

First Time in Pakistan  
**REGIONAL**



**MEETING**



# Safety Briefing





# Introduction with Delegates





# Shakeel H. Kadri

Executive Director,  
CCPS, AIChE



INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals

# 1<sup>st</sup> Pakistan CCPS Regional Meeting

Shakeel Kadri  
Executive Director, CCPS

22 November 2018  
Pearl Continental Karachi

**Meeting  
HOSTS**



# 1<sup>st</sup> CCPS Regional Meeting in Pakistan

Thank you ...






# Personal Safety vs Process Safety





# Process Safety



Process Safety is keeping hazardous materials and energy in the equipment and piping systems to prevent catastrophic fires, explosions and toxic releases.

# Why Process Safety?

## Business Case

### Qualitative Benefits

- **Corporate Responsibility**
  - Image, reputation, and brand
- **Business Flexibility**
  - License to operate
  - Increased business options

### Quantitative Benefits

- **Risk Reduction**
  - Process safety prevents human injury
  - Process safety avoids significant losses and environmental damage
- **Sustained Value**
  - Process safety helps boosts productivity
  - It helps produce high quality products, on time, and at lower cost
  - It contributes to shareholder value

# Process Safety Business Imperative

- **CCPS Member Companies collectively working together to address this Business Imperative**



**"The Global Community Committed to Process Safety"**



# Chemical Engineering & Process Safety

- ❖ What good we bring to the many?
- ❖ What harm we bring to some?
- ❖ The harm all remember.....



# What good we bring to the many?



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# What harm we bring to some that we may not remember?

## Flixborough, UK, 1974



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**



# What harm we bring to some that we may not remember?

## Seveso, Italy, 1976



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# What harm we bring to some that we may not remember?

## Piper Alpha, UK 1988

**167  
fatalities**



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**



# What harm we bring to some that we may not remember?

**Pasadena, TX, 1989**



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# What harm we bring to some that we may not remember?

## Mexico City, 1984


600+  
fatalities



**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# The harm we all must remember...





# **BHOPAL DISASTER**

**DECEMBER 2, 1984**



# How well you know your facility?

- What is the worst process safety event that can happen at your facility?
- What systems are in place to keep them from happening?
- How do you know that preventive systems are working?
- What mitigation systems are in place to respond to such events?
- How do you know these mitigation systems are working?
- What is your role in making sure that these preventive and mitigation systems are working properly?
- Are you raising your concerns to your senior leadership; are these concerns being addressed?

# Lessons Learned.....

- Bhopal is the worst process safety incident that's ever occurred in the chemical industry
- It served as a bellwether event for the industry and a catalyst for a safety reform
- It has lead to improved process safety practices worldwide
- Global process safety improvement initiated
- AIChE was asked to create a Safety Center --- **Center of Chemical Process Safety [CCPS]** – to lead a collaborative effort to eliminate catastrophic process incidents

The Bhopal Disaster

# CCPS Formed on 23 March 1985

## Formation of CCPS

- On February 26th of 1985, industry leaders\* asked the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) **to lead a collaborative effort to eliminate catastrophic process incidents.**
- On March 23, 1985, AIChE formed the **Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS);**
- **CCPS** completed Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures a short time later.

## Founding Leaders of CCPS

1. American Cyanamid
2. The Dow Chemical Company
3. Monsanto Company
4. Rohm and Haas Company
5. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp.
6. Air Products and Chemicals
7. Union Carbide Corporation
8. Great Lakes Carbon Corp.
9. Shell Oil Company
10. Factory Mutual Research

# About CCPS

- Not for profit organization; part of AIChE
- Corporate supported – over 200 members
- Global scope and mission; 40% of members outside of USA
- Focus: preventing process incidents: fires, explosions, and toxic releases
- Petroleum production, refining, chemicals, pharma, food, chemical users, etc.
- Headquarter in New York City, with offices in Frankfurt, Mumbai, Singapore, Ningbo [China] and Houston.

**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**



# Leading Process Safety since 1985

CCPS Certified  
**CCPSC**

Creating Books  
 and Publications

Creating Industry-wide  
 Tools, Programs and  
 Guidelines

Sharing Best Practices



Process  
 Safety  
 Beacon



Conducting Global Conferences  
 and Training

Educating Educators



**"The Global Community Committed to Process Safety"**



# Jahangir Waheed

Vice President Manufacturing  
Engro Polymer & Chemicals



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# Imran Anwer

CEO, Engro Polymer & Chemicals

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CCPS - Looking forward to 2018-19 and beyond

CCPS Global and Regional Plans

CCPS Projects activities

CCPS Key Initiatives

By  
**Shakeel H. Kadri**  
Executive Director,  
CCPS, AIChE



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**PLANET**



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# CCPS Business Update

- ❖ CCPS - Looking forward to 2018-19 and beyond
- ❖ CCPS Global and Regional Plans
- ❖ CCPS Projects activities
- ❖ CCPS Key Initiatives

**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# CCPS Vision



**“To protect people, property and the environment  
by bringing the best process safety knowledge and  
practices to industry, academia, the governments and the  
public around the world through collective wisdom,  
tools, training and expertise.”**

**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# CCPS Mission

Eliminate catastrophic process incidents globally by:

- Advancing global PS technologies, culture, and management practices
- Establishing Process Safety as foundation for responsible operation
- Serving as premier worldwide resource of Process Safety
- Fostering knowledge and understanding of Process Safety
- Promoting Process Safety as key societal value and expectation

**“The Global Community Committed to Process Safety”**

# 2018 -- New CCPS Members

## North America



Inter Pipeline



Intel Corporation



Parkland Refining (BC) Ltd.



Trinseo



Syncrude



United Natural Foods, Inc.

## International



Ambatovy



Arlanxeo



China Chemical Safety Assn.



Deccan Fine Chemicals (I) Pvt. Ltd.



Hengyuan Refining Co. Berhad



Kuwait Oil Company



Lloyd's Register Group, Ltd.



Michelman Inc.



Nghi Son Refinery and Petrochemical, LLC



Promigas



Sahara Petrochemicals Company



Saudi International Petrochemical Co.



Shenyang Research Institute of Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.





Wanhua Chemical Group Co., Ltd.

# 209 Global Corporate Members!





# Representing 35 Countries





# Global / Regional Engagement...

## CCPS Conferences



# 2018 -- CCPS Conferences / Workshops

- ✓ 14<sup>th</sup> Global Congress in Process Safety held in Orlando, FL
- ✓ 8<sup>th</sup> CCPS Conference in Latin America, Buenos Aires, Argentina
- ✓ 6<sup>th</sup> China Conference, Qingdao, China
- ✓ 3<sup>rd</sup> Europe Process Safety + Big Data Conference, Frankfurt, Germany
- ✓ Process Safety Metrics - API-754 Metrics Implementation workshop, Jubail, Saudi Arabia [Hosted by SABIC]
- ✓ Process Safety Metrics - API-754 Metrics Implementation workshop, Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia [Hosted by Saudi Aramco]
- ✓ Pre-workshop at the 6<sup>th</sup> China Conference, Qingdao, China
- ✓ Process Safety Metrics workshop, Buenos Aires, Argentina



# 2019 CCPS Conference Plan

- ❖ 15<sup>th</sup> Global Congress in Process Safety to be held in New Orleans, Louisiana, USA – 1-3 April 2019
- ❖ 7<sup>th</sup> China Conference, China [Date TBC]
- ❖ 4<sup>th</sup> Europe Process Safety + Big Data Conference, 1-2 October 2019, Frankfurt, Germany
- ❖ 5<sup>th</sup> CCPS Global Summit, 22-23 October 2019, Singapore
- ❖ 3<sup>rd</sup> Middle East Process Safety Conference [MEPSC], ME [Date TBC]
- ❖ We will be deploying Process Safety Metrics - API-754 Metrics Implementation workshop at 2-3 locations during 2019


# **6<sup>th</sup> CCPS Global Summit**

## **December 2020**

### **India**

# 2018 Regional Engagement...

## Technical Steering Committee Meetings










# CCPS Body of Knowledge



# 2018 CCPS Books



## PUBLISHED




# More 2018 Books...

**PUBLISHED**


**Sept 2018**



# 2018 Books: Work in Progress




Early Nov. 2018




1Q 2019

# 2018 Non-Book Publications



Guide Document




Monograph




# 2019 Publications Projection

- Process Safety Leadership from Board Room to Front Lines
- Guide to making Acute Risk Decisions
- Guidelines Process Safety in Pilot plant and Labs
- Guidelines for Inherently Safer Design 3rd Ed
- More Incidents that define Process Safety
- Incident Investigation 3rd Ed
- Guidelines for Process Safety in Upstream Industry
  - Might slip to 2020



# Targeted for 2020

- P281 Human Performance in Process Safety
  - Scope document finalization next
- P283 PHA Revalidation 2nd Ed
  - Strong Survey feedback, completing book scope/layout
- P289 Golden Rules for Process Safety
  - Team leaning towards an ‘app’, not a book
- P292 Lessons Learned Years Later
  - Sub-Committee: 7 Volunteers. *NEED MORE*
- P290 Process Safety Toolbox
  - Need Volunteers
- P291 GL for Abnormal Situation Management
  - Team formation in progress



# Process Safety Incident Database (PSID)


- Reopened in December 2017
  - Opened access to all CCPS members
    - Except government / regulatory entities
  - Over 800 incidents and expanding
  - Member benefit – no fees required
  - Company admin and user registrations required
    - User Approval: CCPS Operational admin or Company admin
- We encourage every PSID company to submit *at least* one incident every year
- For more information, please contact [ccps\\_psid@aiche.org](mailto:ccps_psid@aiche.org)



Over 130 new registrations, representing more than 60 companies

**Asia-Pacific TSC will work collaboratively to add incidents**

*The Global Community Committed to Process Safety*

	<p><b>Process Safety Beacon</b></p> <p><a href="http://www.aiche.org/CCPS/Publications/Beacon/index.aspx">http://www.aiche.org/CCPS/Publications/Beacon/index.aspx</a></p> <p>Messages for Manufacturing Personnel</p>	<p>Sponsored by CCPS Supporters</p>
<p><b>Containment Dikes and Pads</b> <span style="float: right;">June 2010</span></p>		
	<p>Most people recognize that containment dikes around storage tanks, and sloped containment pads for pumps, process buildings and structures, truck and rail car unloading areas, and other potential spill locations have an important environmental protection function – preventing contamination of soil and surface water. But, do you know that they often also have important safety functions? Some examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• limiting the spread of a fire and preventing exposure of other equipment if a flammable material spills and is ignited</li> <li>• preventing contact of incompatible reactive materials in case of leak or spill</li> <li>• limiting the spread of spilled corrosive material and preventing contact with equipment which could be damaged by contact with the corrosive material</li> </ul> <p>In 2001, the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated a fire that destroyed a petroleum blending facility in Texas. Poor dike design and maintenance resulted in burning liquid spreading the fire from tank to tank, eventually engulfing the whole plant.</p>	
	<p>← Spill containment dikes for chemical storage tanks</p> <p>A sloped containment pad directs any spills from a truck unloading facility to a chemical sewer trench →</p>	
<p><b>What can you do?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Periodically include containment dikes around storage tanks, sloped containment areas, and drainage trenches as part of your routine plant safety inspections. Look for physical damage, spilled material, accumulation of rain water in dikes, or blocked drainage. Look for debris, equipment, or anything which restricts flow of a spill.</li> <li>• Make sure that your plant procedures include pumping out or draining rain water from containment dikes – if a dike is partly filled with rain water, it may not be able to contain a large spill.</li> <li>• If you have any kind of valves or other piping to remove rain water from a containment dike, make sure these are closed or otherwise blocked when not being used.</li> <li>• If you do any maintenance or construction work on a storage dike which results in damage to the integrity of the dike, make sure the damage is repaired before the job is finished.</li> </ul> <div data-bbox="608 835 966 1071">  </div> <p>The arrow shows a hole in a containment dike. More damage can be seen at the base and the top of the dike wall. Other examples of damage include cracks in dike walls or floors, holes where pipes have been installed passing through dike walls, and anything else which would allow spilled material to flow out of the dike area.</p>		
<p><b>Inspect and maintain your containment dikes and pads!</b></p>		
<p><small>AIChE © 2010. All rights reserved. Reproduction for non-commercial, educational purposes is encouraged. However, reproduction for the purpose of resale by anyone other than CCPS is strictly prohibited. Contact us at <a href="mailto:ccps_beacon@aiiche.org">ccps_beacon@aiiche.org</a> or 646-495-1371.</small></p>		

The Beacon is usually available in Afrikaans, Arabic, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hebrew, Hindi, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Malay, Marathi, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Tamil, Thai, Telugu, Turkish, Urdu, and Vietnamese.

- More than a million readers
- 31 languages
- Delivered monthly
- 80 + volunteer translators
- Nearly 17 years of volunteers led publication effort



# CCPS Credentialing - CCPSC



- CCPSC – what is it
- Why is it needed/important
- How it works
- Who is it for
- Summary & Q/A



# What is CCPSC

## The CCPS Credentialing Program

- Purpose: To evaluate and certify Process Safety Professionals
- Started in 2015
- Global Reach
- Modeled after the Professional Engineering Certification in the US

CCPS Certified

# What is CCPSC

- The Definitive stamp of approval in Process Safety
- A mark of True Expertise in Process Safety Practice
- Uniform and Consistent basis for assessing the *Body of Knowledge in Process Safety*
  - *Criteria: Range, Rigor, References*
    - *Range: Breadth of experience*
    - *Rigor: Depth of hands on experience*
    - *References: Recognition by peers and colleagues*
- Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) at the core

*More at:* [www.aiche.org/ccps-certified](http://www.aiche.org/ccps-certified)




# Why CCPSC

- Directly tied to the mission of CCPS
- Provide a global uniform standard for knowledge assessment
- Benefits:
  - Individuals: Distinguish your expertise
  - Companies: Know who can do what for you
  - Industry as a whole: Accurately recognize the expertise
- Overcome the clutter of various denominations that do not really focus on Process safety

Recognition with the CCPS brand

# How CCPSC Works



# How it Works - Requirements

- Education: A STEM degree
  - Science / Technology / Engineering / Math
- Experience: Minimum 5 years relevant
  - Additional 5 years may be substituted for education
- Hands on Knowledge of many elements of RBPS
  - With Familiarity with all 20 elements
- An ongoing commitment to Process Safety & personal development
  - Continuing Education requirements

# How it Works

- Examination - Typically 2 or 3 times a year
  - 4 hours, continuous, open book, individualized
- Conducted Online
- Multiple Choice questions
  - 120 questions covering the 20 elements of RBPS
- Essay questions
  - Descriptive answers required for situation analysis
- Examination is in English
  - Careful consideration is given to avoid confusion for applicants whose first language is not English



# Who Should Apply

- All individuals globally with some responsibility for Process Safety
- Chemicals, Oil & Gas, Petrochemicals
- Food, Mining, Pharma, Other Manufacturing
- Consulting, Academia, Government

# Summary


- CCPSC – a definitive recognition of Process Safety Expertise
- Globally available
- Wide interest and growing rapidly

For more information or to get started, visit  
[www.aiche.org/ccps-certified](http://www.aiche.org/ccps-certified)

# CCPSC Update


- ~ 150 Certified [CCPSC] Individuals as of November 2018
- Exam software stability issues fixed
  - Zero data loss in July, September and November 2018 exams
- Actions planned – looking ahead
  - Significant marketing push to popularize the credentialing - Globally
  - Deep dive in to the processes & procedures begun
  - Opportunities:
    - Reduce Manual effort, Automate several tasks; Critical for volume expansion
    - Leverage existing AIChE processes including the customer service team
    - Simplify processes for the applicant – Application, References, etc.

# Process Safety Journey to Excellence





# Vision 20/20




# Responsible Collaboration

Organization	Collaborating activity
Energy Institute [EI]	Bow Tie Guideline + Human Performance
Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE]	Process Safety for Upstream Guideline Book
American Chemical Council [ACC]	Enhancing Process Safety effort
Japan Society for Safety Engineering [JSSE]	4 <sup>th</sup> Global Summit, Okayama, Japan
European Process Safety Center [EPSC]	Europe PS + Big Data Conference, Frankfurt
EPSC + Dow Chemicals	RAST [Risk Analysis Screening Tool]
ICHEME, MKO, EPSC and WPLP	2017 WCCE-10 Barcelona PSM Track
Singapore Chemical Industry Council	MOU signed; 6 <sup>th</sup> Global Summit [2019]
PERTAMINA University [Indonesia]	MOU signed
Universiti Teknologi Petronas [UTP] University [Malaysia]	2 <sup>nd</sup> Global Summit
OSHA	CCPS Risk Based Process Safety elements as best practices reference on the OSHA Web Tool
Chemical Safety Board [CSB]	Potential CCPS-CSB collaboration on developing video modules using CCPS content

# Risk Based Process Safety

- CCPS “Risk Based Process Safety [RBPS]” Guideline Book was published in 2007; it is our highest selling Book
- We are seeing a large number of companies globally following this Risk Management approach
- It has provided companies with guidelines and tools to establish a strong process safety risk management program



# WHY DO WE NEED Risk Based Process Safety?

- All hazards and risks in a facility are not equal
- Using same practices to manage every hazard is **inefficient** use of **resources**
- Risk-based approach reduces potential for assigning an undue amount of resources to manage lower-risk activities, thereby freeing up resources for tasks for higher-risk activities

**Goal: Match effort to potential risk.**




# Objective of the Risk Based Process Safety

- Approach accident prevention from compliance-based to risk-based strategy.
- Improve management system effectiveness.
- Employ process safety for non-regulatory processes using risk based design.
- Integrate the process safety into an organization's business processes.
- Focus their resources on higher risk activities

## Four major process safety incident prevention principles:

1. **Leadership commitment to process safety** is the key building block for pursuit of process safety excellence. Leaders “walking the talk” will send a consistent message to do “the right things, in the right ways, at the right times – even when no one is looking.”
2. **Understanding hazards and evaluating risk** is necessary for an organization to know where to apply its limited resources to help ensure that accidents do not occur.
3. **Managing risk:** Involves a focus on - operating and maintaining processes that pose the risk, controlling changes to those processes to avoid inadvertent risk increases; and preparing for, responding to, and managing incidents that do occur.
4. **Learning from experience:** In spite of our best efforts, things don’t always work out as planned, so organizations must be ready to turn its mistakes – and those by others – into opportunities for improvement.

# Risk Based Process Safety



# OSHA PSM Regulation Elements VS. CCPS RBPS PSM Elements





1. Employee Participation
2. Process Hazards Analysis
3. Training
4. Pre-startup Safety Review
5. Hot Work Permit
6. Incident Investigation
7. Compliance Audit
8. Process Safety Information
9. Operating Procedures
10. Contractors
11. Mechanical Integrity
12. Management of Change
13. Emergency Planning
14. Trade Secrets

### 1.0 Commit to Process Safety

- 1.1 Process Safety Culture
- 1.2 Compliance with Standards
- 1.3 Process Safety Competency
- 1.4 Workforce Involvement
- 1.5 Stakeholder Outreach

### 2.0 Understanding Hazards & Risks

- 2.1 Process Knowledge Management
- 2.2 Hazard Identification & Risk Identification

### 3.0 Manage Risk

- 3.1 Operating Procedures
- 3.2 Safe Work Practices
- 3.3 Asset Integrity & Reliability
- 3.4 Contractor Management
- 3.5 Training & Performance Assurance
- 3.6 Management of Change
- 3.7 Operational Readiness
- 3.8 Conduct of Operations
- 3.9 Emergency Management

### 4.0 Learn from Experience

- 4.1 Incident Investigation
- 4.2 Measures & Metrics
- 4.3 Auditing
- 4.4 Management Review & continuous Improvement

# CCPS Elements for Which There is No Matching OSHA Element

## **1.1 Process Safety Culture**

**1.2** Compliance with Standards (not an OSHA element but implied by OSHA 1910.119 (d)(3)(ii))

## **1.3 Process Safety Competency**

**1.5** Stakeholder Outreach

**3.8** Conduct of Operations

## **4.2 Measures & Metrics**

**4.4** Management Review & Continuous Improvement

# Questions?

# Coffee Break





First Time in Pakistan  
**REGIONAL**



**MEETING**



## Evolution of Process Safety at Engro

By

**Jahangir Piracha**  
CEO, Engro Vopak



INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals



# engro Evolution of Process Safety at Engro

**1<sup>st</sup> Pakistan  
Regional  
CCPS  
Meeting**

**Speaker:**

**Mr. JAHANGIR PIRACHA**

**Chief Executive Officer**

**Engro Vopak & Elengy Terminal Limited**

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## our vision

to be the premier pakistani enterprise with a global reach, passionately pursuing value creation for all stakeholders



Revenue  
\$1,219 million

Market Cap of  
\$1,308 million with  
4 Listed Entities

Pioneer in Thar  
Coal Mining &  
Power Generation

First LNG Terminal  
in Pakistan

Pakistan's premier  
business conglomerate

Operating in Fertilizers, Power Generation,  
Petrochemicals, Mining, Dairy,  
LNG and Chemical Storage

Sole Manufacturer of  
PVC in Pakistan

Connects with 12  
Million Customers

Import Substitution  
~\$850 Mn per year




## our footprint in pakistan

USD 400 million contribution to national exchequer

3,500 employees


18,000 indirect employees



## evolution of process safety management at engro



# Rise of Process Safety at Engro



- Conversion from Exxon Model to DuPont Model helped engro in aligning themselves with world best safety practices
- SPHERA : Platform for Process Safety Management – Web based application with feature of automated reminders for action items
- Quantitative Risk Assessment studies helped engro in recognition and mitigation of major process safety related risks at engro



## Design Changes / Upgrades — In lieu of process safety evolution

Year	Process Safety Study	Design Upgrades / Changes
1991 - 2018	Design / Cyclic PHAs	Design Changes / Modifications
2000	FMEA	Triple Modular Redundancy ESD System
2007	QRA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Double Walled Ammonia Storage Tank</li> <li>- Blast proof Centralized Control Room / Safe Heavens</li> <li>- F&amp;G Detection System at enVen Plant</li> </ul>
2009	PHA	Flare System at new Plant
2012	QRA	Double Walled Ammonia Storage Tank
2013 onwards	SIL / LOPA Studies	Inherently Safer / Reliable Complex Control Loops




# Challenges in Implementation of Process Safety

Challenges		Solutions
<b>Technology</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Obsolescence</li><li>• Implementation Difficulties</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Upgrade / Replace</li><li>▪ Innovate</li></ul>
<b>Technical Capabilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Risk assessment expertise</li><li>• Risk Assessment Softwares</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Resources development</li><li>▪ ASP/CSP certifications</li><li>▪ Participation in Conferences</li></ul>
<b>Return on Investment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Funds availability for upgrades</li><li>• Do ability</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ For safety related projects, ROI's are never looked at</li></ul>
<b>Communities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Emergency Response</li><li>• External communities</li><li>• Weak Government infrastructure</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ CAER Program</li><li>▪ Joint drills with Government</li></ul>





# CAER – Community Awareness & Emergency Response Program




# Process Safety Management - Leading Indicators

- ▶ Process Safety Action Items (PSSR, PHA, Incidents)
- ▶ Process Safety Studies (PHA's, MOC's)
- ▶ Resources Development (Training)
- ▶ Mechanical Integrity
- ▶ Safety Instrumentation System Failure

KPI Dimnension	Affiliate- 01	Affiliate- 02	Affiliate- 03	Affiliate- 04	Affiliate- 05	Affiliate- 06	Affiliate- 07	Affiliate- 08	Aggregate numbers for Engro Corp
<b>Process Safety Lagging Indicators</b>									
Asset Damage Incidents	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	0
Environmental Incidents	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	11
Process Fire Incidents	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	0
Process Safety Incidents	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	10
<b>Cultural Elements</b>									
MSAs Index	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	81%
Safety Talks Index	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	86%
Reporting Index	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	80%
<b>Leading Indicators</b>									
Behavioral Safety LIs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	85%
Process Safety LIs	●	●	●	NA	NA	●	●	●	83%
Environmental KPIs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	84%
Health KPIs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	87%



# Process Safety Management Journey in Engro Affiliates



recognized globally & locally

### safety awards

- DuPont Safety and Sustainability Award won by Engro Fertilizers in the category of “Stakeholder Engagement for Sustainability” in 2013
- Engro Vopak completed 20 years of safe operations without any lost work injury in 2017
- Engro Vopak secured 98% score in 2016 in THA (Terminal Health Audit) which is currently highest score globally in the VOPAK World



A wide-angle photograph of a large industrial complex, likely a refinery or chemical plant, captured at dusk or dawn. The sky is filled with heavy, dark clouds, with some light breaking through near the horizon. The facility features numerous tall distillation columns, complex piping networks, and several large storage tanks. Some areas are illuminated by artificial lights, creating a contrast with the dim natural light. The foreground shows a flat, unpaved area with some sparse vegetation and a few small pools of water.

thank you



Learning from Incident at  
Engro Polymer & Chemicals Ltd.

By

**Mati-ur-Rabi Siddiqui**  
HSE Manager,  
Engro Polymer & Chemical

INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



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# LEARNING FROM AN INCIDENT

Presented by  
**Mati ur Rab Siddiqui**



MAKING  
HEADLINES  
CREATING  
RIPPLES



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# PRESENTER INTRODUCTION

Chemical Engineer by education

Over 6 years experience in Safety and Risk Management

Over all 21 years experience in Fertilizer/Petrochemicals

Exposure to all walks in Manufacturing facilities

Developed various safety programs within EPCL, Fatima Group( PFL) & SAFCO KSA for both personnel and Process Safety



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# COMPANY PROFILE



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Established in 1997 as PVC manufacturing Plant

First & the Only fully integrated Chlor-Vinyl Chemical Complex in Pakistan



**PVC**  
195  
kTA



**Caustic  
Soda**  
117  
kTA



**Sodium  
Hypochlori  
te**  
20 kTA



**Hydrochlo  
ric Acid**  
60 kTA



**Hydrogen**  
3 kTA

# ACCREDITATIONS



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	<b>ISO-9001:</b> Continual improvement of Quality Management system	<b>2018</b>
	<b>ISO-14001:</b> Environmental Management system	<b>2018</b>
	<b>OHSAS-18001:</b> Occupational Health & Safety Management systems	<b>2018</b>
	<b>PSM – Level 4.2</b> Personal Safety Management	<b>2015</b>
	<b>PSRM – Level 4.0</b> Process Safety & Risk Management	<b>2015</b>
	<b>WWF Green Office Compliant</b>	<b>2017</b>
	<b>OHIH – Level 3.5</b> Occupational Health and Industrial Hygiene	<b>2018</b>
	<b>Lean Six Sigma Operational Excellence</b>	<b>2012</b>
	<b>CCPS Membership</b>	<b>2010</b>



# CASE STUDY:

## FURNACE FIRE



# VCM PLANT IN PAKISTAN



- VCM plant at this site is relocated plant from Formosa Plastics Corporation, USA.
- It is Pakistan's 1st VCM plant
- VCM is raw material of PVC, which is a growing industry in this region



# PROCESS DETAILS



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- In VCM plant there are two identical cracking furnaces which are operating in parallel
- Dry purified EDC fed to Cracking Unit where it decomposes into VCM and hydrochloric acid
- These furnaces were installed between 1984 and 1987 during EDC/VCM plant debottlenecking project.
- In 2007 back integration project EDC/VCM, both furnaces were relocated from Formosa Plastics Corp. USA.




$$\Delta H = -30,500 \frac{BTU}{lb\ mol}$$



# EQUIPMENT INFORMATION



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# THE INCIDENT



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- On May 04, 2011, EDC Cracking Furnace B (HF-301 B) caught fire as a result of EDC leakage from the first inlet bend on the convection section tube bank of the furnace
- Emergency response was very good and a major fire was controlled within 15 minutes of the arrival of the fire squad at site and the VCM plant was shutdown safely
- The fire lasted for more than 4 hours, despite the fact that the fuel source had been cut.
  - The hydrocarbons present in tubes, controlled burning took place and finally the fire was completely extinguished
- Luckily, no fatality/injury was observed however there was major damage to the furnace





# IMPACT



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## Cultural Impact

- Puts Question mark on overall HSE system ( Plant MI) in the organization

## Financial Impact

- An approximate loss of US \$ 5 Million
- A production loss of nearly 45 days



# FACTS AND FINDINGS



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- Comprehensive history of furnace inspection done at FPC was not available
- Furnace B had completed over 130,000 hrs. and Furnace A had completed 138,000 hrs.
- Recommended life for tube replacement is 100,000 hrs.
- The inspection regime to ensure mechanical integrity of convection tubes was inadequate.
- The impact of chlorides attack on the furnace tube is expected to be much higher in convection zone where temperatures are less and since feed is introduced from top, there are chances of condensation resulting in stress corrosion cracks in presence of HCl.



# FACTS AND FINDINGS



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- There was no structural analysis done for the complete furnaces before relocating them to Pakistan
- Stainless Steel 347 H has low resistance against Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
- Furnace B compared to furnace A has some key differences:
  - During commissioning, two tubes leaked in hydro test and were blocked at Furnace B on the convection section
  - Furnace B had 32% more shutdowns and startups than A (25 vs 17)
  - There had been 4 hot starts of Furnace B while A had none
  - There had been 33% more incidents of emergency feed cut to Furnace B
  - Furnace B had seen 4 instances of high moisture while Furnace A had 3



# CONCLUSION

- Immediate cause – Stress Corrosion Cracking at bends
- Root Cause – Gaps in Site Mechanical Integrity Program including:
  - Inspection and monitoring regime
  - Quality Assurance Regime during plant relocation
  - Loop holes in Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Program

*All in all a general gap observed in how things are perceived while evaluating risks and decisions taken*



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# RECOMMENDATIONS



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- Revise emergency procedure in case of furnace convection tube and radiant tube failure
- Develop matrix for periodic inspection and testing of the deluge system on quench. Review and upgrade metallurgy of the tubes for the convection section to withstand the high chloride environment.
- Provision of furnace trip logic on low O<sub>2</sub>.
- Non destructive testing method to be evaluated for the radiant tubes. Based on this testing, life expectancy should be established





# RECOMMENDATIONS



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- Develop protocol to control plant personnel movement on the furnace platforms especially during checking of the damper opening
- Site reliability program to be structured in such a manner that dedicated task force are assigned for specific equipment reliability enhancement like; Furnaces, Incinerators, Oxy Reactor, Electrolyzes.
- Ensure availability of critical spares like radiant and convection tubes on site.
- Inspection section need to be reinforced for a few years so that they are able to develop a base line MI picture of the plant
- Develop training plan especially for Process and Inspection groups on common failures on the VCM plant.



# STEPS TAKEN

## Emergency Handling

- Fire Emergency scenarios for all critical equipment were developed and made part of the emergency drills.
- Periodic inspection and testing plan was developed and implemented for the deluge system on quench.

## Maintenance/Inspection

- Comprehensive inspection plan was developed after benchmarking with Oxy-Vinyl & Petrochemia (LRUT & Destructive testing also made part of inspection with VT, DPT, RT ).
- Material is improved in top two rows ( 8 tubes & bends) of convection tubes and bends with Alloy 800 for better resistant against SCC.
- Liaisons for Best Industrial Practices (AKCC, OxyVinyl, Ineos) on furnaces and other high risk areas.
- Furnace-B All convection and radiant tube banks replaced.
- Later on Furnace-A both tube banks were also replaced.
- Run length regime for Furnaces is defined and implemented.



# STEPS TAKEN

## Investment In People

- Process Hazard Analysis Training by DuPont for all levels
- SIL, LOPA & ALARP Training by foreign experts
- Fire Fighting & Rescue Training by Pakistan Navy School for Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Disasters (NBCD)

## Reliability Improvement

- Unit/Critical Equipment specific forums were developed for reliability improvement.
- Plant reliabilities issues/ learnings are stewarded in reliability forums.
- Inspection & Process Monitoring Plan was revised and implemented.



*“An incident is just the tip of the iceberg, a sign of a much larger problem below the surface.”*



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# Chemical Plant Safety – A Global Perspective

**Gawie Venter**

Process Safety Consultant

INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals



# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PURPOSE (WHY)

To ensure that new or modified plants as well as plants on mayor maintenance turnaround or shutdown can be safely commissioned and operated.

## PSSR (TOOL)

Pre-Start-up Safety Review is a tool that will confirm that the construction, modification or maintenance actions are completed in accordance with design specifications and that all safety (PSM Standards), operating, maintenance, reliability and emergency procedures are adequate and in place **and understood by all employees involved.**

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (FOR)

### Required for following

- New Plants
- Modifications to Existing Plants
- After Mayor Plant Shutdown

### Part Existing Systems

- Part of Business Track
- MOC Procedure
- Shutdown Plan (CFO)

## PSSR (WHEN)

### The PSSR is as a Ready for Commissioning (RFC) hold point

- |                                    |                          |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ■ New Plants                       | - Prior to Commissioning |
| ■ Modifications to Existing Plants | - Prior to Commissioning |
| ■ After Mayor Plant Shutdown       | - Prior to Start-up      |

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## TEAM (WHO)

A qualified team should be assembled to conduct each PSSR. This team, at a minimum, should include individuals with design and process safety expertise.

### **Internal participants**

- Internal SHERQ representative
- Technical & Operations representative
- Human resource (Training)

### **External participants**

- DESCON – Risk Group
- EPCL – Technology Groups
- Technology Partners – USA

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## TEAM (WHO)

### **Roles and Responsibilities:**

#### **Line Management :**

To ensure that no new projects, modifications or equipment on mayor maintenance turnarounds are commissioned before a PSSR has been carried out.

#### **Project Manager :**

To ensure that the PSSR takes place prior to Ready For Commissioning (RFC)

#### **The PSSR Team leader :**

Consider the significance of review team findings recommending whether start-up may safely proceed or not.

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## TEAM (WHO)

### **Roles and Responsibilities:**

#### **General Management**

- Issue a declaration of support for PSM that includes PSSR.
- Shall oversee the development and implementation of the PSSR implementation plan based on the requirements as per standard
- Shall sign the PSSR review report to authorise commissioning or start-up activities, subject to completion of the review recommendations and with due regard for QMS 360 and specific pertinent site procedures.



# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## TEAM (WHO)

### **Roles and Responsibilities:**

#### **PSSR Team Leader**

- Ensure that the requirements of the relevant PSSR checklist are met for safe start-up.
- A PSM PSSR champion is required to coordinate the plan and network with other PSM champion elements
- The PSM PSSR champion is required to update and revise the facility procedure for this element.

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (WHAT)

The pre-start-up safety review team shall ensure that all relevant PSM elements have been appropriately addressed.  
by reviewing the PSM elements against specific checklist

- Process Safety Information
- Process hazard analysis
- Operating procedures and safe work practices
- Mechanical integrity
- Management of change
- Training
- Incident investigation:
- Emergency planning and response
- Auditing

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## **PSSR (DOCUMENTATION)**

- PSSR documentation includes a checklist of items reviewed and the resulting action plan for addressing short comings
- A graded approach to conducting PSSR's should be used. For simple processes, it may be adequate to complete a form with appropriate authorization blocks indicating that the plant is ready for startup
- This documentation, with the appropriate approvals, must be maintained on file to indicate the equipment was constructed according to the design specifications and was properly installed and tested..
- A system shall be established and controlled by the operations manager to ensure review recommendations are resolved (including documentation) before hazardous substances are introduced to the facility.

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR Vinyls

### Required for following

- Modifications to Existing Plants
- After Mayor Plant Shutdown

### Part Existing Systems

- MOC Procedure
- Shutdown Plan (CFO)

### The PSSR is as a Ready for Commissioning (RFC) or Start-up

- Modifications to Existing Plants
  - Prior to Commissioning
- After Mayor Plant Shutdown
  - Prior to Start-up

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (MOC)

### **Modifications to Existing Plants:**

- The PSSR - After Punching - Before RFC of the Modification.
- Meeting will be arranged by TSG Project Manger
- Meeting will have a PSSR Team Leader (different Project Manager)
- Meeting will Consist of Operations, SHERQ and TSG members
- Meeting will Compete a PSSR Checklist.
- Meeting will agree on the categorization of outstanding actions
  - Before RFC
  - Before RFO
  - After BO
- The Checklist will form part of Modification Pack – and actions will be signed off on the checklist in the Modification pack.



# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (MOC)

### Modifications to Existing Plants:

- The PSSR – Actions must be completed and signed off before modification closure.

**Findings and Categorization of Outstanding actions (as per PSSR Checklist) – will support the General Manager's decision to sign RFC. The checklist can not authorize RFC – only supporting documentation.**

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (Checklist will Audit)

### ***Plant Design Integrity :***

Plant is designed & constructed under sound engineering practices.

### ***Occupational Safety :***

Plant is safe to move around in by employees and focus more on mechanical and electrical risks.

### ***Process Safety***

Actions and interactions of the operation personnel with the plant, does not pose additional risks.

### ***Maintenance Safety***

Actions and interactions of the maintenance personnel with the plant, does not pose additional risks.

### ***Incident Management***

if an incident occurs that it is effectively managed to reduce the impact

***Commissioning Readiness –Additional activities associated with the safe first time start-up of a plant are adhered to.***

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (Clearance for Operations - CLO)

**After Shutdown of 48hr or when work was done specific equipment.**

- The CLO – Before the close-out of Shutdown Actions:
- Meeting will be arranged by **Shutdown Coordinator**
- Meeting will have a **Maintenance Manager** (not shutdown coordinator)
- Close-out per discipline - Mechanical, Electrical , Instrumentation)
- Meeting will consist of Operations, SHERQ and TSG members and **Maintenance Team Leaders**
- Meeting will agree on the categorization of outstanding actions
  - Before RFC
  - Before RFO
  - After BO
- The CLO - checklist will form part of Shutdown plan –Actions will be signed off on the Shutdown plan.

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## PSSR (CLO)

**Plant Shutdown: > 48Hr or specific equipment (Table)**

**Findings and Categorization of Outstanding actions (as per CLO Checklist) – will support the General Manager's decision to sign RFO.**

**The checklist can not authorize RFO – only supporting documentation.**

# VCM PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## CLO (Checklist will Audit)

### ***Mechanical Work Integrity :***

Specific Questionnaire. To be drafted by the Mechanical Team

### ***Instrumentation Work Integrity :***

Specific Questionnaire. To be drafted by the Instruments Team

### ***Electrical Integrity***

Specific Questionnaire. To be drafted by the Electrical Team

### ***Vibration Integrity***

Specific Questionnaire. To be drafted by the Machinery Team

### ***Rotation Equipment Integrity***

Specific Questionnaire. To be drafted by the Machinery Team

**Not all discipline checklist are required for all specific equipment maintenance activities**

**Discipline checklist will be rolled out separately**

**Develop a action plant for Vendor (Need to sign and receive training)**



# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## EQUIPMENT FOR CLO- EXAMPLES (MC, IC, EC)

- **VCM :**

**Business assigned Mechanical, Instrumentation and Electrical person must complete the CLO for the required equipment.**

<i>DC Reactor</i>	<i>MC, IC,</i>
<i>Oxy Reactor</i>	<i>MC</i>
<i>Fridge Compressor</i>	<i>MC, EC, IC</i>
<i>Cracker Decoking</i>	<i>MC, IC</i>
<i>Specific Work Radio Active Sources</i>	<i>IC, APC</i>
<i>DCS Emergency Shutdown Modes</i>	<i>IC</i>
<i>DCS Re-load or Download</i>	<i>IC, APC</i>

# VINYLS PSSR

Gawie Venter – 22 November 2018

## EQUIPMENT FOR CLO (MC, IC, EC)

- **PVC :**

**Business assigned Mechanical, Instrumentation and Electrical person must complete the CLO for the required equipment.**

<i>Autoclaves</i>	<i>MC, IC, EC</i>
<i>Initiator Pumps</i>	<i>MC, IC</i>
<i>Stirrers</i>	<i>MC</i>
<i>VCR</i>	<i>MC, IC</i>
<i>Specific Work Radio Active Sources</i>	<i>MC, IC, APC</i>
<i>MCC Work</i>	<i>EC</i>
<i>DCS Re-load or Download</i>	<i>IC, APC</i>

# Safety in Design During Engineering

by

**Rasim Mahmood Qureshi**

QAPCO [Qatar Petrochemical Company]

INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



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# **SAFETY IN DESIGN DURING ENGINEERING PHASES**

# PROCESS SAFETY HISTORY

❖ The Flixborough disaster was an explosion at a chemical plant close to the village of Flixborough, UK, on 1 June 1974. It killed 28 people & injured 36



❖ BHOPAL Incident where 20,000 people lost their lives and Union carbide in the region went out of business, it occurred in 1984. First Process Safety standard issued in 1983 by OSHA 29CFR1926.64



❖ Piper Alpha 1988, 161 people lost their lives.



❖ 1989 Pasadena incident, 23 killed and over 400 injured due to heavy HC leak during maintenance.





# PROCESS SAFETY HISTORY

- ❖ 1992 OSHA again issued Process Safety Standard 29 CFR 1910.119, adopted by multinational oil companies etc.

- ❖ In the early 1990 focus was on Process Safety

- ❖ During the late 1990 and early 2000 trend indicates that the focus shifted back to behavior based safety and occupational safety.

- ❖ BP Texas incident in 2004

- ❖ Buncefield Accident in 2005

- ❖ BP Mexico spill in 2010.

BP TEXAS  
Refinery  
incident



Buncefield  
incident, UK



BP Deep Water Oil Spill Accident  
Mexico



# DEFINITIONS

**Safety** is the condition of being safe; freedom from danger, risk, or injury

**Occupational safety** is a cross-disciplinary area concerned with protecting the safety and welfare of people engaged in work or employment. The goal of OS programs is to foster a safe work environment


**Process Safety** is a disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and processes by applying good design principles, engineering and operating practices.

It deals with the prevention and control of incidents that have the potential to release hazardous materials or energy.

Such incidents can cause toxic effects, fire or explosion and could ultimately result in serious injury or death(s), property damage, lost production and environmental impact.

(2007, CCPS)

# PROCESS SAFETY VS. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY



# STANDARDS / ACTS / LAWS

- OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 (Process Safety Management)
- OSHA 29 CFR 1926.64 (PSM for construction industry)
- NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)
- API (American Petroleum Institute)
- EPA 40 CFR 68 Sub-Part B (Risk Management Plan)
- CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) USA
- OGP International association for Oil & Gas producers
- FHSA (Federal Hazardous Substance Labeling Act 1960- USA)
- HMTA (Hazardous Material Transportation Act 1977-USA)
- TSCA (Toxic Substance Control Act 1986 –USA)
- CERCLA (Comprehensive Env. Reso. Comp & Liability Act 1980)
- EPCRA (Emergency Planning & Community Right to Know Act)

# REFERENCES / PUBLICATIONS

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- Case histories of accident in chemical industry
- Plant design for safety by TENVOR A.KLETZ
- What went wrong by TENVOR A.KLETZ
- Loss Prevention in the Process Industry by FRANK P.LEES
- Managing change in the chemical plants by ROY SANDERS
- Publication and safety bulletins by CCPS
- Publication from American Society of Safety Engineers
- European center for chemical process safety
- SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering
- Lees Loss Prevention in the Process Industry by SAM MANNAN

# PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS

CCPS four pillars of PSM include

Commit to process safety      Understand hazards and risk  
Manage risk      Learn from experience

1. Process safety culture
2. Compliance with standards
3. Process safety competency
4. Workforce involvement
5. Stakeholder outreach
6. Process knowledge management
7. Hazard identification and risk analysis
8. Operating procedures
9. Safe work practices
10. Asset integrity and reliability
11. Contractor management
12. Training and performance assurance
13. Management of change
14. Operational readiness
15. Conduct of operations
16. Emergency management
17. Incident investigation
18. Measurement and metrics
19. Auditing
20. Management review and continuous improvement



# SAFETY ENGINEERING MANTRA

**WE GO OVER EVERY INCH  
SO YOU CAN COVER  
EVERY MILE.**




# SAFETY ENGINEERING MANTRA


**SAFETY ENGINEERING  
COVERS EVERY RISK  
SO YOU CAN OPERATE  
RISK FREE**




# LIFE CYCLE




# LIFE CYCLE



# INTERACTIONS




# INTERACTIONS





# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN



# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN

## 1. Technical Safety

- Technical safety philosophy (design basis)
- Process Hazard Analysis (HAZID/ENVID/OHID)
- Layout safety review / Facility sitting
- Safety engineering equipment schedule
- Consequence analysis / Frequency analysis
- COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards)
- QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) / Bow-Tie analysis
- HSECES (HSE Critical Equipment and Systems) analysis
- EERA (Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis) / Building risk assessment
- HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) / Hazardous area classification
- Traffic study (Ignition sources) / Process safety training

# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN

## 2. Functional Safety

- Fire & Gas detection philosophy
- LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis)
- SIL (Safety Integrity Level) assessment
- SIL (Safety Integrity Level) validation
- Fire & Gas mapping
- HSE critical equipment performance standards

# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN

## 3. Fire Engineering

- Fire protection philosophy
- FHA (Fire Hazard Analysis)
- FERA (Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment)
- Fire zoning study
- Fire protection equipment mapping
- Fire water demand study
- Fire water hydraulics analysis
- Fire envelope drawing / Fire proofing study
- Foam system requirement analysis / drawings
- Deluge system requirement analysis / drawings
- Fire equipment data Sheets / drawings

# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN

## 4. Human Factor Engineering

- Human factors philosophy
- Human factors risk assessment
- Layout and spacing design review
- Accessibility design review
- Illumination analysis
- 3D model reviews for ergonomics

# ELEMENTS OF SAFETY IN DESIGN

## 5. Environmental Engineering

- Environment Base Line Study (EBS)
- Gas dispersion modeling
- EIA (Environment Impact Assessment)
- Waste management study
- Fugitive emission analysis
- Noise study and abatement analysis



# ENGINEERING PHASES

Technical Safety	CONCEPTUAL	FEED	DETAIL ENGINEERING
Technical safety philosophy (design basis)	-	Y	Y
Process Hazard Analysis (HAZID/ENVID/OHID)	Y	Y	Y
Layout safety review / Facility sitting	Y	Y	-
Safety engineering equipment schedule	-	Y	Y
Consequence analysis / Frequency analysis	-	Y	Y
COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards)	-	Y	Y
QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) / Bow-Tie analysis	-	Y	Y
HSECES (HSE Critical Equipment and Systems) analysis	-	-	Y
EERA (Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis)	-	Y	Y
Building risk assessment	-	Y	-
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability)		Y	Y
Traffic study (Ignition sources)	-	-	Y
Hazardous area classification	-	Y	Y

# ENGINEERING PHASES

Functional Safety	CONCEPTUAL	FEED	DETAIL ENGINEERING
Fire & Gas detection philosophy	-	Y	Y
LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis)	-	Y	Y
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) assessment	-	Y	Y
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) validation	-	-	Y
Fire & Gas mapping	-	-	Y
HSE critical equipment performance standards	-	-	Y
Shutdown philosophy	-	Y	Y

# ENGINEERING PHASES

Fire Engineering	CONCEPTUAL	FEED	DETAIL ENGINEERING
Fire protection philosophy	-	Y	Y
FHA (Fire Hazard Analysis)	-	Y	Y
FERA (Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment)	-	Y	Y
Fire zoning study	-	Y	Y
Fire protection equipment mapping	-	Y	Y
Fire water demand study	-	Y	Y
Fire water hydraulics analysis	-	-	Y
Fire envelope drawing	-	Y	Y
Fire proofing study	-	Y	Y
Foam system requirement analysis / drawings	-	-	Y
Deluge system requirement analysis / drawings	-	-	Y
Fire equipment data Sheets / drawings	-	-	Y

# ENGINEERING PHASES


Human Factor Engineering	CONCEPTUAL	FEED	DETAIL ENGINEERING
Human factors philosophy	-	Y	Y
Human factors risk assessment	-	Y	Y
Layout and spacing design review	Y	Y	Y
Accessibility design review	-	Y	Y
Illumination analysis	-	-	Y
3D model reviews for ergonomics	-	Y	Y

# ENGINEERING PHASES

Environmental Engineering	CONCEPTUAL	FEED	DETAIL ENGINEERING
Environment Base Line Study (EBS)	-	Y	Y
Gas dispersion modeling		Y	Y
EIA (Environment Impact Assessment)	Y	Y	Y
Waste management study	-	Y	Y
Fugitive emission analysis	-	-	Y
Noise study and abatement analysis	-	Y	Y

# SAFETY IN DESIGN PROCESSES

## A systematic approach to address the inputs and outputs of a system





# RESOURCES & LIMITATIONS

- ☐ Newly emerging field
- ☐ Limited experienced resources available
- ☐ No one stop solution available in the market
- ☐ Safety engineering software's available but expensive
- ☐ Not all the companies have access to all the software
- ☐ Community of Practice for safety engineering not yet a strong forum
- ☐ Safety engineering standards vary widely from company to company
- ☐ Not all companies have access to available safety engineering standards
- ☐ Very few safety engineering analysis requested in project SOW documents

**THANK YOU**

# Lunch Break



# Learning from Incident at ORPIC

by

**Sohail Rabbani**

ORPIC [Oman Refinery Company]

INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals



# Lessons Learnt in Orpic's Process Safety Journey

We put health, safety and the environment first


We work together with integrity, commitment and engagement

We empower our people to maximize their potential

We serve Oman and customers with pride

Sohail Rabbani – Head of Process Safety

MSc (SHE), CFSE, CSP, CMIOSH






# The Company



# The Plants





838 KTA HDPE/LLDPE  
215 KTA of Polypropylene  
Mogs and Benzene



Plant	Capacity
Mina Al Fahal Refinery	106,000 barrels per day
Sohar Refinery	116,000 barrels per day
Polypropylene Plant	350,000 metric tonnes of polypropylene per annum
Aromatics Plant	818,000 metric tonnes of paraxylene per annum 198,000 metric tonnes of benzene per annum


# PSM Implementation – Orpic Approach



# PSM Implementation – Orpic Approach




	Item	Expectation	Scoring/Gaps
A	Process Safety Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective Leadership from Management &amp; BoD</li> <li>Expectations and Verifiable objectives are set.</li> </ul>	
B	Process Safety Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An Integrated and comprehensive PSM system established and implemented.</li> <li>Continuous identification, reduction / management of Process Safety risks.</li> </ul>	
C	Process Safety Knowledge & expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appropriate level of process safety knowledge and expertise.</li> <li>Competence assurance system for the organization and its contractors. That includes incident investigation and process hazard analysis techniques, and awareness training.</li> </ul>	
D	Process Safety Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Positive, trusting, and open process safety culture developed.</li> <li>Proper reporting of Unsafe acts and conditions, and their use to improve the way things are done.</li> </ul>	
E	Clearly define expectations & accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Compensation of managers and supervisors linked to Process safety performance indicators and objectives.</li> <li>Development of an assessment tool to Emphasize and strengthen <u>ownership</u> of the area managers.</li> </ul>	



# PSM Implementation – Orpic Approach



	Item	Expectation	Scoring/Gaps
F	Support the Line Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sufficient support for line management regarding Process Safety.</li> </ul>	
G	Leading & Lagging Process Safety Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective performance monitoring through an integrated set of leading and lagging performance Process Safety indicators.</li> </ul>	
H	Process safety auditing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective implementation of auditing for process safety performance.</li> <li>Periodic auditing through independent team.</li> <li>Timely verification of remedial measures completed.</li> </ul>	
I	Board monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An Independent observer to monitor the implementation of the recommendations and the ongoing process safety performance.</li> </ul>	
J	Industry leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of experience to transform the company into a recognized industry leader in process safety management.</li> </ul>	







Tier 1, 2 & 3 Incidents	Tier 4 Performance Indicators	
Tier 1 Incident	PS KPI	Target
Tier 2 Incident	Process Safety Securities override	< 10
Tier 3 Incident	No. of Temporary MOC overdue	< 5
Tier 3 Performance Indicators		
Small LOPC	%age of Pressure Relief Valve tested against planned	100%
Safe Operating Limit Excursions	%age RCA (Tier-1 & 2) completed	100%
Activation of SIL Loops / ESD	%age H & HH Recommendations completion (Action Tracking)	≥ 95%
Failure on Demand (ESD/SIL Loops)	%age SOPs updated vs planned	≥ 90%
Pressure Relief Valve failed during testing	%age Hot work Permit Compliance	100%
No. of Repeated Incidents	%age PSSR compliance	≥ 95%
High Potential Near misses	%age MOC compliance	≥ 95%
	%age Override Compliance	≥ 95%
	Fire Water Capacity Available	100%
	%age PS Competency assessment	≥ 95%
	%age SCE PM Compliance	100%
	Alarm Count / Panel / hr	6




# PSM Key Performance Indicators



- Insufficient SOPs, or its awareness/implementation
- Improper implementation of MoC
- Insufficient Risk Assessment
- Insufficient implementation of PTW
- Overriding of Barriers without adequate mitigation





# Process Safety Culture





Create & Sustain the Sense of Vulnerability

Leadership Commitment & Visibility

Focus on People and Change Management

Develop Barrier Thinking Mindset



# Process Safety Culture




أوربك  
Orpic


- Process Safety Learnings from Incidents
- Barrier Thinking Training & Campaign
- Staff Competency Assessment

- Process Safety Audits
- Process Safety Workshops to involve users and to get their ownership


- Process Safety Barrier Surveys (KPI)
- Leadership Process Safety Walks (KPI)
- Rewards & Recognition



Competence



Compliance




Culture

Corporate KPIs	10% linked to Process Safety Lagging Indicators
Function KPIs	10% linked to Process Safety Leading Indicators
Personal KPIs	5% linked to Process Safety Barrier Surveys (12 surveys / employee)

## Process Safety Culture → Process Safety Rules

- 
- A large orange arrow pointing downwards, with a small white horizontal line near its base.
- To create and develop healthy Process Safety Culture, Company Rules and Values play an important role.

- 
- A large grey arrow pointing downwards, with a small white horizontal line near its base.
- These rules define Process Safety Values, that should be complied at all times, to ensure safe operation.

## Process Safety Rules



Always take mitigating measures for overrides or if Process Safety Barriers are not functioning.



Assure mechanical completion and tightness.



No hose connections (utilities, flushing) without Risk Assessment / MOC / Procedure & backpressure protection.



Follow Startup and Shutdown procedures and sign off every step.



Walk the Line, Field check for correct lineup.



Always use 2 barriers for vents and drains of chemicals and hydrocarbons.



Verify Positive Isolation and pressure/gas free before starting the work.



No Change without MOC.



Never leave draining unattended.




# Core Principals for Process Safety Culture



Establish an Imperative for Process Safety	Production not possible without Process Safety
Providing Strong Leadership	Leaders Inspire other to Process Safety Excellence and Walk the Talk
Foster Mutual Trust	Everyone does what they say and says what they mean
Ensure Open & Frank Communication	Communications channels are open and encouraged. Messengers not blamed.
Maintain a Sense of Vulnerability	Healthy level of respect for hazards and risks of facility and company.
Understand & Act Upon Hazards / Risks	Hazards and Risks analyzed and controlled with appropriate safeguards
Empower Individuals to Fulfill their Process Safety Responsibilities	Workers have Authority and Resources to perform assigned Process Safety roles
Defer to Expertise	Technical Knowledge related to Process Safety valued and opinions accepted
Combat the Normalization of Deviation	No Tolerance for Deviations from approved Rules & Standards
Learn to Assess and Advance the Culture	Learnings used to maintain and enhance Process Safety Culture.

## Progress So far in 2018



## Some Useful Basics;

- Keep it Simple – focus on the basics
  - Consider your Customers. Use Change Management Practices.
  - Involve workforce in Procedure development /updates. Create ownership
  - Develop Barrier Thinking Mindset.
  - Knowledge and competency development.
  - Visible leadership and visible leaders
  - Action Management – close the loop
  - Work on development of PS Culture by using 10 core principals



Thank You  
شكرا

First Time in Pakistan  
**REGIONAL**



**MEETING**



# Process Safety Undergraduate Education in Pakistan

by  
**Dr. Junaid Akhlas**  
Assistant Professor  
Department of Polymer & Petrochemical Engineering  
NED Department of Engineering & Technology, Karachi



INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals



**NED UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY**



# Undergraduate Education on Process Safety in Pakistan

**Dr. Junaid Akhlas**  
Assistant Professor

Department of Polymer & Petrochemical Engineering  
NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi





# Overview



- **Current Status**
  - Institutes
  - Salient Course Features
  - Benchmarking
  - Gap Analysis
- **Process Safety Education Plan**
  - Outcome Based Education
  - Industrial Contribution to Academia

# Institutes



- **Institutes offering Process Safety Education at Undergraduate Level in Chemical & Process Engineering**
  - **NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi**
  - **Dawood University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi**
  - **Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, Swabi**
  - **University of Engineering & Technology, Lahore**

# Salient Course Features



- **Objectives**

**Understand and appreciate the**

- **Importance of safety and the occupational health related to chemical industries**
- **Plant safety by risks identification, control, and management**
- **Significance of reduced and controlled impact on the environment**
- **International standards**

# Salient Course Features



- **Plant Safety**
- **Process Plant Hazards**
- **Toxicology**
- **Accident Analysis and Prevention**
- **Accident Investigation and Case Histories**
- **Regulations for Industrial Safety (OSHA)**
- **Safety Management**
- **Hazard and Risk Assessment (HAZOP)**
- **Ergonomics**

# Benchmarking



- According to HEC NCRC for Chemical Engineering, a Process Safety Management course must include
  - Plant Safety
  - Accident Analysis and Prevention
  - Regulations and Standards
  - Safety Management
  - Hazard and Risk Assessment
  - Safety Equipment
  - Environmental Impacts
  - Quality Standards

# Benchmarking



- According to HEC NCRC for Chemical Engineering, a Risk Management and Safety course must include
  - Risk and Hazard Identification
  - Fire and Explosion Modeling
  - Human Factors in Risk Analysis
  - Risk of Chemical Reactions
  - Emergency Planning and Responses
  - Storage and Transportation of Hazardous Materials
  - Introduction to International Safety Standards



# Benchmarking



- **According to AIChE – CCPS**
  - **Process Safety and its Importance**
  - **Hazard identification**
  - **Hazard Modeling**
  - **Risk Modeling**
  - **Risk Mitigation**
  - **Inherently Safe Design**
  - **Mechanical Integrity**
  - **Emergency Response Planning**


# Gap Analysis



- **One compulsory course dedicated to Process Safety**
- **One optional course dedicated to Process Safety & Risk Management**
- **HEIs offering Process Safety courses may modify their course contents to include or enhance the following topics:**
  - **Risk and Hazard Assessment**  
(Risk Modeling, Hazard Modeling, Fire and Explosion Modeling)
  - **Emergency Response Planning**
  - **Mechanical Integrity**
  - **Environmental Impacts**

# Process Safety Education Plan

## ■ Outcome Based Education



# Process Safety Education Plan



- **Industrial Contribution to Academia**
  - **Process Safety Management Systems**
  - **Risk Management Systems**
  - **Incident Reports and Case Studies**
  - **Engineering Practices for Safe Operations**
  - **HAZOP Analyses**

# Thank You



**Dr. Junaid Akhlas**  
**22<sup>nd</sup> November 2018**

## AIChE / CCPS Undergraduate Process Safety Education Initiative

By **Shakeel H. Kadri**  
Executive Director,  
CCPS, AIChE



INSPIRING  
**PEOPLE**  
PRESERVING  
**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals



# Process Safety — Start Them Young

Shakeel Kadri  
Executive Director, CCPS  
22 November 2018

Presentation at the 1<sup>st</sup> Pakistan CCPS Regional Meeting

# 1970's


## Process Safety Awareness



### Flixborough [1974]

**"The Global Community Committed to Process Safety"**

# 1980's



## Process Safety Awareness

**Bhopal [1984], Piper Alpha [1988]**

**"The Global Community Committed to Process Safety"**

# Process Safety Education [1970's]

# Process Safety Education

## 1980's and 1990's



# Process safety Education [2000 +]

- A few universities started offering the program

## Annual graduations of ChEs

**The question is: How are they going to get Process Safety Education?**

**Process Safety Course requirement non-mandatory**



# Knowledge vs Competency

- **Knowledge**

- Information what is known; provides the means to catalog, store, and retrieve information so that it can be accessed on request

- **Competency**

- Ability of a person to do a job properly. It is the strategy a professional would apply in practice to apply his/her knowledge if given the opportunity.

# T2 Lab Explosion



## Key Overarching Lessons & Actions

- ❖ Lack of process safety knowledge
- ❖ Lack of process safety competency
- ❑ Include process safety in undergraduate ChE program

# Undergraduate Process Safety Education [UPSLI]


- In 2010, CSB asked AIChE [parent of CCPS] to include process safety in ChE curriculum
- AIChE worked with the US **Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology** [ABET] and the ChE curriculum was updated in 2012 to include process safety
- In 2015, CCPS launched an initiative to develop / implement the **Undergraduate Process Safety Education** program to accommodate the ABET requirements

# **VISION for Process Safety in ChE Education**

**In 8-10 years, all graduating BS ChE's anywhere in the world will have learned the process safety basics necessary to have a successful and safe career, on a sustainable basis.**

# The Background


In 2014, CCPS Advisory Board recognized a major industry challenge.





# Program Overview

The Undergraduate Process Safety Learning Initiative includes 3 major elements:



# Industry & University Collaboration

## Accelerating the Program



Less than  
28% students have taken  
SACHe modules

**Prior to Launch**

100% new hires with  
rigorous process  
safety training

**By 2024**

Reduction in  
catastrophic  
process  
safety  
incidents

Level 1 (4)

Level 2 (14)

Level 3 (~18)

# Process Safety Curriculum

The Importance of Process Safety

Hazard Recognition

Identifying & Minimizing Process Safety Hazards

An Introduction to Managing Process Safety Hazards

Understand Hazards and Risk

Process Safety at a Personal Level

Hazard Assessment/Source Models - 1

Hazard Assessment/Source Models - 2

Fire Hazards

Explosion Hazards

Chemical Reactivity

Toxicological Hazards

Management of hazards and risk - Background

Management of hazards and risk – Emergency Relief [ER]

Management of hazards and risk – Safeguards other than ER

Management of hazards and risk – Hazard ID Techniques

Safe Design & Operation / Equipment Hazards

Hazard Assessment/Atmospheric Dispersion - 1

Hazard Assessment/Atmospheric Dispersion - 2

Material Hazards

Inherent Safer Design  
Safety Systems and How they work

Quantitative Methods and Hazard Assessment

Risk Based Process Safety Management

Nitrogen Hazards  
Dust Explosions

Equipment Hazards  
Damage Mechanism  
Reactor Pressure Relief  
Facility Siting


LOPA  
Adv Dispersion & Consequence Modeling  
Adv Proc Haz Analysis

Commit to Proc Safety  
Understand Hazards & Risk  
Manage Risk  
Learn from Experience

Biological Hazard  
Toxicity & Flammability  
Hazards of Common Chemicals

Additional detailed courses build on concepts presented in Level 2 courses

# New SACHE Module



The screenshot displays the SACHE (Safety and Chemical Engineering Education) module interface. The top left features the SACHE logo and the text 'Safety and Chemical Engineering Education'. The top right shows the current unit: 'Level 1, Course 3: Unit 1 - Inherently Safer Design', along with links for 'Help', 'Abbreviations', 'Glossary', 'Resources', and 'Exit'.

The left sidebar contains a 'Topics' menu with the following items:

- Level 1, Course 3: Unit 1 - Inherently Sa...
- Getting Started
- Objectives
- SECTION 1: An Introduction to Inher...
- SECTION 2: The Hierarchy of Design ...
- SECTION 3: Approaches for Achievin...
- Inherently Safer Design and the Proc...
- Cost of Change
- Unit 1 Summary
- Unit 1 Quiz

The main content area shows a video player with a thumbnail image of a person in a light blue shirt and jeans, holding a yellow pencil, standing over a desk. On the desk are various items: an orange hard hat, a pair of black safety glasses, a yellow measuring tape, a white roll of paper, and a pair of white gloves. The video player includes a search bar at the bottom left, a play button, a progress bar, a refresh button, and a 'NEXT' button at the bottom right.



# Faculty Workshops Educating the Educators



## 2016 Faculty Workshops

Dow - Freeport, TX June 20 – 23, 2016

Archer Daniels Midland - Decatur, IL, July 25-28, 2016

Cargill - Blair, NE, August, 15 – 18, 2016


Chevron - Richmond, CA, August 21 -24, 2016

# UPSLI Update 2018



## New SACHE Modules

- Eight new SACHE modules are in process of getting completed



## Faculty Workshops

1. LyondellBasell
2. Dow
3. Chevron
4. BASF
5. Chemours
6. Covestro - AIChE Annual Meeting



## Students PS Boot Camps

1. University of Michigan
2. Colorado School of Mines
3. North Carolina State University
4. Mississippi State University
5. University of Tennessee-Knoxville
6. Ohio State University





# The Impact



# 26,700

**STUDENTS**  
using SChE modules  
since 2015

# 389

**NEW FACULTY MEMBERS**  
educated on process safety  
since campaign launch

# 416

**UNIVERSITIES PARTICIPATING**  
in Undergraduate Process  
Safety Learning Initiative  
curriculum



# 85,000+

**SAFETY CERTIFICATES**  
awarded to students  
since 2015



# 17 Faculty Workshops

since 2015

## 2016

- Archer Daniels Midland – Decatur, IL
- Cargill – Blair, NE
- Chevron – Richmond, CA
- Annual Meeting – San Francisco, CA

## 2017

- Dow – Freeport , TX
- WACKER – Charleston, TN
- Archer Daniels Midland – Decatur, IL
- Chevron – Richmond, CA
- Reliance Industries – India
- Annual Meeting – Minneapolis, MN

## 2018

- LyondellBasell – Houston, TX
- Dow – Freeport, TX
- Chevron – Richmond, CA
- Chemours – Fayetteville, NC
- BASF – Wyandotte, MI
- Covestro – Pittsburgh, PA




## 2019 Planning Underway

- LyondellBasell - Jan 6 - 9
- The Dow Chemical Company - June 10 - 13
- BASF - July 22 - 25
- Bayer U.S Crop Science - July 29th – August 1st
- ExxonMobil - August 12-15
- Chemours TBD



# Student Bootcamps



## 2016 Student Bootcamps

UC Berkeley – April 2-3

Georgia Institute of Technology – Sept. 10-11

University of Illinois-Urbana (mini regional) – Sept. 10-11

# Impact of Student Bootcamps

## 2016


- UC Berkeley
- Georgia Institute of Technology
- University of Illinois-Urbana

## 2017

- Virginia Tech
- University of Delaware
- Louisiana State University
- University of Texas, Austin

## 2018

- University of Michigan
- Colorado School of Mines
- North Carolina State University
- Mississippi State University
- University of Tennessee-Knoxville
- Ohio State University



*Average of 30 students/bootcamp*

**“The course helped emphasize the importance of process safety as lives are on the line. Keep up the work!”**

– Undergraduate Student,  
Colorado School of Mines

# The Support

The AIChE Foundation has raised \$11MM towards the Doing a World of Good campaign.

## FOUNDERS' CIRCLE

**Benefactors**  
\$750,000 and up



**Underwriters**  
\$500,000 - \$749,999



**Patrons**  
\$250,000 - \$499,999



## MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS

### Partners - \$100,000-\$249,999

Albemarle  
Archer Daniels Midland  
Company  
Bayer U.S. – Crop Science  
Cabot Corporation  
Evonik  
ExxonMobil Corporation

ExxonMobil Corporation  
FMC Corporation  
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.  
Olin  
PolyOne  
Trinseo LLC  
WACKER Chemical  
Corporation

### Supporters - \$50,000-\$99,999

Air Liquide  
Arkema Inc.  
Bouchard Transportation  
Cargill  
Honeywell

Intercontinental Terminals  
Company LLC  
LANXESS  
Novus International, Inc.  
Praxair

For a complete list of donors, visit [www.DoingaWorldofGood.org](http://www.DoingaWorldofGood.org)

# Process Safety — Start Them Young

# Thank You!





# Safety Equipment Philosophy in Oil & Gas Sector

## Rehan Sajjad

BYCO Petroleum

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**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals

# **SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT**


**Rehan Sajjad Mughal**

**BYCO Petroleum Pakistan LTD.**



# Rehan Sajjad Mughal

□ Chemical Engineering from.....



“**Safety** is the control of hazards in order to achieve an acceptable level of risk”

### Process Safety

- Encircles Processes, Equipment & Instrumentation

### Behavioral Safety

- Encircles Behaviors, Mindsets, Practices & Culture



## **KEY Challenges** in Modern Process & Manufacturing Industries are



Limited Time



Limited Budget



Limited Skill Manpower



Sustainability



**Best utilization** of limited resources can be done by identifying and prioritizing critical assets

Normal  
Assets

Business  
Critical

Safety  
Critical

**Asset  
Types**





“Devices, equipment or systems whose failure could result in **catastrophic consequence**”

For example:



Major Loss of Containment



Explosion, Fire & Fatality



Environment Damage



# HIGH HAZARD PROCESS

“Any activity using hazardous substances that, when they are released, ignited, or intentionally combined, have significant potential for **catastrophic consequence**”



# LOW HAZARD OPERATION

“Any activity **without** potential for a catastrophic consequence”



**HHP, LHO hence SCD** can be segregated based on following standard



NFPA 30




OSHA



EPA



Refers to **NFPA & EPA** for detailed guidelines




“**High HAZARD PROCESS** is all those Hazardous Chemicals with quantity greater than their threshold limit as identified by OSHA / EPA / regulated chemicals list






Chemical Name	EPA Quantity (lb) for HHP
H <sub>2</sub> S	10,000
HCL	5000
Caustic	10,000
Sulfuric Acid	10,000
Chlorine	2500
MEA	10,000




**“OSHA/ EPA** list of Hazardous Chemicals threshold limit does not cover all Hydrocarbons at an Oil & Gas Industry




“**High HAZARD PROCESS** is one which involves a flammable gas or liquid with a flashpoint below 100 °F (37.8 °C) in one location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more”

AND

“All processes handling, storing or processing combustible liquids at temperature higher than their flash point, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more”



Chemical Name	Flash Point °F	Category
C1-C4	-156	HHP
Naphtha	-8	HHP
Gasoline	-45	HHP
Kerosene	107	Depends on Process Temperature
Jet fuel (A/A-1)	100 - 150	Depends on Process Temperature
Light Gas Oil	176	Depends on Process Temperature
HSD	>130	Depends on Process Temperature
Crude Oil	-	Depends on Process Temperature



Any equipment/ instrument & device  
falling under NFPA/ OSHA/ EPA  
threshold quantity

Containment Controls i.e. Relieve  
devices etc

Shutdown controls i.e. ESD system,  
alarms etc

Controlled Release  
Equipment/Systems i.e. Flare header

**Safety  
Critical  
- Rules**



Safety Monitoring Systems i.e.  
Detectors

Active Mitigation Systems i.e. Fire  
protection systems, deluge and  
sprinklers

Passive Prevention and Mitigation  
Systems i.e. Dykes, Fire walls

Service/ Utility Systems that help  
maintain safe operation i.e. UPS,  
Diesel generators

**Safety  
Critical  
- Rules**





AREA	MAJOR PROCESSES	HHP	LHO	JUSTIFICATION
Crude Storage Tank (Capacity)	Tank	√		<b>HHP - General Set Rule</b>
	Tank inlet and outlet lines	√		<b>Wetted Part of HHP</b>
	Feed to Plant	√		<b>HHP based on Threshold Quantity</b>

All process equipment associated to Crude Tank i.e. Relief devices, Level Indicators, ESD system and secondary containment will be considered Safety critical equipment



# Coffee Break



Chemical Plant Safety in Japan

**Yoshio Shiga**


Mitsubishi Corporation

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


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## Disabling injury frequency rate in Japan



## Leak from broken valve




**W/O Learning → Dangerous**  
**W/O Thinking → Waste**

**Sharing Experience/Notice/Thinking**



## Liquid blow-down


Flammable liquid




Inert Gas

+ Flow meter

## Number of cases by accident scale



# Outline of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station



First Time in Pakistan  
**REGIONAL**



**MEETING**



# OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) Model implementation - Success Story

by

**Ahsan Sarfraz**

Fatima Group

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
# **Achieving Excellence in Process Safety Management (PSM)** ***At Fatima Fertilizer Complex--- “A Success Story”***

**Muhammd Ahsan Sarfraz – HSE Manager**  
**Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited, Pakistan**




# Outline

- 🌟 Fatima Group and Fatima Fertilizer Overview
- 🌟 Factors Driving PSM In FFCL
- 🌟 PSM Elements and Rating Scale
- 🌟 Gap Analysis and Implementation Strategy
- 🌟 Outcomes and Performance Measures
- 🌟 Challenges Ahead
- 🌟 Questions






# Fatima Group (FG) - A Journey of Success Since 1936



- Annual Turnover : 764 Million USD
- More than 6,300 Permanent Employees

# Factors Driving PSM in FFCL

- ✧ Fatima Group **HSE Vision** and **Committed Leadership**.
- ✧ Recognized **Industry Trend**
- ✧ Human, Economic, Environmental **Loss Prevention**
  - ✧ Series of LTI and Operational Upsets in 2012.
- ✧ Company **Reputation and Recognition**
- ✧ Purely **Self Initiative** without any Legal Obligation



# Benchmark Rating Scale and PSM Model

🌟 22 elements PSM Model was implemented (in house)

🌟 DuPont was selected as an external consultant and facilitator in the process.



1	Fundamental systems in place
2	Awareness of role, systems and expectations
3	Skills & systems fully in place and practiced
4	Excellence in all results
5	World Class Performance

# PSM 22 Element Classification- FFL Philosophy

## Leadership

- 1 Management Commitment
- 2 Policies & Principles
- 3 Procedures and Perf. Standards
- 4 Goals, Objectives and Plans

## Personnel

- 13 MoC - Personnel
- 14 Contractor Safety Management

## Organization

- 5 Integrated Organizat. Structure
- 6 Line Management  
Responsib. & Accountability
- 7 Safety Personnel
- 8 Motivation & Awareness

## Facilities

- 15 Quality Assurance
- 16 Pre-start-up Safety Reviews
- 17 Mechanical Integrity
- 18 MoC - Facilities

## Processes

- 9 Training & Development
- 10 Effective Communication
- 11 Audits & Observations
- 12 Incident Investigation & Reporting

## Technology

- 19 Process Safety Information
- 20 MoC – Technology
- 21 Risk Assessment and PHA
- 22 Emergency Preparedness

# Initial Gap Analysis

- 🚩 Absence Of **HSE Goals & Objectives** And **Reward / Reprimand** System.
- 🚩 High Number Of **Injuries**, **High TRIR** And **Process Fires**.
- 🚩 High Rate Of **Loss Of Containments** And **Process Releases**.
- 🚩 Less Significance And **Importance Of Safe Practices**.
- 🚩 Inadequate **Contractors Safety Management System**.
- 🚩 **Weak Emergency Response** And Lack Of Trust Between Site  
And **Local Community**.
- 🚩 **Low Employees Morale**.
- 🚩 HSE Department In **Policing Role**.



# Implementation Strategy

In order to transform site safety culture, following strategy was devised.



Deployment of Highly experienced HSE leadership with execution team.



Gap Analysis to assess the Process Safety Culture & Organizational Reliability.



Bench Marking with OSHA PSM standard and Roadmap development.



Adapting **Change Management strategy**; Identifying and involving Change activators (Mngt & Staff) and neutralizing resistors by What is in it for me.

# Implementation Strategy



Conversion of PSM literature into crisp/presentable format in local languages.



Periodic Campaigns, Quizzes and Competitions to reinvigorate PSM drive.



PSM Validation of all employees and contactors engagement programs.




Inception of extensive in-house PSM Audit Program for progress review



# Internal Audits Rating


- 06 extensive internal audits were performed by team to raise the bar during 05 years time.
- Detailed action plan was developed and stewarded as the result of each audit in true spirits.



# External Audits Rating

🌟 02 external audits were performed by DuPont.

🌟 FFL Site declared at Excellence level in this **Shortest Time Span of 05 Years.**




# Outcomes / Achievements

FFCL believes that robust PSM implementation equates to enhanced safety, reliability & productivity and same is evident as:

- 🌟 No Fatality / LTI after implementation.
- 🌟 Lowest TRIR, above **46.3**million Safe Man-Hours.
- 🌟 Decreased number of Fires, Process Releases and Injuries
- 🌟 Improved service and capacity factors of plants.
- 🌟 High Morale of Employees.
- 🌟 Improved Emergency Response.
- 🌟 Reduced risk to nearby communities and Increased reputation & community engagement.




# TRIR Trend





# SAFE MILLION MAN-HOURS

Indication of successful HSE performance. No Recordable injury since June- 2012.


Highest Man Hours in the industry.



# Fatalities & Lost Time Injures



Decreasing Injuries Trend (Company & Contractor Employees)





# Challenges Ahead

- 🌱 Sustainability and Strive for Excellence.
- 🌱 Inter-dependent Culture.
- 🌱 Increasing Safe Million Man-Hours and Complacency.
- 🌱 Contractor Safety Excellence.
- 🌱 Off The Job Safety Improvement.
- 🌱 Occupational Health & Industrial Hygiene Program Compliance.
- 🌱 Environmental Management System Benchmarking.

***‘Still A Long Way To Go...’***

***Thank You !  
Questions***



# Distributionn of Souvenirs



Hats off to the  
EPCL team for  
putting it together





# Process Safety Metrics – API-754 Implementation

By  
**Shakeel H. Kadri**  
Executive Director,  
CCPS, AIChE



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**PLANET**



engro polymer & chemicals

# Leadership message on Process Safety Metrics

Shakeel Kadri

Executive Director, CCPS

22 November 2018

Presentation at the 1<sup>st</sup> Pakistan CCPS Regional Meeting



# CCPS Workshop

## “Process Safety Metrics: API-RP-754 Implementation”

**Workshop facilitator:**

**Shakeel Kadri**




October 10<sup>th</sup> 2018 (0800 Hrs. to 1500 Hrs)

Le Méridien Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia

**The Host and sponsor for this CCPS workshop is Saudi Aramco, with support from other CCPS member companies**

أرامكو السعودية  
saudi aramco



# Agenda

7:30 – 7:45	<b>Introduction / Workshop opening thoughts</b>
7:45 to 10:00	<b>Overview – Process Safety Metrics</b>
	<b>Process Safety Metrics Journey [CCPS]</b>
	<b>Why API RP-754?</b>
	<b>API RP-754 Key Concepts</b>
	<b>API RP 754 – Lagging and Leading Indicators</b> • <b>Tier 1 Process Safety Events</b>
10:00-10:15	<b>Tea/Coffee break</b>
10:15 to 11:30	<b>API RP 754 – Lagging and Leading Indicators</b> • <b>Tier 2 Severity System</b>
	<b>Tier 1 and Tier 2 Data Capture and Data Analysis</b>
	<b>CCPS Incident Evaluation App</b>
	<b>API RP-754 Tier 3 Indicators, data capture / analysis</b>
	<b>API RP-754 Tier 4 Indicators, data capture / analysis</b>
11:30-12:30	<b>Lunch break</b>
12:30 to 15:00	<b>Metrics sharing from Regional companies</b> • <b>Saudi Aramco</b> • <b>SABIC</b> • <b>Saudi Chevron Phillips</b> • <b>Air Products</b>
	<b>Process Safety Leading Indicators Benchmarking Project [CCPS]</b>
	<b>Metrics driven improvement initiatives</b>
	<b>Communicating Process Safety Metrics</b>

# Workshop Objectives

Attendees who complete this workshop will be able to:

- Understand their status relative to the history of Process Safety performance measurement
- Alignment of CCPS and API-754 Metrics
- Competently use API RP 754: Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries – 2<sup>nd</sup> edition
- Use the CCPS Process Safety Event Evaluation App
- Establish Tier 1 – 3 event data collection requirements
- Select effective leading indicators (Tiers 3 & 4)

***THIS IS A WORKSHOP – IT SHOULD BE A DIALOG***

# Workshop Objectives [cont'd]

- Perform basic data analyses for Tier 1 – 4 indicators
- Test individual Tiers 3 & 4 indicators for their “leading value”
- Identify promising areas for improvement initiatives
- View examples of improvement initiatives developed by industry leaders
- Effectively communicate Process Safety indicator results
- Understand and overcome barriers to indicator program implementation
- Provide ample opportunities to address participants questions and perform benchmarking

***THIS IS A WORKSHOP – IT SHOULD BE A DIALOG***

# Safety Metrics History



*The key process safety objective is to identify failures, gaps or conditions and to correct them before they contribute to a major process safety incident.*


What Gets Measured Gets Done.

And What Gets Done, Gets **IMPROVED!**

# CCPS Process Safety Metrics Deliverables [2007-2008]


## “You Don’t Improve What You Don’t Measure”

- Common Industry-Wide Lagging Metric
- Near-Miss or Other Lagging Metrics
- Leading Metrics
- Pamphlet with Recommendations in these three areas COMPLETED December 2007!



## Process Safety Metrics Guideline Book Completed

*If you are not managing process safety well, you are probably not managing other things well.*



# Available in Multiple Languages




## Spanish

<http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/metrics%20spanish%20updated.pdf>



## Japanese

[http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/CCPS\\_ProcessSafety\\_Lagging\\_Japanese\\_2011\\_2-24.pdf](http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/CCPS_ProcessSafety_Lagging_Japanese_2011_2-24.pdf)



## Portuguese

[http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/project\\_233\\_leading\\_indicator\\_white\\_paper- edited - 2-21-13\\_r1\\_portugues.pdf](http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/project_233_leading_indicator_white_paper- edited - 2-21-13_r1_portugues.pdf)



## Chinese

<http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/PSMetricsSimplifiedChineseV5.pdf>




# Industry Call to Action

- Baker Panel Report : **RECOMMENDATION #7 – LEADING AND LAGGING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROCESS SAFETY**
  - BP should develop, implement, maintain, and periodically update an integrated set of leading and lagging performance indicators for more effectively monitoring the process safety performance of the U.S. refineries by BP's refining line management, executive management (including the Group Chief Executive), and Board of Directors. In addition, BP should work with the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board and with industry, labor organizations, other governmental agencies, and other organizations to develop a consensus set of leading and lagging indicators for process safety performance for use in the refining and chemical processing industries.
- CSB Report: **13.0 RECOMMENDATIONS** - {American Petroleum Institute (API) and United Steelworkers International Union (USW).}
  - a. ...create performance indicators for process safety in the refinery and petrochemical industries. Ensure that the standard identifies leading and lagging indicators for nationwide public reporting as well as indicators for use at individual facilities. Include methods for the development and use of the performance indicators.
  - b .....In the development of each standard, ensure that the committees include representation of diverse sectors such as industry, labor, government, public interest and environmental organizations and experts from relevant scientific organizations and disciplines.



# API RP 754 – *Process Safety Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries*

- Proven successful indicators of Process Safety performance apart from Personnel Safety
- Adopted by major industry associations across the globe: API, AFPM, ACC, UKPIA, IOGP (via OGP 456), IPIECA and ICCA among others
- Provides for benchmarking on a consistent basis



**Workshop attendees develop competence in application of RP 754**

# CCPS Incident Evaluation Tool / APP



AT&T Wi-Fi 8:24 PM 64%

Process Safety Report

Was there a release from the process?

Yes

Was the release unplanned or uncontrolled?

Yes - unplanned and/or uncontrolled

Were there any injuries as a result of the release?

Yes

Did the release result in a fatality?

Yes

**Result: This is a Tier 1 process safety event.**


✓ SAVE AS PDF

# Tier 1 Process Safety Events

## Tier 1 Threshold quantities, toxics

Threshold Release Category	Material Hazard Classification	Typical Materials	Outdoor Threshold	Indoor Threshold
T1-1	TIH Zone A	MIC, Phosgene, Fluorine, HCN	$\geq 5$ kg (11 lb)	$\geq 0.5$ kg (1.1 lb)
T1-2	TIH Zone B	H <sub>2</sub> S, Cl <sub>2</sub> , SO <sub>3</sub> , BF <sub>3</sub>	$\geq 25$ kg (55 lb)	$\geq 2.5$ kg (5.5 lb)
T1-3	TIH Zone C	HF, HCl, SO <sub>2</sub>	$\geq 100$ kg (220 lb)	$\geq 10$ kg (22 lb)
T1-4	TIH Zone D	NH <sub>3</sub> , CO, Ethylene Oxide	$\geq 200$ kg (440 lb)	$\geq 20$ kg (44 lb)

Hazard Zone	Inhalation Toxicity
A	LC <sub>50</sub> less than or equal to 200 ppm
B	LC <sub>50</sub> greater than 200 ppm and less than or equal to 1000 ppm
C	LC <sub>50</sub> greater than 1000 ppm and less than or equal to 3000 ppm
D	LC <sub>50</sub> greater than 3000 ppm or less than or equal to 5000 ppm



The table above and graph to the right (Appendix F) define toxicity zones for gases and liquids.


# RP 754 – Tier 1 PSE Severity Weighting

Increasing Severity


Severity Points	Consequence Categories				
	Safety / Human Health <sup>c</sup>	Direct Cost from Fire or Explosion	Material Release within any 1-Hour Period <sup>a</sup>	Community Impact	Offsite Environmental Impact <sup>b</sup>
1	Injury requiring treatment beyond first aid to any worker. (Meets the definition of a US OSHA recordable injury)	Results in \$100,000 to <\$1,000,000 Direct Cost Damage	Release volume is 1x to < 3x Tier 1 TQ outside secondary containment	Officially declared shelter-in-place, evacuation, or other public protective measures (road closure) that last ≤ 3 hours	Results in \$100,000 to < \$1,000,000 Acute Environmental Cost
3	Days Away From Work injury to any worker or injury requiring treatment beyond first aid to a third party	Results in \$1,000,000 to <\$10,000,000 Direct Cost Damage	Release volume is 3x to < 9x Tier 1 TQ outside secondary containment	Officially declared shelter-in-place, evacuation, or other public protective measures (road closure) that last > 3 hours but ≤ 24 hours	Results in \$1,000,000 to < \$10,000,000 Acute Environmental Cost, or Small-scale injury or death of aquatic or land-based wildlife
9	A fatality to a worker or A hospital admission of a third party	Results in \$10,000,000 to <\$100,000,000 Direct Cost Damage	Release volume is 9x to < 27x Tier 1 TQ outside secondary containment	Officially declared evacuation > 24 hours but ≤ 48 hours	Results in \$10,000,000 to < \$100,000,000 Acute Environmental Cost, or Medium-scale injury or death of aquatic or land-based wildlife
27	Multiple worker fatalities or multiple hospital admissions of third parties or a fatality to a third party	Results in ≥ \$100,000,000 Direct Cost Damage	Release volume exceeds 27x Tier 1 TQ outside secondary containment	Officially declared evacuation exceeding 48 hours	Acute Environmental Cost equals or exceeds \$100,000,000, or Large-scale injury or death of aquatic or land-based wildlife

# Tier 1&2 PSE Data Analysis


Company Point of Release for Tier 1 & 2 PSEs




T 1 & 2 Causal Factors



Company T1&2 by Mode of Operation




Mode of Operation in Steady State






# Tier 1&2 PSE Data Analysis

T1 & T2 by Point of Release




T1 & T2 Piping System Events by Sub-system




## T1 & T2 Data Drilldown

T1 & T2 Valve Events by Type



T1 & T2 Piping System Events by Causal Factor







# Tier 3 PSE Data Analysis

## Tier 3 at the company and site levels


# of Tier 3s




Site A # of Tier 3s



Company Tier 3 Rate Trend




Site A Tier 3 Rate Trend



# Tier 4 PSE Data Analysis

# of Past-due action items




Risk Level	# Open Prior Quarter	# New This Quarter	# Closed This Quarter	# Open End of Quarter	# Open > 2 Yrs.	# Open > 3 Yrs.
Higher	3	0	0	3	3	3
Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lower	0	0	0	0	0	0

# Process Safety Leading Indicator Metrics

## Industry Survey on Leading Metrics

A CCPS Project

# Free Publication



Published in 2013 - Available for download at:


[http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/leading-indicator-survey\\_0.pdf](http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/pages/leading-indicator-survey_0.pdf)

# # of Companies using a Specific Indicator

All 25 leading indicators were used by one or more of the responding 43 companies.

12 or more leading indicators were used by 20 or more of the 43 companies, (45%)

The red box on the chart highlights the 12 leading indicators used by the 20 or more companies



# Barriers to Implementing Process Safety Indicator Programs

*Management's visible responses to problems identified by the metrics are as important – if not more important – than the metrics themselves.*

# Barriers to Implementation

- Senior Management Commitment/support is essential for the implementation and sustainability of a successful metrics program.
- There can be differences in understanding metrics definitions across the company, e.g., different geographies, acquisitions
- Resources are needed in order to report metrics in a timely manner.
  - Maintaining trained resources who understood the definitions and how to extract the data from the computer tracking system presented a challenge due to transfers, turnovers and retirements.




# Communicating Process Safety Indicators

## Best Practices in Reporting Process Safety Indicators

*Communicating process safety results is a critical element for a process safety improvement strategy.*


# Global Process Safety Metrics

September 2014 (YTD)







# Multi-year Process Safety KPI Trend

## Quarterly Process Safety Event Performance



# Global Process Safety Metrics

## Leading Indicators 12 Months Trend



# ZERO Fire Initiative

## (72) Process Safety Related Fire Events

### • (5) Tier 1 Process Safety Fire Events

- Massiac contractor burn (LTI)
- Gent Compressor Oil Fire
- Tangshan Expander Oil Fire
- Hsin Chu TW NF3 Bundle Fire (LTI)
- Wison ASU Compressor Building Fire


### • (3) Tier 2 Process Safety Fire Events

- Insulation Fire CO2 Tank, Poland
- Silane Fire, Shiwha, Korea
- T2 VSA O2 blower fire, Merak, Indonesia

### • (64) Tier 3 Events


- (29) Stack Fires – venting to safe locations
- (9) O2 Fires
- (8) Hot Work related
- (3) Oil Fires
- (3) Silane Fires
- (12) Others not classified

(72) Process Safety Fire Events  
by Type




- 25% of fire related KPI events resulted in LTI
- Stack fires Corrective Action Team working to reduce occurrence (low risk)
- Oxygen fires and Machinery fires identified for improvement efforts

# Process Safety KPI Causes Attributed to PSM Elements




**FY10-13** Process Safety KPI  
 PSM Elements



**FY13** Process Safety  
 KPI PSM Elements

PSM Element colors are the same for both pie charts

# FY13 Process Safety Event Hazard Conditions



➤ Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) accounted for 60% of Process Safety Events in FY13 vs. 66% in FY12

➤ Unsafe condition / early hazard identification lowered to 21% in FY13 vs. 24% in FY12





WCCE10, Barcelona, 3.10.2017

# Process Safety Incidents

## From Tracking to active Reduction Initiatives

Hans V. Schwarz, BASF



We create chemistry

# Thanks!!



***The Global Community Committed to Process Safety***

# Q&A





# Closing Remarks



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# Thank You

