





Accumulation of small changes leads to an explosion November 2018


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Messages for Manufacturing Personnel

In September 2012, at an industrial site in Himeji, Japan, a 70 cu m (18,500 US gal) fixed roof acrylic acid (AA) tank exploded, and a fire followed. There was one fatality, a fire-fighter. 36 people were injured -2 policemen, 24 fire-fighters, and 10 plant workers. The tank was destroyed and nearby facilities were significantly damaged (Photo 1). There were no major impacts to the neighborhood and environment.

The tank provided intermediate storage between two distillation columns for purifying AA. Originally the tank had been used at full capacity. The contents were cooled and mixed by pumping from the bottom of the tank to the top. Later, the normal operating level was reduced to a level below the cooling coil. The contents were no longer recirculated to the top of the tank, but instead to a nozzle near the bottom that was also used to connect a level gauge (Drawing 2).

At the time of explosion, the plant was conducting a test of the downstream distillation column, which required stopping feed from this tank. The level of the tank gradually increased to its original operating level. Without recycle to the top of the tank, the AA above the cooling coils was not mixed and cooled. The temperature of the incoming AA was believed to be below the onset temperature for polymerization, and the AA contained polymerization inhibitor. However, the temperature in the tank increased, especially at the top. The tank eventually over pressurized and exploded.



Reference: Nippon Shokubai Co., Ltd. Himeji Plant Explosion and Fire at Acrylic Acid Production Facility Investigation Report March 2013.

What happened?

- Originally the pipe feeding the tank was hot water jacketed to provide freeze protection, but this was changed to steam.
- ▶ Removal of a steam trap made temperature control unreliable.
- The top layer was no longer mixed with cooler AA, and stayed warm from incoming AA.
- There are two exothermic AA self-reactions dimerization and polymerization. Polymerization inhibitor does not stop the dimerization reaction. Experiments showed that heat from dimerization raised the temperature sufficiently to start a runaway polymerization reaction.
- The hazard of heat from dimerization was not recognized, so recirculation to the top of tank was not resumed.
- The tank had no temperature indicator. The first indication of a problem was observation of AA vapors escaping from the top vent on the tank.

What can you do?

- Never make any changes to your plant, even changes you think are small, without following your plant Management of Change (MOC) procedures.
- When you see any change in your plant, ask if there has been an MOC review. If there has been, and you were not informed of the change, tell your supervisor. You should always be informed of changes in your plant that impact your job.
- If something is different from normal operation, confirm operating procedures or ask your supervisor what to do.
- Accumulation of small changes can cause an incident with a big consequence. All small changes must be identified and the risk to the total system analyzed and adequately managed.

Small changes can cause a big consequence!

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