


# REFLECTING ON THE PAST, ENVISIONING THE FUTURE: A VISION 20/20 PRIMER


## Process Safety Management Mentoring (PSM<sup>2</sup>) Forum

Jack McCavit, Staff Consultant, CCPS

Cheryl Grounds, VP Process Safety, BP



# Vision 20/20



# Committed Culture



**EVENT DATE** January 28, 1984



**NASA Challenger**

<b>Country</b>	USA
<b>Location</b>	Florida
<b>Unit Type</b>	Space Shuttle
<b>Material</b>	Rocket Fuel
<b>Event</b>	Explosion
<b>Cause</b>	O-ring failure
<b>Fatalities</b>	7

“The [Rogers] Presidential Commission concluded that ***the NASA organization contributed*** to the technical failures attributing the controversial decision to launch to a flawed decision making process.”

“A separate report by the US House of Representatives ***did lay blame with managers***, without naming individuals, suggesting that they were unqualified for the positions they held.”

From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”

In a **Committed Culture**, executives involve themselves personally, managers and supervisors drive excellent execution every day, and all employees maintain a sense of vigilance and vulnerability.



An AIChE Technology Alliance  
**CPS**  
 Center for Chemical Process Safety

# Committed Culture



**EVENT DATE** February 1, 2003



**NASA Columbia**

<b>Country</b>	USA
<b>Location</b>	Texas/Louisiana
<b>Unit Type</b>	Space Shuttle
<b>Material</b>	-
<b>Event</b>	Disintegration
<b>Cause</b>	Wing damage
<b>Fatalities</b>	7

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) “also examined similarities between the Columbia accident and the accident that occurred to Challenger some 17 years earlier. In the case of Challenger all of the **arguments were made before lift off**, in the case of Columbia **they were made after the launch**. However, in both cases, **each decision in the long chain of argument**, taken by itself, did not appear to be influencing flight safety at that time. In retrospect, the cumulative effect was fatal.”


From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”

In a **Committed Culture**, executives involve themselves personally, managers and supervisors drive excellent execution every day, and all employees maintain a sense of vigilance and vulnerability.



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# Vibrant Management Systems



**EVENT DATE** April 20, 2010



**Transocean Deepwater Horizon**

<b>Country</b>	USA
<b>Location</b>	Gulf of Mexico
<b>Unit Type</b>	Drilling Rig
<b>Material</b>	Oil
<b>Event</b>	Blowout
<b>Cause</b>	Barrier failure
<b>Fatalities</b>	11

## API RP 75 –

*Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities*

In October 2015, the original **SEMS rule**, as known as the **Workplace Safety Rule**, made the previously voluntary practices in the API RP 75 **mandatory for all offshore oil and gas operations in federal waters**.

In June 2015, the revised **SEMS II rule** became effective.

From BSSE's "SEMS Fact Sheet"

**Vibrant Management Systems** are engrained throughout the organization. Vibrant systems readily adapt to the organization's varying operations and risks.



# Disciplined Adherence to Standards



**EVENT DATE** October 23, 1989



<b>Country</b>	USA
<b>Location</b>	Pasadena, Texas
<b>Unit Type</b>	Reactor
<b>Material</b>	Polyethylene
<b>Event</b>	Explosion/Fire
<b>Cause</b>	Open valve
<b>Fatalities</b>	23


“The company’s **corporate safety procedures** and **standard industry practice** require back up protection in the form of a double valve, which can be locked in the closed position with the intervening space vented, or line blind inserted between flanges whenever a process line connected to operating plant in opened. However, at Phillips Pasadena, **a local plant safety procedure for this work was in place** that did not require this form of back up to be used.”

From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”

**Disciplined Adherence to Standards** means using recognized design, operations, and maintenance standards. These standards are followed every time, all the time, and are continually improved.



# Intentional Competency Development



**EVENT DATE** August 6, 2012



**Chevron Richmond Refinery**


<b>Country</b>	USA
<b>Location</b>	Richmond, CA
<b>Unit Type</b>	Crude Distillation
<b>Material</b>	Diesel
<b>Event</b>	Fire
<b>Cause</b>	CUI
<b>Fatalities</b>	0

“As the firefighters were removing the sheathing of the 4-sidecut line, white hydrocarbon vapor visibly began to emerge from under the now-exposed insulation material. The firefighters ***continued to remove the sheathing despite the formation of hydrocarbon vapor.***”

“***Directed by the operations personnel,*** the Chevron Fire Department sprayed the insulation with hard, straight streams using the fire hoses in an attempt to knock the insulation off the pipe.”


From CSB’s Final Investigation Report on Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire

**Intentional Competency Development** ensures that all employees who impact process safety are fully capable of meeting the technical and behavioral requirements for their jobs.



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# Enhanced Application & Sharing of Lessons Learned



**EVENT DATE** March 6, 1987



**Herald of Free Enterprise**

<b>Country</b>	Belgium
<b>Location</b>	Zeebrugge
<b>Unit Type</b>	Ferry
<b>Material</b>	-
<b>Event</b>	Capsize
<b>Cause</b>	Water ingress
<b>Fatalities</b>	193


“Sailing with the bow or stern doors open had happened at least five times before, but the ships masters ***had not been made aware of these incidents*** by the shore management. These should have been identified as high potential near misses and investigated accordingly. Had this happened, then perhaps remote indicator lights showing door status may have been fitted some time previously.”

From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”


**Enhanced Application & Sharing of Lessons Learned** communicates critical knowledge in a focused manner that satisfies the thirst for learning.



# Harmonization of Global Standards



**EVENT DATE** December 3, 1984




“A **competitor plant** that used MIC as an intermediate integrated the operation of the MIC and downstream plant so there was no inter-plant storage – all MIC produced was immediately used to manufacture the final product.”

“This incident also raised questions on **application of industry standards** in countries where Local Authorities are not applying much scrutiny.”

From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”

**Harmonization of Global Standards** for the safe design, operation, and maintenance of equipment streamlines practices, eliminates redundancy, and cooperatively addresses emerging issues.

<b>Country</b>	India
<b>Location</b>	Bhopal
<b>Unit Type</b>	Reactor
<b>Material</b>	MIC
<b>Event</b>	Toxic Release
<b>Cause</b>	Exothermic rxn
<b>Fatalities</b>	3,787 to 20,000+



# Enhanced Stakeholder Knowledge



EVENT DATE April 17, 2013



West Fertilizer Company

Country	USA
Location	West, Texas
Unit Type	Storage/Retail
Material	Ammonium Nitrate
Event	Explosion
Cause	Warehouse fire
Fatalities	15

“CSB determined *that lack of knowledge and understanding* of [Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate] detonation hazards at the [West Fertilizer Company] facility contributed to the emergency responder fatalities.”


“...CSB found that *none of the firefighter HAZMAT field training courses provide sufficient information* on firefighter situational awareness and risk assessment that could help them make informed decisions while at the fire scene.”

From CSB’s Final Investigation Report  
on West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion


**Enhanced Stakeholder Knowledge** promotes understanding of risk among all stakeholders, including the public, government, and industry leaders.



# Meticulous Verification



**EVENT DATE** July 6, 1988



**Occidental Piper Alpha**

<b>Country</b>	United Kingdom
<b>Location</b>	North Sea
<b>Unit Type</b>	Pump
<b>Material</b>	Condensate
<b>Event</b>	Explosion
<b>Cause</b>	Blind flange
<b>Fatalities</b>	167

“Occidental Petroleum had carried out regular safety audits of its facilities, but ***they were not performed well.*** Few if any problems were ever identified, including serious issues with corrosion of deluge pipes and spray heads. ***When a major problem was found, it was sometimes just ignored.***”

From “Incidents that Define Process Safety”

**Meticulous Verification** by knowledgeable independent parties helps companies evaluate their process safety programs from an independent perspective.



# Responsible Collaboration



**EVENT DATE** August 1, 2003

## EXECUTIVE ORDER 13650



“The Federal Government has developed and implemented numerous programs aimed at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However, ***additional measures can be taken by executive departments and agencies*** (agencies) with regulatory authority to further improve chemical facility safety and security ***in coordination with owners and operators.***”

From Executive Order 13650 –  
Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security


**Responsible Collaboration** is a cooperative relationship among regulatory and investigative authorities, labor organizations, communities, research institutions, universities, and industries.

**For more information, attend:**  
**Process Safety Spotlight Session**  
on Executive Order 13650 –  
Improving Chemical Facility  
Safety and Security: An Update  
10:15 AM-11:45 AM  
GRB: 362 A, B, D & E



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# Vision 20/20



# References

- Atherton, John, and Frederic Gil. *Incidents that Define Process Safety*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., April 2008.
- SEMS Fact Sheet*. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. Web. 9 March 2016.
- U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. *Final Investigation Report – Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire*. January 2015.
- U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. *Final Investigation Report – West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion*. Report 2013-02-I-TX. January 2016.

