









Case Study – Phillips Petroleum Process Description

Six settling legs were attached to the bottom of each loop reactor. Each settling leg consisted of a flanged, 8-inch diameter pipe connected to an air-operated, tight-shutoff, 8-inch ball valve. Beyond this ball valve was an 8-foot length run of straight pipe where the reaction product called polyethylene "fluff," collected. The 8-inch ball valves were to remain open during production. This configuration allowed polyethylene fluff to drop into the settling legs.

Below the settling leg was a takeoff valve where the fluff would pass on its way into the flash tank. The settling legs were the interface between the high-pressure (loop reactor) and low-pressure (flash tank) process sections. The intent of loop reactor operation was to deliver polyethylene fluff into the flash tank, where it was removed and later pelletized.















Enter the equipment parameters on **Equipment Data** worksheet.

The Loop Reactor consists of four 30 in diameter loops 150 ft. tall. It has a total volume of roughly 3,240 cu. ft., a maximum allowable working pressure near 660 psig, pipe ("nozzle") diameter of 8 in., an estimated wetted surface area of 2590 sq. ft., an estimated elevation from take-off valve to surface (ground) of 20 ft.., and the "drain valve" diameter of 8 in (the take-off valve diameter).





Enter the operating conditions on the **Process Conditions** worksheet.

Assume an ambient temperature of 70 F.

Since the contents of the loop reactor are at 600 psi, use the reported ~2 min release duration and a zero lb./min feed rate (deinventoried before more feed entered).

The percent of operating time is > 10% and there are frequent Cleanouts to remove settling leg logs.







An A DHE Techno kay Allance POPER Center for Chemikal Process Safety	Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) Case Study – Phillips Petroleum
	Save Inputs to Equipment Table
	Equipment Identification = Loop Reactor Equipment Type = Vessel/Tank Equipment Location = Outdoors Date Entry Status or Notes:
	Plant Section or Sub-Area:
	Input Information Min Evalue and Reports Data already exists for this equipment tag in table. Complex Complex Fire & Explosion Index / Chemical Data Input Check Inputs Fire & Explosion Index / Chemical Exposure Index Click OK to overwrite data.
	Equipment Parameter Input Process Conditions Input Save Inputs to Equipment Table Kazards & Consequences OK Cancel Concel Conce Concel Concel Conce
	Plant Layout Input Reaction Input and Evaluation Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded Relief Effluent Screening For Loop Reactor, "OK"
	Input Guidance Information LOPA Menu > Pool Fire Evaluation Input Data Sufficient to Proceed with Analysis
	Slide - 15



CPS r for Chemical Proces	s Safety			Risk A Case	nalysis S e Study -	creening - Phillips	To Pet	ol ro	(R le	RA un	S1 n	Г)				
Creensho Ocus on	ot of Scenar the "Loss Ev	io List s /ent" co	suggested t blumn "Drai	by the potent n or Vent Lea	ial scenaric ak."	os in the RA	ST	Lib	rar	y.						
<< Go To Main M	enu	Suggeste	ed Scenarios from	the RAST Library		1	Potential Outcome / Tolerable Prequency				erieq	uency	Go To Scen	ario Results >		
Update List Create User Scenario	Evaluation No Plant Section = Equipment Type = Vessel/T Equipment Tag = Loop Rea	ank tor	Rouse Lensign Intent Summary. Chlorine Rail Carls a Tani. Truck/Rail Carl Tole containing Chlorine that opera C and 8 bar. The volume is 17300 gal with a maximum adovable working pre 375 psi. The maximum field or flow rate is 0 kg/min.			Scenarios in gray were suggested to be excluded for reason noted under Scenario Comments Study Team should review aach to determine if excluding from Filsk	Toxic Release Toxic Release	oxic Release	e or Fireball	oud Explosion	explosion ent Explosion	Damage or Busin mental Damage	Update Input	It this worksheet		
	Session Date:	3/20/2020	Session Participants:	RAST Administrator		Analysis is appropriate.	-Site	oor T	emica sh Fir	oor Cl	uipme	perty	Save Input to	Equipment Table		
OPA Menu Filters: Scenario Type	Scenario Comments	Parameters and Deviati *	Initiating Event (Cau 🛫	Initiating Event Description	Loss Event	Outcome	uo v	4 To:	▲ Ch	< Vaj	• Eq.	< Ent	Existing Salegua	Recommend	ations	Further Analysis
Drain or Vent Valve Open	Drain or Vent Valve left open following infrequent maintenance, purging or cleaning	Flow-Loss of Containment	Human Failure Action more than once per quarter	Operator leaves Drain or Vent Open following unloading or clean-out	Drain or Vent Leak	Chemical Exposure, Flash Fire or Fireball, Vapor Cloud Explosion	,		4 6	6						Yes
	Chemical comply				Vapor Relief Vent - Fire	Flash Fire or Fireball, Vapor Cloud Explosion				Sel	ect	"Ye	s" for		"0-	
xcessive Heat Input - Pool Fire Exposure	vaporizes upon relea. such that no liquid pool is formed	-High	IEF=2 pending more detailed evaluation	ceak of Hammable Material or Material above its Flash Point which may ignite	Fouriement Punking at	Flach Fire or Firehold		+	F	urt	ner	An	aiysis	Equipr	nent T	e to able"
		This su applies	uggested scer s to this case s	nario study	Fire Conditions	Equipment Explosion			6		6					

AnA DhE Technology Alliance	Risk Analysis Screening Tool (RAST) Case Study – Phillips Petroleum	
Once saved to Equi Equipment Input, t	ment Table, return to Main Menu for results by selecting en Main Menu.	
< LOPA Menu Load Selected	Update Scenarios for Equipment Loaded Loop Reactor Industry Clear Equipment Table Go to Equipment Industry Go To Scenario Results >	
To modify information, select a cell in row to be	ated and int "Load Selected" button	
Equipment Tag	Input Status Equipment Description Date Input Last Saved Plant Sector #8/ID Number Equipment Type Personnel Elevation of Elevation of Nearest Inmediate Nearest Work Area Units	
Loop Reactor	Vessel/Tank Yes m	
·	<< Go To Main Menu Equipment Input	
	Select Equipment Input	le .
	ent Identification: Loop Reador Equipment Type: Vessel/Tank Location: Outdoors	
	Select Main Menu	Slide - 18



















ChE Tachno kgy Allance PSS mik al Process Safety	RAS Case S	T Results Compari tudy – Phillips Petr	son roleum	
Proper	ty Damage Table (NFPA)			
Overpressure (psi)	Building	Damage		
0.15	Typical pressure for g	lass failure		
1-2	Failure of wood siding	g; partial demolition		
> 10	Probable total destru	ction		
> 30	Steel towers blown de	own		
RAST Est	imates for the Vapor Clo	oud Explosion (VCE)]
		Distance	Overpressure	1
		1/2 Mile (800 m)	0.8 psi	1
Significant property	damage within 250 ft	250 ft (75 m)	> 10 psi	

















Slide - 36