(181e) Investigation Findings and Lessons Learned from the 2012 MSC Flaminia Explosion and FIRE

On July 14, 2012, an explosion and ensuring fire significantly damaged the container ship MSC Flaminia hat was transporting cargo from the United States to Europe. The vessel was first loaded in New Orleans 14 days prior to the incident and had made subsequent port calls to finish cargo loading, where it began its transatlantic voyage on July 8, 2012, with over 4,800 containers stowed on and below deck. Early on the morning of July 14, smoke alarms began to sound in cargo hold no. 4 and a white cloud was visible emanating from the hold. The crew incorrectly assumed that there was a fire in hold no. 4, hence began CO₂extinguishing activities and ultimately entered hold no. for further firefighting activities. Their activities likely initiated an explosion that killed three crew members and resulted in a subsequently fire that damaged thousands of containers.

All parties agreed that the incident was caused by a runaway condition from the auto-polymerization of 80% grade of divinylbenzene (DVB80) that was contained in ISO-containers within hold no. 4. DVB80 is a monomer that can exothermically form a polymer and the energy generated by this reaction can rapidly increase the polymerization rate (self-promoting and auto-accelerating), until it can no longer be controlled, or runaway occurs. Inhibitors in conjunction with dissolved oxygen are added to DVB80 to prevent this auto-polymerization. This paper presents the results of an extensive investigation into whether the runaway was cause by insignificant oxygenation during DVB80 manufacture or was it caused by the storage conditions at the port and on the ship.