on Main Menu

If the Equipment Identification is not is not V-101, use Load Selected from the Equipment Table.

STEP 2: Ensure Analysis is Current. If the Equipment Item has not yet been analyzed or if inputs have changed since the last analysis, Select *Update Scenario for Equipment Loaded* which will go to the **Scenario Results** worksheet when completed.

STEP 3: Select Scenario Cases for the LOPAs on the Scenario Results worksheet (Figure 7-23). There are many cases listed so focus on those identified as "worst cases" as the case within a broad scenario category having the Highest Tolerable Frequency Factor ("High TF"), Greater Number of IPLs Needed ("High IPL") or both ("High TF & IPL").


Figure 7-23 Selecting Analyze with LOPA on Scenario Results Worksheet

Select "Yes" to Analyze via LOPA? for the following four cases to begin with:

- Excessive Heat – Pool Fire with Vapor Venting
- Excessive Heat – Pool Fire with Equipment Rupture
- Ignitable Headspace
- Overfill

Note that the Tolerable Frequency Factor for many of these Scenarios is high. Return to **Plant Layout** (via the Main Menu) and enter a Dike Area of 200 m². Save this change by selecting **Save Input to Equipment Table**. Return to the **LOPA Menu** and *Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded* which again will go to the **Scenario Results** worksheet when completed. Note that several Scenario Cases have been updated (denoted by "green" cells). Entry of a Dike or Containment Area significantly reduces the area for pool evaporation and the total Airborne Quantity, hence lowering the Tolerable Frequency Factors for several scenario cases. Refer to Figure 7-23.

STEP 4: Select LOPA Worksheet. Information from the RAST evaluation will be captured in the LOPA Worksheet for additional inputs and evaluation by the LOPA Team. Refer to Figure 7-24.

Figure 7-24 LOPA Worksheet

STEP 5: Review the Description of Undesired Consequences and LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor provided by RAST. This Description and Tolerable Frequency Factor are based on a specific RAST analysis and may not be changed. Consider entering User Scenario Cases where these descriptions do not represent a Process Risk associated with the equipment being analyzed. If a more detailed analysis of the Consequence is available which results in a different LOPA Tolerable Frequency Factor, an alternate Tolerable Frequency Factor and Description may be entered and the RAST analysis will not be used.

STEP 6: Review the Initiating Event Description and Update as appropriate. The documentation should be clearly understood by LOPA Team members. *Determine if the correct Initiating Event Factor has been used and Update if needed.*

Starting with the Open Drain Valve, update the Initiating Description to better reflect how this might occur. Consider how frequently the drain valve might be operated – such as opened less than once per year to prepare the pump or piping for maintenance or opened with each transfer to drain the unloading hose. Change the Initiating Event Factor by using the "pull down" Menu to "Operator Failure Action more than once per quarter" if appropriate.

STEP 7: Review the Enabling Factors and Update as appropriate.

STEP 8: Determine the Most Effective Protective Layers for managing the Process Risk. Protective Layer information is entered on the "Right" Side of the LOPA Workbook (Figure 7-25). Some common Protective Layers are suggested by RAST which the LOPA Team updates the description and enters the appropriate "Credit" from "pull down" Menu selections for each.

In this Scenario Case, a flammable leak detector with alarm would be documented under "Operator Response to Alarm" if there were sufficient time for Operator Response to stop the leak and significantly reduce the Consequence. This would represent a "Mitigating" Protective Layers and it does not prevent the Loss Event (leak from an open drain valve) from occurring.

Figure 7-25 Choosing the Most Effective Protection Layers

STEP 9: Complete the LOPA by entering any Notes to help explain the Scenario Case. Another column is provided in the RAST version of the LOPA Workbook for capturing Issues and Action Items. In addition, columns are provided for entry of Process Safety, Manufacturing, and Process Control reviewers and Review Date.

STEP 10: Save the LOPA Inputs to the Scenario Results Worksheet. Select **Back to Scenario Results** to save inputs made on the LOPA Worksheet. Once the LOPA Worksheet has "closed", the entire RAST workbook should be saved.

It should be noted that an IPL is considered Independent if it is not adversely affected by the initiating event or any other protection layer associated within the scenario. In some cases, however, the same IPLs may be used to manage related scenarios such that the PFD should be adjusted. If we have two scenarios with the same loss event and incident outcome but different initiating events, we may need to consider adjusting the PFD. For example: if we have two means for overfill of a tank, one a BPCS level control failure (at a frequency of 0.1 per year) and the other a human error, such as unloading into the wrong tank (at a frequency of 0.1 per year); then total demand on IPLs shared between these scenarios is 0.2 per year. At least one of the shared IPLs should be considered a PFD of 0.2 rather than 0.1 (or 0.02 rather than 0.01, etc.). This "correction" is typically ignored when using only order of magnitude assuming there is sufficient conservatism in the analysis. If, for example, the shared IPL is a SIS loop, then one could specify a PFD of 0.05 rather than 0.1 for a SIL-1 to accommodate.

7.8   Mechanical (Asset) Integrity Scenarios in RAST

Mechanical Integrity (MI) failures represent nearly 50% of Process Safety Events. These are difficult to analyze within LOPA as a "cause" is not identified other than corrosion or fatigue. Without an identified "cause" only frequent inspection and Mitigating Protective Layers can be used. Fortunately, Mechanical Integrity failures of piping and equipment are not frequent and, in many cases, Protective Layers will not be required.

RAST screens for Mechanical Integrity failures based on "order of magnitude" industry frequency data. This feature is disabled on the LOPA Menu by entering "Yes" to the question "Exclude Mechanical Integrity Scenarios". MI scenarios appear in the Scenario Result worksheet as "Piping or Equipment LOPC – xxx" where xxx represent a specific hole size. Screening is performed using four hole sizes: 5 mm, 25 mm, 100 mm, and 250 mm (or other hole sizes entered under the Administrative Parameters).

7.9   Supporting Evaluations and Reports in the LOPA Menu

There are several supporting evaluations and reports are accessed from the LOPA Menu including (Figure 7-26):

- Pool Fire Frequency Estimate – uses a simplified Fault Tree approach to estimate a frequency of pool fire.
- Maximum Allowable Response Time – provides estimates of MART that may be used in specifying Safety Instrumented Systems.
- Maximum Allowable Leak Rate - provides estimates of MALR that may be used in specifying Safety Instrumented Systems.
- Independent Protection Layer Summary – provides a listing of all Protective Layers identified for a specific Equipment Item
- Risk Summary – provides both tabular and graphical summary for risk associated with all scenarios being considered.


Figure 7-26 Supporting Evaluations in the LOPA Menu

7.10 Pool Fire Evaluation

A "general" Initiating Event Factor representing a leak with ignition is used by RAST for initial screening of Pool Fire cases. Estimation of pool fire frequency, however, is complex and requires an evaluation of all potential leak sources of fuel. A Pool Fire Frequency section of this worksheet is available to perform a very

simple Fault Tree based on LOPA Scenario information to obtain a more reasonable estimate of the Initiating Event Factor.

STEP 1: Select Estimate Pool Fire Evaluation from the either the Main Menu or LOPA Menu. Since the Pool Fire Evaluation Summary is commonly used to determine which equipment may require more detailed evaluation of Pool Fire Frequency, access is located on both the Main Menu and LOPA Menu. *Ensure V-101 is the equipment that is active (or select V-101 from the Equipment Table and use "Load Selected"*

STEP 2: Identify Scenario Cases (on Scenario Results worksheet) which contribute to a flammable leak near the physical location of the equipment being analyzed (cases with flammable outcome that are not pool fire related). Refer to Figure 7-27. A pool fire scenario impacting V-101 could be caused by spills from V-101, pump P-101, or other tanks within the same dike or containment area.

To determine scenario cases with flammable outcome not related to pool fire, one may *filter* scenario cases with Outcome of either "Flash, Jet or Pool Fire" or "Vapor Cloud Explosion" or "Building Explosion" and *filter* Scenario Type to exclude "Excessive Heat Input – Pool Fire".

To reduce the number of contributing cases (to less than 10), those with highest frequency should be selected (or those with the smallest sum of Initiating Event plus Probability of Ignition plus non-mitigating Protective Layer factors). The summation of frequencies for the contributing scenarios will not be significantly impacted by excluding the very low frequency cases.

To demonstrate this capability, select scenarios with Flash Fire as an Outcome as this is often how a pool fire begins. Note that one should include scenarios from other equipment items in the same physical area of the facility that could contribute to a pool fire in the area   This might include mechanical failure of overhead piping, seal leak of pumps within the same diked area, and loss of containment scenario of other tanks and equipment in the same area.

Figure 7-27 Identify Scenario to Include for Pool Fire Evaluation

STEP 3: Record the Scenario Identification Numbers for scenarios with flammable outcome associated with these Equipment Items.

Enter the Scenario Identification Numbers of the contributing cases in the column on the left side of the Pool Fire worksheet. RAST will retrieve information for each scenario including Protective Layers and summarize in additional columns of the same row. The overall frequency and frequency factor are shown at

the bottom right of this worksheet. This frequency factor may then be used for updating the Initiating Event Factor for the Excessive Heat from Pool Fire to V-101 scenario from the LOPA Workbook "pull down" Menu. Refer to Figure 7-28.

Note that if an entered scenario number does not pull up the appropriate scenario information, try copying the scenario number on the Scenario Results worksheet and "paste special" into the Pool Fire worksheet. This will preserve the proper format such that the lookup function may exactly match the scenario identification.

Figure 7-28 Pool Fire Worksheet

STEP 4: Save the List of Contributing Scenarios by using the Save Input to Equipment Table command.

7.11 Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART)

An estimate of the Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART) is required for each Safety Instrumented System identified within a LOPA. The MART provides key information for specification of the instrumentation. The RAST tool provides a worksheet to assist in MART estimation for common scenarios. The MART-MALR Estimation worksheet is accessed from the LOPA Menu. Refer to Figure 7-29. Estimates are based on various inputs for flowrate, operating level, heat transfer rate, etc. and the proposed Alarm set points.

Overflow and Backflow – this section of the MART worksheet estimates the MART from an entered High-Level Alarm Set Point to "hydraulically full" based on the entered Maximum Feed Rate or Maximum Backflow Rate inputs from the Process Conditions worksheet. A value for the Sensor Time Constant may also be entered which will incorporate a first-order time delay into the MART estimate.

Pad Gas Overpressure – this section of the MART worksheet estimates the MART from an entered High-Pressure Alarm Set Point to the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure based on the entered Maximum Pad Gas Rate input from the Process Conditions worksheet. A value for the Sensor Time Constant may also be entered which will incorporate a first-order time delay into the MART estimate.

Overheating – this section of the MART worksheet estimates the MART from an entered High Temperature Alarm Set Point to the Saturation Temperature at the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure based on heat inputs from Heat Transfer, Mechanical Energy, or Fire. A value for the Sensor Time Constant may also be entered which will incorporate a first-order time delay into the MART estimate.

Reaction - this section of the MART worksheet estimates the MART from an entered <u>desired</u> High Temperature Alarm Set Point to the Saturation Temperature at the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure based on heat inputs from various Reaction cases. A value for the Sensor Time Constant may also be entered which will incorporate a first-order time delay into the MART estimate. As reaction heat rate may be very high, an actual High Temperature Alarm Set Point meeting the desired value is returned based on the entered Sensor Time Constant.

Note that the estimates from the MART-MALR worksheet are not saved. Results may be entered in the SIS Instrumentation details of the LOPA workbook.

<< Go To LOPA Menu   **Maximum Allowable Response Time (MART)**   Clear Input This Worksheet

This Worksheet for Calculation Only - Results are Not Saved. Print this page if a copy is n...

Equipment Identification: V-101
Equipment Type: Vessel/Tank
MAWP or Relief Set Pressure: 0.10 barg

Estimated as the time between the alarm activation and the undesired consequence (typically activation of ...
rupture). Estimated as 0.5 times Process Safety Time to allow for Sensor Response, Decision Time, and A...
Losses are Not Included in the Estimated Times. MART for Pumps is found on the Pump Deadhead Page...

Liquid Overfilling Scenario:

	Overflow	Backflow	
Level Alarm Set Point:			Fraction Full
Sensor Time Constant:			min
Maximum Contained Mass:	79690		Kg
Maximum Source Pressure:	0.001	0.000	bar gauge
Liquid Feedrate:	400.00	0.00	Kg/min
Sensor Lag:	0.0000	0.0000	Fraction Full
Max Allowable Response Time:	199.23		min

Source Pressure less than Relief Set or MAWP - Overflow May Not Occur
Source Pressure less than Relief Set or MAWP - Backflow May Not Occur

Pad Gas or Vapor Overpressure:

Pressure Alarm Set Point:		bar gauge
Sensor Time Constant:		min
Normal Operating Pressure:	0.01	bar gauge
Maximum Pad Gas Flowrate:	0.000	Kg/min
Maximum Pad Gas Pressure:	0.001	bar gauge
Equipment Volume:	100000.0	liter
Initial Liquid Fill Fraction:	0.8	
Sensor Lag:	0.0000	atm gauge
Max Allowable Response Time:		min

Source Pressure less than Relief Set or MAWP - Overpressure May Not Occur

Overheating Scenario:

	Heat Transfer	Mechanical Energy	Fire	
Temperature Alarm Set Point:				
Sensor Time Constant:				
Normal Operating Temperature	25			C
Boiling Point at MAWP or Relief Set	80.2			C
Heating Media Temperature	0.0			C
Max Mechanical Energy Temperature at High Level	26.2			C
Max Mechanical Energy Temperature at Low Level	32.3			C
Heat Transfer Area	0			m²
Heat Transfer Coefficient	0			Kwatt/m²C
Heat Capacity	2.136			Joule/gm C
Equipment Contained Mass at High Level	63752.00			Kg
Equipment Contained Mass at Low Level	7969.00			Kg
Overall Heat or Mechanical Energy Input	0.00	5.60	2995.98	Kwatt
Sensor Lag	0.00	0.00	0.00	C
Max Allowable Response Time at High Level:		65029.53	60.78	min
Sensor Lag	0.00	0.00	0.00	C
Max Allowable Response Time at Low Level:		8128.69	25.32	min

Heating Media Temperature less than Boiling Point at Relief Set or MAWP - Overpressure May Not Occur
Maximum Mechanical Energy Temperature at High Level less than Boiling Point at Relief Set or MAWP - Overpressure May Not Occur
Maximum Mechanical Energy Temperature at Low Level less than Boiling Point at Relief Set or MAWP - Overpressure May Not Occur

Reaction Scenario based on Normal Operation Liquid Level:
(Excludes Gas Generation)

	Adiabatic Reaction	Reaction + Ext Heat	Reaction + Fire	Reaction + Catalyst	Reaction + Pooling	Reaction + Misloading	
Temperature Alarm Set Point	0						C
Sensor Time Constant	0						min
Temperature of No Return	176.6						C
Boiling Pt at MAWP or Relief Set	80.2						C
Required Alarm Set Point	0.0	0.0	0.0				C
Rx Heat Rate at Alarm Point	0.0000	0.0609	1.3557				C/min
Sensor Lag	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				C
Time to Relief Set or MAWP:	###########	1384.00	64.56				min

Figure 7-29 Maximum Allowable Response Time

As an example, estimate the Maximum Allowable Response time for a level alarm to stop an overflow of Tank V-101 from the maximum operating fill fraction of 0.8 assuming an instrument 1 min or less time constant from a set point of 0,9 fill fraction (Figure 7-30). One may evaluate various alarm set points to determine if there is sufficient time for an operator response to alarm.

Figure 7-30 Example Maximum Allowable Response Time for High Level Alarm

7.12 Maximum Allowable Leak Rate (MALR)

An estimate of the Maximum Allowable Leak Rate is also required for each Safety Instrumented System identified within a LOPA. This provides key information in the specification of instrumentation. The RAST tool provides a worksheet to assist in this estimation. The MART-MALR Estimation worksheet is accessed from the LOPA Menu. Refer to Figure 7-31.

The Maximum Allowable Leak Rate is either based on *Limiting* the incident outcome to prevent a potentially serious human impact OR based on *Stopping* or *Delaying* the Event Sequence. For example:

LIMIT the release rate to Prevent a Potentially Serious Human Impact would be reducing the release rate such that a multiple of ERPG-3 or ½ LFL distance is less than 3 m (10 ft) or O_2 concentration within a confined work area is greater than 19.5 volume %.

STOP the Event Sequence from reaching Process Conditions *that could lead to a Release*. This may involve limiting the maximum pressure within the Equipment Item to below the MAWP or the Relief Set Pressure. For example, limit the flow rate of heat transfer fluid such that the maximum temperature is below that where the vapor pressure exceeds the MAWP or Relief Set Pressure resulting in no release.

DELAY the Event Sequence from reaching potential Release conditions for a Sufficiently Long Period of Time – which is commonly accepted as 24 hours. For example, limit the feed rate to a vessel such that the volume from alarm activation to overfill takes longer than 24 hours.

Allowable Release Rate of Hazardous Material - this section of the MALR worksheet estimates the MALR for a hazardous release such that a multiple of ERPG-3 or ½ LFL distance is less than 3 m (10 ft). The leak location ("Indoors" or "Outdoors") must be entered or the "default" of "Outdoors" is used. If the location is indoors, the Release Rate corresponding to O_2 concentration greater than 19.5 volume % is also reported.

Allowable Addition Rate for Preventing Loss Event - this section of the MALR worksheet estimates the MALR is based on an overall heat balance. The first estimate is the <u>Maximum Allowable Heating Media Flow</u> to limit the maximum temperature from increasing above the entered Temperature Alarm Set Point. The second estimate is the <u>Maximum Allowable Reagent Flow Rate</u> that limits the reaction temperature from increasing above the entered Temperature Alarm Set Point based on an entered Fraction of Limiting Reagent within the total equipment contents.

Addition Rate to Delay Loss Event for 24 Hours - this section of the MALR worksheet estimates the MALR based on an overall material and energy balance. The first estimate is the <u>Maximum Allowable Heating Media Flow</u> to limit the maximum temperature to less than the boiling point at the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure over 24 hours. The second estimate is the <u>Maximum Allowable Reagent Flow Rate</u> that limits the reaction temperature to less than the boiling point at the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure based on a Fraction of Limiting Reagent within the total equipment contents over 24 hours. The third estimate is the Feed Rate or Pad Gas Flow Rate that limits Maximum Pressure to the lower of MAWP or Relief Device Set Pressure from the High-Pressure Alarm Set Point over 24 hours. (Note that Maximum Pressure from Liquid Feed Rate is based on "compression" of the vapor head space in this estimate.)

Note that the estimates from the MART-MALR worksheet *are not saved*. Results may be entered in the SIS Instrumentation details of the LOPA workbook.

Maximum Allowable Leak Rate (MALR)

This Worksheet for Calculation Only - Results are Not Saved. Print this page if a cop...

Equipment Identification:	V-101
Equipment Type:	Vessel/Tank

Maximum Allowable Leak Rate is the maximum flow that can leak by a valve used as the final element in a ... ario without exceeding a threshold consequence criteria.

There are generally three cases to consider:

a) **LIMIT** the release rate of hazardous material such that the consequence has been essentially elimin... s is typically based on distance to time-scaled LC-50 or a multiple of LFL concentration is less than a specified haz... inimis distance).

b) **STOP** the scenario propagation by limiting the continued addition of material or energy to less th... ural ability of the system to remove (such as the flow rate of heat transfer fluid that prevents further heating of the ... on).

c) **DELAY** the potential for catastrophic failure for a sufficiently long period of time (such as the ... rate which delays hydraulic overpressure for at least 24 hours) by limiting the continued addition of material or ene... y.

LIMIT - Allowable Release Rate of Hazardous Material:

Leak Location:		*Assumed Outdoors if blank*
Indoor Process Volume:	0	m^3
ERPG-3 at Initial Vapor Composition:	75.0	ppm
Lower Flammable Limit at Initial Vapor Composition:	3.0	vol %
Approximate Flash + Pool Evaporation Fractions:	1.000	
Maximum Allowable Leak Rate for time-scaled LC-50 < 3 m:	**0.08**	**Kg/min**
Maximum Allowable Leak Rate for 0.5 LFL < 3 m:	**1.45**	**Kg/min**

STOP - Allowable Addition Rate for Preventing Incident — *Temperature Alarm Set Point*

Equipment Surface Area:	100.64	m^2
Heat Loss Coefficient (no Insulation):	0.01	Kwatt/m^2 C
Alarm Temperature:	0	C
Heat Loss Rate at Temperature Alarm:	-25.16	Kwatt
Heat Transfer:		
Heat Transfer Fluid:		
Heat Transfer Fluid Temperature:	0	C
Heat Capacity:		Kjoule/Kg C
Maximum Allowable Heating Media Leak Rate:		**Kg/min**

Reaction:		
Fraction Limiting Reagent within Reaction Mixture:		
Heat of Reaction:	-1365.0	Kjoule/Kg Reaction Mixture
Reaction Temperature of No Return:	176.6	C
Heat Loss Rate at Temperature Alarm:		Kwatt
Maximum Allowable Reagent Addition Rate:		**Kg/min**

Alarm Temperature is less than Ambient Temperature

DELAY - Addition Rate to Delay Incident for 24 Hours — *Boiling Point at MAWP or Relief Set*

Contained Mass:	63752.0	Kg
Process Heat Capacity:	2.19	Kjoule/Kg C - Liquid
Total 24 hour Heat Input:	9035980	Kjoule
Maximum Allowable Heating Media Leak Rate:		**Kg/min**

Total 24 hour Reaction Heat Input:	22492456.0	Kjoule
Maximum Allowable Reagent Addition Rate:	**0.00**	**Kg/min**

	Pressure < MAWP or Relief Set	*Level < Overfill*	
Equipment Volume:	100		m^3
Initial Liquid Fill Fraction:	0.8		
Maximum Allowable Pad Gas Leak Rate:			**Kg/min**
Maximum Allowable Liquid Fill Rate:	**0.99**	**55.34**	**Kg/min**

Figure 7-31 Maximum Allowable Leak Time

(Callout: Enter Leak Location (Indoors or Outdoors))

(Callout: Displays MALR based on Flammable or Toxic Personnel Exposure.)

(Callout: Displays MALR to Stop Event Sequence based on Heat Rate or Reaction)

(Callout: Displays 24 hour MALR based on Heat Rate.)

(Callout: Displays 24 hour MALR based on Liquid or Vapor Feed Rate.)

7.13 Protection Layer Summary

A listing of each unique Protective Layer associated with a specific Equipment Item is displayed on the IPL Summary worksheet. This worksheet is accessed from the LOPA Menu. The Refresh macro (top center of the worksheet) should be used to update the information shown. Refer to Figure 7-32 This information is helpful for those designing the various instrumented loops used a Basic Process Control Interlocks (including Alarms and Safety Instrumented Systems. Displayed are the scenario identification numbers, type of protective layer, risk reduction factor, description of the function and status of the implementation.

Figure 7-32 Independent Protection Layer Summary

7.14 Risk Summary

The status for Protective Layers may be entered for each Scenario in the LOPA Workbook. Two tables of LOPA Consequence (as Tolerable Frequency Factor) versus LOPA Frequency is developed for all "Analyzed" Scenarios before and after full implementation of Protective Layers. In addition, a graph representing cumulative frequency versus consequence severity is provided for comparison to a company's FN curve for societal risk. This Risk Graph Summary is provided to assist in prioritization of Risk Reduction resources. Those cells denoted in "red" are scenarios not meeting a company's risk tolerance criteria.

The Risk Summary may be viewed for ALL Equipment Items within the Equipment Table or "filtered" to only the specific Equipment Items selected on the left side of this worksheet. The *Risk Summary* is accessed through the LOPA Menu. Refer to Figure 7-33. Note that these tables and graph are highly dependent on entry of the status for each protective layer.

Figure 7-33 Risk Summary Worksheet

8 Case Study – Continue Evaluation of AN Storage and Unloading Operation

To gain familiarity with the RAST workbook, the Example Problem described in the Getting Started section is used for this Case Study.

A Case Study – Input Information (Figure 8-1)

As under Getting Started, the following information is used:

Equipment Parameters

Tank Volume = 100 m³ (26000 gal)
Chemical = Acrylonitrile
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure = 0.2 bar (2.9 psig)
Flat Bottom Non-Anchored Tank
Bottom Outlet Nozzle = 100 mm (4 inch)
Circulating Pump = 5.6 kW (7.5 HP)

Operating Conditions

Operating Temperature = 25 C
Pressure = 0.01 bar (0.2 psig)
Liquid Head = 6 m (20 ft)
Feed Rate = 400 Kg/min (880 lb/min)

Figure 8-1 Input Information for the Case Study

In addition to the Storage Tank, perform analysis for the Tank Truck and Pump with 200 m transfer piping.

Additional input information includes:

Storage Tank, V-101

- Flat Bottom Non-Anchored Tank within a 200 m² diked or bunded area and 70000 Kg of other flammables in the area.
- Relief Device PVRV-101 is a 250 mm (10 inch) diameter PVRV set at 0.07 barg (1 psig). The Relief Discharge Elevation is 6 m (20 ft) with Horizontal discharge.
- V-101 is maintained with a non-ignitable atmosphere. The maximum pad gas source pressure is regulated to 1 barg (14.5 psig) with a maximum flow of 100 standard m³/hour (3500 ft³/hr.)
- V-101 is "vapor balanced" with the Tank Truck during unloading.
- The maximum liquid level is 6 meters and the tank is not rated for full vacuum.

Acrylonitrile Tank Truck

- The truck volume is 21 m^3 (5500 gal) with a maximum allowable working pressure of 1 barg (14.5 psig) and not rated for full vacuum.
- The maximum liquid level is 2 meters.
- A 75 mm (3 inch) diameter hose is used for unloading at a flow rate of 400 Kg/min (880 lb./min). The feed or fill rate is typically zero (unloading only).
- The Equipment or Piping Connection type is "hose" and the truck is *not* within the 200 m^2 diked area.
- An operator is present during the unloading operation.

Pump, P-101 with Associated Piping

- The Pump is a 75 mm (3 inch) suction Centrifugal with a Double Mechanical Seal located within the 200 m^2 diked area.
- The maximum pump discharge pressure is 3 barg (43.5 psig) and maximum allowable working pressure is 10 barg (145 psig).
- The associated process piping is primarily 3 inch (75 mm) and roughly 200 m length with 10 flanges.
- The volume of the pump and associated piping is approximately 0.9 m^3.

Acrylonitrile Reaction Data

- Heat of Reaction: - 326 cal/g
- Activation Energy: 32 Kcal/g mole
- Detected Onset Temperature: 190 C
- Detected Onset Rate: 0.08 C/min
- Test Method: ARC with Phi Factor of 2.1

A Case Study – Screening Evaluations	For each Equipment Item: ❑ Complete the necessary Inputs ❑ Determine the F&EI and CEI ❑ Review the Hazards and Potential Loss Event Consequences and note which hazards will likely need to be analyzed ❑ Review the Scenario List (on the Scenario Identification worksheet) and note any scenarios or Tolerable Frequency Factors that may not seem reasonable ❑ Review the Relief Effluent Screening for PVRV-101
A Case Study – Preliminary Risk Analysis	For each Equipment Item: ❑ Review the List of Scenarios and add additional scenarios that should be considered. ❑ Update Scenarios and Select those appropriate for a LOPA. ❑ Complete a LOPA for at least 2 Scenarios for each Equipment Item. ❑ Estimate the Maximum Allowable Response Time and Maximum Allowable Leak Rate for at least one Scenario

9 References

Please refer to the CHEF Guide for the complete listing of references used to develop the RAST Software.

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10 Index

11 Revision History

Revision	Date	Description
1.0	08-Apr-2018	Initial issue. Originally donated documentation with minor modifications.
1.1	13-Sep-2018	Minor corrections reflecting update of RAST Software. Addressed minor formatting issues.
1.2	11-Feb-2018	Updated Introduction. Updated terms to align with CCPS Process Safety Glossary. Addition of Glossary to Manual.
2.0	25-Mar-2019	Major revisions to RAST Software reflected in the CHEF Manual, the CHEF Workbook, and the RAST User's Manual. Includes some technical clarification, updates, and improved descriptions reflecting feedback on earlier editions.
2.1	22-Apr-2019	Addressed minor formatting issues.
3.0	12-Mar-2020	Issued with updates to the Chemical Hazards Engineering Fundamentals (CHEF) Manual. Updated literature references to be consistent with the CHEF Manual. Referred Glossary to CHEF Manual. Updates to RAST/CHEF software reflected in this version.
4.1	25-Mar-2022	Updated title to "RAST Manual, Version 4.1" to be consistent with updates for the new "CHEF Guide, Version 4.1" issued concurrently. Added RAST/CHEF Methods and Models.